The Petersburg Campaign

The Destruction Of The Weldon Railroad

Deep Bottom, Globe Tavern, And Reams Station

August 14-25, 1864

John Horn

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

2nd Edition

John Horn

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DEDICATION

To Mrs. Helen M. McDonough, my wife's grandmother, born Helen Lee Mulcaha, granddaughter of Thomas Mulcaha, who came from Ireland to Mobile, Alabama in 1856, found employment as a farmhand in Yazoo County, Mississippi by 1860, enlisted in the Twelfth Regiment Mississippi Infantry in 1861, and married Miss Susan Bacon at Dinwiddie Court House, Virginia, on November 29, 1864.

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PREFACE

The battles that took place around Petersburg in August of 1864 have not received the attention that they deserve. Fought during the crisis of morale in the North, they displayed Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant at the height of his generalship and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia at the peak of its qualitative superiority. Grant's Fourth Offensive, which gave rise to the August battles, ranks as the longest and amongst the two bloodiest of Grant's nine offensives during the Petersburg campaign.

The August battles around Petersburg have suffered neglect because they occurred between the Battle of the Crater and the fall of Atlanta. Yet the Fourth Offensive adhered to the same basic plan that resulted in the Battle of the Crater. The Fourth Offensive also contributed to the fall of Atlanta by preventing the Confederate government from detaching troops from Virginia and sending them to assist in the defense of Atlanta. The fall of Atlanta proved decisive to President Abraham Lincoln's reelection and fatal to the prospect of Southern independence.

The author hopes that this book will heighten interest in the August battles around Petersburg and in the Petersburg campaign as a whole, the longest, bloodiest campaign of the American Civil War.

CHAPTER 1

The War At Its Crisis

At the beginning of August, 1864, the fortunes of the United States of America stood near their low water mark. Those fortunes manifested themselves in the price of gold on the New York Stock Exchange. Traditionally, the price of gold has furnished a pitiless, impartial, inverse index of faith in the established order — the higher the price of gold, the less the faith. On July 11th, 1864, as Lieutenant General Jubal A. Early led a rebel infantry corps into the suburbs of Washington, D.C., the price of gold reached its wartime high and the price of a dollar in United States currency reached its wartime low.[1]

The Confederacy had withstood the onslaughts of the two major Union army groups. The appalling casualties suffered by Union troops from the beginning of May until the end of July, more than 84,000 in Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant's army group alone, seemed in vain. President of the United States Abraham Lincoln encountered threats of forcible resistance when, on July 18th, he called for a draft of 500,000 more men. At the request of Congress, he declared August 4th a day of national fasting, humiliation and prayer.

Grant, general-in-chief of Federal forces, had failed to take Richmond. Gloom and disgust prevailed among his officers and men in the aftermath of the fiasco at the Battle of the Crater on July 30th.

Major General William T. Sherman had failed to take Atlanta. In a series of battles, skirmishes and raids lasting from July 20th until August 6th, rebel General John B. Hood had halted Sherman's infantry and decimated his cavalry in their efforts to cut the last railroads into the city.[2]

Rear Admiral David G. Farragut's victory in the Battle of Mobile Bay, on August 5th, 1864, started the price of gold on a decline that it would continue until the end of the month. Though reassuring to the financial community, success at Mobile Bay provided little consolidation to the Northern electorate for the failures at Richmond and Atlanta.[3]

General Robert E. Lee's detachment of Early from the Army of Northern Virginia had paid rich dividends. Much as Major General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson had done in 1862, Early had cleared the Shenandoah Valley of Federal troops, diverted reinforcements from the Union command threatening Richmond and shaken the United States War Department's confidence in its general-in-chief's strategy.[4]

Lee wanted more than this, however. He wanted to raise the Siege of Petersburg and relieve Richmond. The War's heretofore master psychologist pinned his hopes on the effect that he supposed Early's threat to the Northern capital would have on the command beleaguering Petersburg. As Grant believed in overwhelming numbers, Lee reasoned to his staff, detachment of sufficient force to protect Washington from Early would so reduce Grant's strength that he would withdraw from Petersburg altogether.[5]

The indirect strategy of the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia seemed on the verge of the same success that it had produced in 1862. On the night of July 30th, 1864, after receiving news that Early had crossed the Potomac into Union territory again, Grant sent the following telegram to Major General George G. Meade, the commander of the Army of the Potomac: "Get all the heavy artillery in the lines about Petersburg moved back to City Point as early as possible." Then the general-in-chief added ominously: "It is by no means improbable the necessity will arise for sending two more corps there."[6] This message indicates exactly how close to success Lee's strategy came. Many on both sides, including knowledgeable observers in high places, expected that Lee would soon march his entire army into Union territory again.[7]

Panicky Republican politicians clamored for a new convention and for President Lincoln to step aside for a candidate who could win in the November election.[8] More level-headed Republicans pressured Lincoln to abandon abolition as a stated condition of peace and to insist upon the Union alone as peace's condition.[9] As staunchly Republican a newspaper as the New York 'Times' criticized Lincoln for not negotiating with the commissioners whom President of the Confederate States Jefferson Davis had sent to Niagara Falls in order to take advantage of Northern war weariness by proposing a peace conference.[10] With Major General John C. Fremont running as a radical Republican candidate and threatening to split the Republican vote, the Democrats indulged themselves in optimism.[11]

Just as in 1862, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and chief of staff Major General Henry W. Halleck cracked under the strain. In their obsession with Washington's vulnerability, they ordered Major General David Hunter, the Union commander in the Shenandoah Valley, back and forth so many times that he soon lost contact with the enemy.[12] The back-biting Halleck criticized Grant for moving south of the James River and not keeping his command interposed between Richmond and Washington.[13] Halleck also urged Grant to withdraw troops from his command and send them north to enforce the draft against expected reistance, ending the dispatch which contained this suggestion with the remark: "Are not the appearances such that we ought to take in sail and prepare the ship for a storm?"[14]

Lincoln and Grant, however, kept their heads. Their resolve accounted for the difference between 1862, when Lee had driven Union forces from the gates of Richmond and carried the war into the North, and 1864, when Lee remained pinned down in defense of his capital.[15] Both the President and the general-in-chief realized the extremity of the South and that the Confederacy's only hope lay in a change of Federal administrations.[16]

As general-in-chief, Grant had the virtue of never losing sight of the overall view. He considered the Federal armies a team, and he wanted them to apply continuous pressure on their respective fronts in order to prevent the enemy from concentrating against any particular army.[17] The general-in-chief believed that a withdrawal from the James would insure Sherman's defeat by allowing the Confederates to shift forces from Virginia to Georgia for a repetition of Chickamauga.[18]

President Lincoln, who had more nerve than any of his advisers, played his part by sustaining Grant against them.[19] The bond between these two men withstood even the tension created by those who thought Grant a stronger presidential candidate than Lincoln and wanted the President to step aside in favor of the general-in-chief.[20]

Before Early had burned Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, on July 30th, Grant had resisted even Lincoln's request that he come north in person in order to rectify the situation in the Shenandoah. The general-in-chief had thought that his departure from the Petersburg trenches would signify a loss of faith in the strategy that had taken him south of the James. Early's second incursion into Northern territory had such serious repercussions, though, that during the first week of August Grant finally yielded to the President.[21]

Fears for the safety of the capital had on the evening of July 30th forced Grant to order from his army group to the Shenandoah an infantry division and a cavalry division.[22] That he had intended the cavalry division to accompany three other cavalry divisions and an infantry corps on a raid down the Petersburg Railroad (commonly called the Weldon Railroad because it connected Petersburg with Weldon, North Carolina) planned for the following day added to his displeasure, even though he had already suspended the plan for other reasons.[23] At a conference with President Lincoln at Fortress Monroe on July 31st, the general-in-chief and the president decided to deal with this crisis — perhaps the crisis of the war — not by abandoning the Siege of Petersburg, but by putting under a single commander the field forces of all four of the Shenandoah's military departments. On August 2nd, Grant sent to the Shenandoah Major General Philip H. Sheridan to take command of all the troops in the field there. Grant directed Sheridan to pursue the enemy to the death.[24]

Halleck's quibbling over this order exhausted Lincoln's patience.

The President insisted upon Grant's personal presence in the vicinity of Washington not so much to protect the capital as to get the Federal forces in the Shenandoah moving aggressively after Early. Lincoln wanted in charge a general, not a bureaucrat.[25]

Hastening by boat and train to Monocacy Station, Grant laid the foundation for September's Union victories in the Shenandoah by removing Hunter and placing Sheridan in departmental as well as field command, then reinforcing Sherdian with another cavalry division from the Union army group threatening Richmond, and finally putting Sheridan in command of a new military division that comprised his own department as well as three others.[26] For the moment, however, Sheridan remained untested as an independent commander and uncharacteristically hesitant in the face of exaggerated reports of Early's strength.[27]

Lee quickly perceived that Grant had sent reinforcements to the Shenandoah. In order to protect Early, Lee on August 6th dispatched to Culpeper Court House Kershaw's Division of the First Corps and Fitzhugh Lee's Division of cavalry, both under Lieutenant General Richard H. Anderson. Lee ordered Anderson to thwart any enemy move across the Blue Ridge into the Shenandoah by threatening Washington.[28]

On August 7th, Lieutenant Colonel John C. Pemberton prepared to implement a plan that he and President Davis had formulated to drive the Federals from their bridgehead at Deep Bottom. Vanquished at Vicksburg, the northern-born former lieutenant general served as a lieutenant colonel of artillery in the Department of Richmond because no Confederate unit warranting a higher-ranking commander would serve under him. Pemberton planned to bring the pontoon bridges linking Deep Bottom with Bermuda Hundred under the fire of enough artillery to force the abandonment of the bridgehead. He intended for heavy artillery to enfilade the brigades, while rifle fieldpieces at Tilghman's Gate created a crossfire. A number of problems arose in implementing the plan, however. A shortage of mortars illustrative of the immense difference between Northern and Southern industrial capacities required him to supplement the two 10-inch mortars available with four 8-inch howitzers placed with their trails sunk to give the necessary elevation. Furthermore, Pemberton feared that his men might find it impracticable to position the relatively short-ranged howitzers close enough to the pontoon bridges to render them effective. Finally, despite the importance of opening fire as soon as possible, a shortage of transportation that provided another illustration of the difference between Northern and Southern production condemned the plan to a delay — General Lee's artillerists at Petersburg had a prior claim on the use of the sole serviceable mortar sling cart in the department.[29]

Returning to City Point on August 9th, Grant narrowly escaped death

at the hands of a Confederate saboteur who placed a time-bomb aboard a Federal ordnance boat. The blast, which occurred shortly before noon on the day of Grant's return, killed 43 and wounded 126.[30] Shells, shot, bullets, timber fragments and even saddles rained down on Grant's headquarters in Appomattox Manor. Grant demonstrated his mettle on this occasion. Alone of all those present, the general-in-chief moved toward the scene of the explosion.[31]

On August 10th, the commander of the Army of the James, Major General Benjamin F. Butler (hereinafter referred to as "Butler") sent a detachment to begin work on a canal at Dutch Gap, a few miles upriver from Deep Bottom. He intended to open up the James to Union ironclads.[32] Discovering the excavation, the rebels prepared to bring the workmen under fire from field artillery and the gunboats of the Confederate Navy's James River Flotilla.[33] Butler's project would eventually result in today's main ship channel to Richmond — but not until April, 1865, after its success or failure had ceased to make a difference to the outcome of the War.[34]

On August 11th, Lee appointed Major General Wade Hampton commander of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia and dispatched Hampton with (Brigadier General Matthew C.) Butler's Division of cavalry to join Anderson at Culpeper Court House on the 15th.[35]

Between August 8th and August 11th, reports had arrived at City Point that several divisions of the Army of Northern Virginia had left the Petersburg front en route to join Early in the Shenandoah or Hood at Atlanta.[36] By August 12th, Grant had determined that Lee had reinforced Early with two or three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry. In order to force Lee to recall these troops, Grant immediately began to issue directives for another offensive.[37]

Early on August 13th, the Rockbridge Battery of light artillery on Signal Hill, Poague's Artillery Battalion on Proctor's Creek ridge and Confederate rams on the James River below Chaffin's Bluff opened a severe crossfire on the Federals at Dutch Gap. The Water Battery at the northern terminus of the Union Bermuda Hundred lines and Federal gunboats near Jones' Neck on the James River replied. Firing had almost ceased by noon, and the Confederate had failed to force the Federals at Dutch Gap to stop digging.[38]

At about 3 p.m., Pemberton's mortars at the foot of New Market Heights and his howitzers almost half a mile closer to the river finally opened fire on the Federal pontoon bridges at Deep Bottom. A section of Parrott rifles at the Pottery, where the New Market and Malvern Hill Road crossed Bailey's Creek, joined in with Pemberton's heavy guns. The Confederates failed to fine the range on the pontoon bridges and soon received the attention of the Federal gunboats, which commenced an ac-

curate fire upon the rebel lines.[39]

On the same day, Grant finally authorized the return of his heavy artillery to the front from Broadway Landing, where a subordinate had diverted it on July 30th. The Federal general-in-chief also received information that Butler's Division of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia had departed the Petersburg front for the Shenandoah. A rumor circulated that Lee's entire army, except for Pickett's Division, had orders to go north.[40]

Though otherwise in good health, Grant's armies roasted in the Petersburg trenches during the extraordinary spell of hot and dry weather.[41] Many years later, the historian of the 20th Massachusetts described the ordeal:

> The summer of 1864 was one of excessive heat. For forty-five days no rain had fallen and a tropical sun, unveiled by a single cloud, beat down upon the earth. Springs and streams had dried up and nowhere was there a green thing visible. The trees were loaded with a coating of dust that obscured their natural coloring and neutralized everything to a dusty brown. The clayey soil was baked into a hardened mass, but its surface was covered with a fine dust that floated in the air like a mist, and, while it somewhat obscured the brightness of the sun's rays, it made the heat more oppressive and harder to bear. The hot and suffocating nights took from sleep its usual refreshment after the hard labors of the day.[42]

Used up in the Overland campaign and during the opening assault on Petersburg, the Army of the Potomac lacked the enthusiasm and elan necessary to turn numerical or positional advantages into victory.[43] Battle casualties of over 70,000 killed, wounded and missing, as well as detachments, desertion, disease and expiring enlistments, had reduced it from about 120,000 men at the beginning of May to about 52,000 at the end of July despite over 55,000 replacements, most of them poor in quality.[44] Its commander, in a letter to his wife on July 23rd, said: "The army would hail an honorable peace with delight, and I do believe, if the question was left to those who do the fighting, an honorable peace would be made in a few hours."[45]

The smaller Army of the James had suffered a far lower percentage of losses during the months of May, June and July and remained a proportionately more effective fighting force than the Army of the Potomac. More than 13,000 battle casualties, in addition to desertion, disease and expiring enlistments, had reduced it from about 40,000 men at the beginning of May to about 33,000 by the end of July in spite of numerous replacements.[46]

Opposite the Federals, Lee's men also suffered from the extreme heat. Detachments, desertion, disease and about 35,000 battle casualties had reduced the components of Lee's army group at Petersburg from an initial strength of around 100,000 at the beginning of May to about 55,000 just before Butler's Division departed for Culpeper Court House.[47] Lee received too few replacements to permit himself the luxury of complaining about anything other than their quantity.[48] Lean but healthy from a skimpy yet balanced diet, the rebels remained in high morale and determined to keep the enemy out of Richmond. On August 6th, the surgeon of the 13th Regiment South Carolina Volunteers wrote to his wife: "I am willing to do anything to whip out the Yankees."[49]

The Confederates enjoyed no more immunity from internal political strife than did the Federals. A pro-war but anti-administration faction and an outright peace-at-any-price faction bedeviled the Confederate government in the same way that their Northern counterparts bedeviled Lincoln's government.[50] A bitter controversy raged throughout the South over President Davis's removal of General Joseph E. Johnston from the command of the army defending Atlanta.[51] The rebels also suffered from material wants unknown in the North, though prices in Richmond had begun to fall and the value of Confederate currency overseas had begun to rise.[52]

By August 13th, Field's Division of the First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia had received orders to prepare to march to Culpeper Court House.[53]

Grant beat Lee to the punch, however. The Federal general-in-chief's fourth offensive of the Petersburg campaign began that night.[54]


Richmond &
Fredericksburg R.R.
Virginia
Central R.R.
RICHMOND
Nine Mile Road
York River R.R.
Williamsburg Road
Richmond &
Danville R.R.
Manchester
Charles City Road
White Oak
Swamp
Chickahominy
River
White's
Tavern
Goodman
Fisher
James River
Osborne Turnpike
Darbytown Road
Fisher's
Run
Mrs.
Craddock
Long Bridge Road
New Market Road
Fussell's
Mill
Riddell's
Shop
Richmond &
Petersburg R.R.
"Jennings"
Varina Road
Chaffin's Bluff
Four Mile
Creek
Bailey's
Creek
Gatewood
Drewry's Bluff
Kingsland
Road
Three
Mile
Creek
River Road
Quaker Road
Tilghman
Strawberry
Plains
Dutch Gap
Aiken
Jones
Neck
Malvern
Hill
MAP 1
Richmond And
Deep Bottom

CHAPTER 2

The Second Battle Of Deep Bottom, August 14, 1864

On August 12th, when Grant decided upon an offensive, he chose to implement the same basic plan that had fallen apart on July 30th. That plan had called for Major General Winfield S. Hancock to take a force consisting of two divisions of cavalry under Sheridan, as well as Hancock's own II Corps, north of the James to threaten Richmond. Sheridan and the cavalry would dash toward the rebel capital and the Virginia Central Railroad while the II Corps pushed toward Chaffin's Bluff from Deep Bottom in order to prevent the rebels from cutting off the cavalry from that base. Grant had hoped that this would at least draw a large part of Lee's forces away from the Southside, where the general-in-chief intended to follow up with what he termed a "grand raid" on the Weldon Railroad that would destroy fifteen or twenty miles of track. If Sheridan managed to rip up the Virginia Central Railroad north of Richmond or capture the capital, so much the better.[1]

In July, Grant had no sooner set the plan in motion than he altered it, dropping the projected attack on the Weldon Railroad in order to take advantage of the completion of the Petersburg mine.[2] The plan worked well enough that even after the Battle of the Crater ended in disaster on the morning of July 30th, so many Confederates remained north of the James that at 2 p.m. on the same day Grant ordered an attack on the Weldon Railroad for July 31st. By 5 p.m., however, enough rebels had returned to the Southside that the general-in-chief suspended the attack.[3] The departure of a division of infantry and a division of cavalry to Washington after 10 p.m. that night ruled out lifting the suspension, and Grant's Third Offensive came to an end.[4]

In August, Grant again put Hancock in charge of the expedition to the north side of the James This time Hancock had at his disposal the II Corps, two divisions of the X Corps under Major General David B. Birney (hereinafter referred to as "Birney") and the Second Cavalry Division. The general-in-chief, however, imposed a goal additional to that of laying the foundation for a "grand raid" on the Weldon Railroad by drawing a large portion of Lee's forces from the Southside. Grant wanted to force Lee to recall the troops supposedly sent to Early.[5]

The general-in-chief also added a refinement to the plan. While the X Corps crossed the James on the pontoon bridge above Deep Bottom and the Second Cavalry Division crossed on the pontoon bridge below Deep Bottom, the II Corps would participate in a ruse. Grant ordered the II Corps

to march to City Point and there embark upon steamers which would take the corps down river. He hoped that this would deceive the Confederates into thinking Washington the destination of the movement. This fleet would reverse itself after nightfall, run back up the James to Deep Bottom, throw out gangplanks to the shore and by 5 a.m. disembark the troops, who would then penetrate the line of lulled rebels along Bailey's Creek and push on to the Confederate capital.[6]

The II Corps proceeded to City Point on the afternoon of August 12th and bivouacked there that evening. The men made this movement of about ten miles in excessive heat and over dusty roads. Despite frequent halts and a leisurely pace, cases of sunstroke appeared.[7]

On the 13th, Hancock issued his orders for the operation. He had formulated them with the benefit of the opinion of the commander of the Army of the James that the rebels had fewer than 5,000 infantry north of the James and southeast of Richmond, exclusive of reserve militia. Butler had based his opinion on a detailed estimate from an Army of the James intelligence officer who reported that three Confederate infantry brigades of the seven recently stationed there had departed, presumably for the Shenandoah Valley.[8]

Unfortunately for the Union, none of the rebel infantry north of the James and southeast of Richmond had left. Seven infantry brigades totalling approximately seven thousand men occupied the Confederate trenches from the river to Fussell's Mill on Bailey's Creek. Occupation of this four-mile stretch of line required the Southern commander here, Major General Charles W. Field, to stretch out his men in a single rank at wide intervals. Next to the river, Field had a two-brigade detachment of Wilcox's Division under Brigadier General James Conner. Field's Division under Brigadier General John Gregg (hereinafter referred to as "John Gregg") occupied the works from the Deep Bottom Road on Conner's left to Fussell's Mill. Gary's Brigade of cavalry protected the left of the Confederate infantry. The Hampton Legion of this brigade picketed from the James River to the Charles City Road while the 24th Virginia Cavalry guarded the extreme rebel left at Bottom's Bridge and the 7th South Carolina Cavalry remained in camp at Gatewood's farm about a mile east of Fussell's Mill.[9]

Hancock planned to drive the Confederates from their nearly impregnable position atop New Market Heights behind Bailey's Creek by turning the rebel left flank.[10] He had employed the same plan unsuccessfully in July.[11] His orders called for the Second Cavalry Division, under Brigadier General David M. Gregg (hereinafter referred to as "Gregg"), to cross the James to Strawberry Plains on the lower pontoon bridge at nightfall. The X Corps would cross the upper pontoon bridge at midnight, except for its First Division's Third Brigade, which already oc-

cupied the Deep Bottom entrenchments. The II Corps would finish disembarking at Deep Bottom by daybreak. The Third Division would disembark first, followed by the Second Division and then the First Division.[12]

The commander of the II Corps wanted his Third Division, under Brigadier General Gershom Mott, to move up the New Market and Malvern Hill Road and drive the Confederates into their fortifications across Bailey's Creek. The Second and First Divisions, under Major General Francis A. Barlow, would move to the Third Division's right, assault the rebels across Bailey's Creek about half a mile below Fussell's Mill and clear the Southerners from the front of the Third Division, which would then advance up the New Market Road. Birney's X Corps would attack the rebel position behind Four Mile Creek as early as daybreak. If successful, Birney would proceed up the Kingsland Road to the Varina Road and beyond. The cavalry would cover first Mott's and then Barlow's right. As soon as the infantry had cleared the way to the Darbytown Road (sometimes called the Central Road) and the Charles City Road, Gregg would head for the Virginia Central Railroad and Richmond.[13]

At noon on August 13th, the infantry of the II Corps began filing onto the streamers. By 7:30 p.m., the men had all embarked. The steamers departed from City Point at 10 p.m. They stopped at about midnight, having dropping down the James about five miles. Then the fleet reversed course and headed upriver toward Deep Bottom. Having looked forward to seeing Washington again, the men felt disappointed. To make matters worse, the suffocating heat and, in the words of Hancock's aide-de-camp, "infernally tormenting" mosquitoes, made sleep or rest impossible.[14]

The men of the II Corps never forgot that night — or the following day.[15]

The men of the X Corps also spent an unpleasant night on the 13th. That morning they had received orders to prepare to move out early on the morning of August 14th. The high command had taken such care to conceal Grant's plan and to make Washington appear the destination of the movement that a rumor developed that the X Corps would soon depart for the capital or the Shenandoah. Most of the men looked with approval upon the anticipated change of scenery, preferring the wide open spaces of "the Valley" to the trenches of Deep Bottom and Bermuda Hundred.[16] By the following morning, however, the depressing truth about their destination had dawned upon them. A picket from the 11th Maine later wrote:

> In the night, a sultry one, with little air stirring anywhere, none at all in the woods, so that we of the picket line were all restless and wakeful from the heat, we could hear the rumble of artillery wagons crossing the bridges from the south shore, and the trampling of a host of cavalry horses as they took the same

road. We could not tell by which bridge they were crossing. The sound was evidently deadened by hay that had been strewed over the bridges, but still the dull roar of artillery wheels and the clattering of iron-shod hoofs came clearly to our ears, and then after a time there was a continual screeching of boat whistles, indicating that a large number of steamers were gathering along our river front. What it meant we did not really know, but it seemed to many of us as if our dream of a stirring campaign in the Shenandoah Valley was to remain a dream. Still, some sturdily contended for a time that what we were hearing was but the arrival of a relieving force. But as the artillery rolled, and the horses trampled, and the whistles blew, it became plain to these even that the crossing force was much too large for a mere relieving one. There could be one other meaning — for we knew the signs of the times — and we went to sleep, those that did sleep, with the firm conviction that when we woke it would be to fall into line to learn what sort of soldiers occupied the rebeldom in our immediate front.[17]

An unusual amount of straggling prevailed among those brigades which had to cross the James. Believing their immediate destination Bermuda Hundred, where they would embark upon transports, many men unable to endure a march had reported themselves fit for duty. Such men quickly fell out as a result of exhaustion or the realization of their actual destination, depriving some units of as much as a quarter of their initial strength.[18]

When the X Corps moved out at sunrise that Sunday morning, it moved toward "rebeldom" and not toward Washington or the Shenandoah. The First Division, under Brigadier General Alfred H. Terry, took the lead. Forming the right of the division, the Third Brigade proceeded up the right bank of Four Mile Creek. The First Brigade, in echelon with its right advanced, formed the division's left. The Second Brigade remained in reserve.[19] Behind the First Division came a provisional division under Brigadier General William Birney (hereinafter referred to as "William Birney"). This division consisted of the Second and Third Brigades of the Second Division of the X Corps, and a previously unattached brigade of United States Colored Troops.[20]

At 3 a.m., Brigadier General Robert A. Foster, the commander of Terry's Third Brigade, had ordered his command to attack at daybreak. From left to right, Foster had in line of battle, preceded by a heavy skirmish line, the 1st Maryland Cavalry (dismounted), the 10th Connecticut, the 11th Maine, and the 100th New York. The Deep Bottom Road bisected the brigade, running between the 10th Connecticut and the 11th Maine.[21] The right of the 100th New York rested as close to Four Mile Creek as the

nature of the ground and the presence of the enemy on the opposite bank would permit, which meant that the brigade often lost contact with the stream.[22] "The ground over which we passed. . .cannot be described," an officer of the 100th New York later wrote. "Brush, briars, swamp, ravines and pits, are but expressions for the surface of this historic soil."[23] Foster had the 24th Massachusetts in reserve behind the 10th Connecticut and the 1st Maryland Cavalry (dismounted). The 24th had its right on the Deep Bottom Road.[24]

Opening fire at 5 a.m., Foster's brigade slowly drove the stubborn skirmishers of Bratton's and Law's Brigades back to the entrenched rebel picket line on the ridge overlooking the Kingsland Road. There the advance halted and for about an hour a firefight raged.[25]

Grant's ruse had failed to deceive the Southerners. They had heard the same sounds as had the Federals of the X Corps and had drawn the same unpleasant conclusion.[26] That night one of the Confederate artillerymen on New Market Heights described in his diary the anticipated transition from tranquility to hostilities:

> A splendid brass band on our right strikes up that holy hymn of ancient days, "Old Hundred," carrying the mind of many a soldier boy back to the days when he sat under the ministry of some favorite pastor, and many a dimmed and glistening eye looked over the field of battle. Clearly through the calm Sabbath morning's air comes the grand melody of that hymn, and as the notes rise higher in praise of that God from whom all blessings flow, they seem to carry a solemn petition to the Throne of Grace for aid in the coming struggle. Hark! — the scene changes. A short distance to our right the sharp ringing notes of the skirmisher's rifle warn us of danger ahead, and men that were but a few moments since religiously thinking of the past now must be heroes in the bloody present and hurry to take up the implements of death.[27]

A member of the II Corps later summed up the reaction of Union soldiers to the failure of Grant's ruse:

> Well, the men felt a good deal like boys who had stolen around and come up to the old farmer's melon patch from the rear and saw the farmer, with a bulldog and shotgun, calmly looking over the fence into their faces and wearing a smile that was not reassuring.[28]

At about 7:15 a.m., a lull developed in the fighting on the front of the X Corps. Foster ordered the 24th Massachusetts to charge, supported by the rest of his command and by the 6th Connecticut, detached from the Second Brigade. With the 10th Connecticut on its left and the 11th Maine

on its right, the 24th Massachusetts broke the entrenched rebel picket line and drove the Confederates to their main works, capturing about eighty Alabamians and South Carolinians. The First Brigade charged on the left of the Third, which overlapped the First. The 85th Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers of the First Brigade found itself behind and ordered to support the 1st Maryland Cavalry (dismounted) of the Third Brigade. The 39th Illinois, the 62nd Ohio and four companies of the 67th Ohio respectively formed the First Brigade's line to the left of the Third Brigade. Due to the refused left of the Federal formation, many Confederate pickets escaped capture.[29]

As the skirmishers of Bratton's and Law's Brigades gave way, the pickets to their right, from McGowan's Brigade of Conner's detachment, withdrew without substantial loss.[30] The pickets to the left and the 8th and 59th Georgia, sent out to support those pickets, from Anderson's Brigade of Field's Division, noticed the Federal breakthrough too late to avoid the loss of about twenty men from the 59th Georgia. The withdrawal of Anderson's pickets and their supports rendered untenable the position of the four eight-inch howitzers that Pemberton had planted almost half a mile in front of the main rebel trenches.[31]

The self-professed Yankees of the 10th Connecticut, 24th Massachusetts and 11th Maine found that the rebels had taken advantage of the lull in the fighting to prepare breakfast. The breakfastless Federals enjoyed the Confederate rations of bread and bacon as the spoils of victory while waiting for their own cooks to arrive with beans and coffee.[32]

Then, with the rebel main works in front of them, the X Corps received an order to halt.[33]

The landing had not gone quite as planned. Familiar with light draft steamers and western rivers, Grant had neglected to consider the very different problem posed by using ocean-going or large river steamers on a tidal river. Of the sixteen vessels employed in the expedition, some drew as much as thirteen feet of water.[34]

A former quartermaster, Hancock had foreseen this problem and had proceeded by tug to Deep Bottom on the morning of the 13th, as soon as he had received his orders. There he ascertained that the banks and the nature of the river bottom would not permit the steamers to disembark his men by means of gangplanks. Finding the ruins of three wharves, he sent his chief of staff on a barge with timber to repair them. Upon returning to City Point that afternoon, Hancock issued his orders to the II Corps for the coming operation. To further facilitate disembarkation, he ordered the horses, wagons, ambulances and artillery to cross the James on the lower pontoon bridge behind the cavalry. He also ordered the steamers to depart City Point at 10 p.m., rather than at midnight as originally contemplated.[35]

The desperate efforts of Hancock and the staff of the II Corps proved too little, too late. They failed to make up for the lack of preparation at army and army group levels. The fleet arrived at low water, at about 2:30 a.m. Most of the steamers could not run close in enough to shore to disembark the men over gangplanks and had to disembark over smaller vessels or the makeshift wharves. The soldiers had difficulty descending from the upper decks of some of the steamers, not adapted to the transportation of troops. One big vessel, carrying 1,200 men from the First Division's Fourth Brigade, ran aground.[36]

"Someone should be punished in this matter," fumed Hancock's aide-de-camp, who supervised the landing.[37]

Only half of the II Corps had landed by 5 a.m., when the X Corps opened fire. Not until 9 a.m. had all but one of the steamers disembarked. The grounded steamer did not disembark her men until almost noon.[38]

At 7:45 a.m., after the last of the Third Division had landed, its commander received orders to move out toward the New Market and Malvern Hill Road crossing of Bailey's Creek.[39] Hancock's assistant adjutant general later wrote: "The rays of the August sun smote the heads of the weary soldiers with blows as palpable as if they had been given with a club."[40] In the intolerable heat, on the dusty roads, sunstroke again began to take its toll. Soon dead and dying men lined the roads. In two small regiments of the Third Division, heat overcame 105 men though only about a mile separated the river bank from their destination.[41] When the Third Division reached the New Market and Malvern Hill Road crossing of Bailey's Creek, its commander found the Confederate position on New Market Heights too formidable to assault.[42]

Barlow's men had to go farther than did Mott's division. The historian of the 152nd New York, in the First Brigade of the Second Division, described the effect of the first half[43] of his regiment's march:

> We advanced two miles from the river, and came to a deep woods, where we halted. The heat was intense, the foliage was withered, and the air was suffocating. A comrade of Company E started in quest of water, carrying seven canteens. The order came to forward, quick step, march. The 152d was the last in line. The men began to drop with sunstroke, the froth foaming from the mouth, many dying in convulsions. Lieut. D. B. Fitch excused the comrade who carried the double load, his own and the water-bearer's, and just in time to save his life. After resting a few moments, he arose to proceed, when he was called back by Leonard Baldwin, the hospital steward, and assisted him in prying open the jaws of a comrade of the 20th Mass., forcing a potion of medicine down his throat. The comrade coming up with the water, we straightened up our patient and proceeded,

counting seven men who had died with the intense heat.[44]

Hancock had intended for Barlow to strike with the greater part of his two divisions by concentrating and not worrying about his flanks, but Barlow dispersed his force by extending from Mott's right.[45] The Second Division, under the command of Colonel Thomas A. Smyth, reached the New Market and Long Bridge Road crossing of Bailey's Creek without opposition at about 11:00 a.m. Barlow detached a brigade of this division to protect his flank.[46] To the right of this brigade, he positioned the brigade-sized 4th Regiment New York Heavy Artillery of the First Division. To the right of the 4th, he dispatched as skirmishers the First Division's First Brigade.[47]

Before noon, Barlow encountered the rebels on the Darbytown Road about half a mile beyond the New Market and Long Bridge Road. A very thin line of Confederate skirmishers, dismounted troopers from the 7th South Carolina Cavalry of Gary's Brigade, occupied a line of rifle pits that crossed the Darbytown Road. Barlow ordered the first unit that arrived, the 2nd New York Heavy Artillery, to take this rebel position.[48] The 2nd formed the extreme right of the First Division's First Brigade. Instead of proceeding as ordered, the 2nd veered off to the left toward the rest of the First Brigade and captured some rifle pits in that direction.[49] Barlow then ordered the Second Brigade, formerly part of the famous Irish Brigade, to take the position. The Second Brigade veered off to the right into the shelter of a wood, taking some rifle pits in that direction. Barlow thought that the once elite soldiers of this brigade "behaved disgracefully."[50]

During this time, Barlow could see Confederate reinforcements arriving at the place where the plan called for him to cross Bailey's Creek.[51] Field had rushed part of Anderson's Brigade and two Napoleons of the 3rd Richmond Howitzers from New Market Heights to the endangered point.[52] Despairing of crossing Bailey's Creek at this place, Barlow ordered the Third and Fourth Brigades of the First Division to move still farther to the rebel left, farther than called for by Hancock's plan.[53]

While the II Corps slogged along the Darbytown Road, the X Corps took cover from rebel guns on New Market Heights and from rebel sharpshooters in a band of woods along Four Mile Creek. Shortly after noon, Birney sent the Third Brigade of the Provisional Division toward the junction of the Kingsland and Varina Roads. The rest of the X Corps waited for orders in the unbearable heat.[54] The historian of the 48th New York, the "Fighting Parson's Regiment" in the Third Brigade of the Provisional Division, later wrote that:

> a most curious effect followed the long exposure to the glaring sun. Many officers as well as non-commissioned officers and privates, succumbed to the heat, and were led or carried to the rear. Some were taken with spasms, and sometimes whole

groups fell together. . .[55]

The Confederates used this respite to withdraw a section of field artillery from the position abandoned by Anderson's Brigade as a result of Birney's morning attack. Pemberton's seacoast howitzers also occupied this untenable position, but Pemberton's guns had no horses, and the Confederates had to leave the howitzers to their fate. On New Market Heights, the rebel gunners braced themselves for a Federal onslaught. To meet Barlow's threats to his left, Field had almost completely stripped this key position of infantry support.[56] Field himself rode up and down the lines puffing freely on his Meerschaum pipe, his countenance exuding confidence.[57]

Early in the afternoon, Grant arrived in person in the immediate rear of Foster's brigade on the Kingsland Road after having visited the II Corps sector in the morning.[58] Grant displayed his usual indifference to danger. The soldiers thought the position too exposed for the general-in-chief of the Federal armies, but he calmly puffed on his inevitable cigar and nonchalantly issued orders. "He looked so inward, and distant," the historian of the 100th New York later wrote, "that a child in the street would hardly dare to ask alms when looking into that face, so blank, but not displeasing."[59]

Shortly after noon, Hancock ordered Birney to proceed with his portion of the plan and take the New Market Road's crossing of Four Mile Creek. The order became garbled in transmission, however, and clarification took additional time.[60] Between 2 and 3 p.m., the 100th New York received an order to charge to the right, clear the woods of Confederate sharpshooters and connect with the Third Division of the II Corps on the lower bank of Four Mile Creek. The 6th Connecticut received orders to support the New Yorkers, while the rest of the division maintained the connection with the 100th by a flank movement to the right. The Second Brigade of the Provisional Division supported Terry's men on the right. The 7th and 9th U.S. Colored Troops of the Provisional Division's Colored Brigade supported the left of Terry's division and took some rebel rifle pits on the Kingsland Road at the cost of about thirty-five men. The rest of the Colored Brigade, the 29th Connecticut Colored Infantry and the 8th U.S. Colored Troops, remained in the entrenchments at Deep Bottom.[61]

The 100th charged across an open field into the woods at the double-quick. The New Yorkers drove the rebels from the woods and across the ravine of Four Mile Creek. Confusion occasioned some delay in the ravine. After taking a few moments to reform, the New Yorkers emerged and drove the Confederate skirmishers from the rifle pits beyond the ravine, capturing the eight-inch howitzers placed there by the luckless Pemberton. With men falling from sunstroke as well as from the fire of six to eight rebel guns on New Market Heights, the 100th then trudged on-

ward, crossed the ravine of Bailey's Creek and established communication with the II Corps.[62] "The noise of bursting shell and cracking limbs would have frightened any other troops," wrote an officer of the 100th, "but the One Hundredth Regiment had been on Morris island, and knew what noises were, compared with which these were only crackers."[63] The 100th had developed this esprit de corps during the previous year's Siege of Charleston, where the Federals had deployed eight-inch Parrott rifles and fifteen-inch Dahlgren smoothbores.[64]

After the linkup with Mott, the X Corps consolidated its position and rested.[65] Foster's brigade, which did most of the fighting in Birney's sector, lost fewer than 150 men during the day.[66]

At about 4 p.m., shortly after the 100th New York had taken Pemberton's guns, Barlow finally prepared to attack again. The Third and Fourth Brigades of the First Division had moved farther to the left of the Confederate position behind Bailey's Creek, to a hill near Fussell's mill pond. The 7th South Carolina Cavalry had withdrawn to the works behind Bailey's Creek, but the rebel line there still seemed very thinly occupied. As Barlow prepared to attack with the Fourth Brigade, however, the section of the 3rd Richmond Howitzers opened fire from near the Mitchell Fussell farm. The men of the Fourth Brigade seemed so cowed and demoralized by this fire that Barlow thought it out of the question to employ them in an attack. He ordered the First Brigade of the Second Division to advance upon the still thinly occupied rebel works at Fussell's Mill.[67]

Colonel George N. Macy, the commander of this brigade, formed his men into two lines behind the crest of the hill. Having just returned from an absence caused by a wound, he led on horseback his brigade of about a thousand men into terrain where no officer could go mounted.

The Confederate works lay across and parallel to Bailey's Creek just below Fussell's Mill. Advancing, the left of Macy's brigade immediately became entangled in a thick wood and proceeded no farther. The right moved over the crest and down the open bluff, where it suffered severely from the repeating rifles of the rebel cavalrymen of Gary's Brigade. The Southerners had hurried into this stretch of the works only moments earlier.[68]

Thick blackberry vines covered the slopes and tripped the Federals as they ran down, making the casualties seem higher. Two ditches ran along the bottom of the ravine, about twenty yards apart. Ten or twenty yards more separated the second ditch from the Confederate line, which occupied the top of a steep slope. On the slope grew underbrush difficult for an individual to penetrate, impossible for a battle line.[69] A survivor in the 152nd New York spoke many years later of "the entangling meshes of the wait-a-bit vine, a natural obstruction, almost equal to the barbed wire

of our present day."[70]

Despite the slope and the vines, the tiny 1st Minnesota Battalion on the extreme right made its way across the dam of Fussell's mill pond and into some empty Confederate works on the other side of Bailey's Creek.[71] Meanwhile, part of Anderson's Brigade had arrived opposite the left of Macy's right.[72] The Federals who reached the top of the slope there received a deadly volley. Many of those who survived this volley surrendered. Rebel fire pinned down others. Those who could retreat recoiled toward the Darbytown Road. The Confederates shot two horses out from under Macy. The second one fell on him and sent him back to the hospital. In the absence of support from its left, the 1st Minnesota Battalion withdrew from the rebel works. The brigade had suffered 188 casualties.[73]

The repulse of this attack gave the Southerners time to reinforce their works behind Bailey's Creek with the rest of Anderson's Brigade, and Barlow gave up on his attempt to turn the Confederate left without committing any more of his men.[74]

The personally fearless Barlow unfairly blamed the troops for this failure.[75] Without sleep and on the verge of sunstroke or even death from the heat, they had made an extraordinary effort just to arrive at Fussell's Mill. Furthermore, the men of the II Corps had learned from bitter experience to avoid attacking fortifications. Since May 3rd, the Second Division had lost over seventy-three percent of its initial strength. Many, if not most, of its losses had occurred in assaults upon fortifications similar to those at Fussell's Mill.[76] An incident occurred during the repulse which illustrates the attitude of the soldiers:

> "Follow me, men, follow me," shouted a general officer riding rapidly to the head of their recoiling column, as if determined to charge the enemy's works, if he must do, alone. For a moment there was a hush, as the men swayed back and forth in the edge of the sheltering woods, but not forward into the storm of lead sweeping the field. Then an Irish voice rang out fiercely, "We'll folly ye to Hell"; then, dropping to a wheedling tone, continued, "But don't ye think 'twud be wiser to go by a longer road, General?" A roar of laughter greeted this Hibernian hit, and half-laughing, half-angry, the discomfited general gave the word to fall back.[77]

Farther to the Confederate left, the Union cavalry succeeded in driving the Hampton Legion of Gary's Brigade from a line of rifle pits constructed in 1862 near Fisher's Farm on the Charles City Road. The Second Brigade took this line by a pincer movement. Moving out early in the morning, the brigade had proceeded by roads and tracks to within a mile of Goodman's farm, on the Charles City Road. The 1st Maine Cavalry and the 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry proceeded by a by-road and got in rear of the rebel force

at Fisher's farm. At the same time, the 2nd and 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry went by the road leading directly to Fisher's farm to attack the Southerners in front. The Confederates, however, escaped to the north across White Oak Swamp, leaving behind only four prisoners.[78]

Night put an end to the fighting and allowed the pinned down portion of Macy's brigade to withdraw across Bailey's Creek below Fussell's Mill.[79] The Federals had lost about 500 men to enemy action.[80] The Confederates had lost perhaps half as many.[81]

Though the day's results had disappointed Hancock, he had already attained all of the less ambitious objectives that Grant had set for the operation on the north side of the James. The general-in-chief had forced Lee to recall a portion of the troops dispatched to Northern Virginia. The commander of the Army of Northern Virginia had cancelled the orders sending Butler's Division to Culpeper Court House and had ordered the division to join Field.[82] Though Lee had sent neither Wilcox's Division nor Field's Division to Early, as Grant had feared, the Federal attack from Deep Bottom had prevented Field from executing the marching orders that he had received and put any and all reinforcement of Early out of the question. Hancock's efforts had also drawn rebel forces from the Southside. Lee had ordered Sanders' and Wright's Brigades of Mahone's Division and W. H. F. Lee's Division of cavalry from Petersburg to Field.[83]

With the night came a downpour, the first in many days.[84] During the night, Hancock established a picket line extending from the upper bank of Four Mile Creek all the way out to the cavalry on the Charles City Road and made dispositions for an attack in the morning. Massing most of the II Corps soldiers behind this line, he detached the Second Brigade of the Third Division to Birney, who received orders to find and turn the rebel left or, failing this, to attack if he could find a suitable place. At 10 p.m., Hancock had the men of the X Corps shaken from their sleep and sent on a night march out toward the Confederate left.[85]

At about the same time, Wright's Brigade and Sanders' Brigade arrived from Petersburg and joined Field. An hour or so later, Field had the men of Gregg's Brigade, the famous Texas Brigade, roused and sent to assist the rebel cavalry out on the Charles City Road.[86]

CHAPTER 3

The Second Battle Of Deep Bottom, August 15, 1864

The march of the X Corps to the Confederate left had two stages. The Federals covered the first stretch, which brought them to Strawberry Plains, at night. Different units took different routes. Foster's brigade, most of whom had already crossed Four Mile Creek, proceeded directly through Mott's front. The First Brigade of Terry's division, except for the 39th Illinois, the "Yates Phalanx," followed Foster's men. The rest of the X Corps took the long way, crossing the James at the pontoon bridge above Bailey's Creek, moving along Jones' Neck and then recrossing the river at the pontoon bridge below the creek. Some units began the first leg as early as 10 p.m. and finished as early as midnight. Others began as late as 3 a.m. and finished as late as daybreak. The X Corps brought off three of the four howitzers captured by the 100th New York, leaving the fourth due to want of transportation. The 29th Connecticut Colored Troops and the 8th U.S. Colored Troops found themselves detached from the Colored Brigade and garrisoning the entrenchments at Deep Bottom.[1]

A terrible traffic jam developed on Jones' Neck, along the short stretch between the two pontoon bridges. Some units required as many as four hours to cover less than four miles.[2] An officer of the 7th U.S. Colored Troops later described the wearisome night-marching as

> moving a few rods at a time and then halting for troops ahead to get out of the way; losing sight of them and hurrying to catch up; straggling out in the darkness, stumbling and groping along the rough road, and all the time the rain coming down in a most provoking, exasperating drizzle.[3]

Dawn came drizzly and even hotter than the previous day.[4] Early in the morning, Gregg's Second Brigade sent out a squadron on a reconnaissance up the Charles City Road. The squadron proceeded all the way to White's Tavern. There, according to the Second Brigade's commander, Colonel J. Irvin Gregg (hereinafter referred to as "Irvin Gregg") the Federal cavlrymen found the rebels "in some force."[5]

The Confederates encountered included Barringer's Brigade of W. H. F. Lee's Division of cavalry, which had arrived from the Southside early that morning. The rebels followed the reconnoitering squadron back down the Charles City Road. At Fisher's Farm, Brigadier General Rufus Barringer's North Carolinians slammed into the 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry, on picket duty there. The Tarheels drove the 13th across Fisher's

Run, and back on the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry. Bringing up infantry and artillery, the Confederates forced both regiments of Keystoners to retire about two miles to the rest of the Second Brigade, which threw up an abatis and stopped the rebel advance.[6]

At about 9 a.m., the X Corps began the second leg of its march.[7] As the men plodded toward Fussell's mill pond, the sun began to take its toll. Fatigued from the night march, soaked from the rain, sick from the heat, prostrated and dead soldiers soon lined the roadsides for the second day in a row.[8] "The army of stragglers soon became larger than the army of operations," the historian of the 100th New York later wrote. "The men were falling to the ground, from heat, foaming at the mouth, shivering like dead men."[9]

Straggling reached unprecedented proportions. Butler had detached about 9,000 men from the X Corps to assist Hancock. On August 15th, the provost marshal picked up approximately 3,000 for straggling.[10] Heat prostrated thirty-two men of only four companies in the 67th Ohio, in the First Brigade of the First Division.[11] The 1st Maryland Cavalry (dismounted), in the same division's Third Brigade, suffered thirty cases of sunstroke — while resting.[12] In the fearful heat, men fell out of the ranks by companies at a time. Had the march not halted at around 2 p.m., the X Corps would have completely disintegrated.[13]

Those of Foster's brigade who completed the march found themselves in reserve, but these veteran soldiers had learned to harbor reservations about the significance of that status:

> "On resarve," said an Irishman of the Second Corps; 'yis, resarved for the heavy foighting,' and his sally became a corps joke; and Foster's brigade found that the 'heavy foighting' was just what it had been reserved for on the 15th.[14]

The sound of firing on the Charles City Road distracted Birney from his mission to turn the left of the Confederate position above Fussell's mill pond. He worried that if he tried to envelop this position, the Confederate force to his right would take him in reverse. Rather than seek the Confederate left, Birney reconnoitered to the sound of the guns.[15]

Birney used relatively rested troops while the X Corps recuperated. At about 10 a.m., Mott detached his Second Brigade under Colonel Calvin A. Craig. Birney sent it three miles to the right, where the brigade massed in rear of the Colored Brigade.[16] Around an hour later, Barlow detached the First Division's First Brigade under Brigadier General Nelson A. Miles. Birney sent it toward the Charles City Road by the New Market and Long Bridge Road, a route which did not get the brigade there until the following day.[17]

After massing in the rear of the Colored Brigade, Craig's men march-

ed another two miles in the direction of the Charles City Road. At Mrs. Craddock's house they found the skirmish line of the 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry, which had remained in contact with the Confederates since the morning fighting. Here Craig formed his battle line.

The 1st U.S. Sharpshooters deployed in front as skirmishers. From left to right, the battle line consisted of the 105th Pennsylvania, the 1st Massachusetts Heavy Artillery and the 84th Pennsylvania. Massed in column by division, the 5th Michigan supported the left, the 93rd New York the center and the 141st Pennsylvania the right. The 57th Pennsylvania protected the left flank of the brigade while the cavalry protected the right.[18]

The brigade encountered Confederate skirmishers in some woods about a mile and a half from the Charles City Road. The Federals advanced into the woods and drove out the rebels. Craig ordered two companies of the 5th Michigan to the left of the 57th Pennsylvania. He also ordered two companies of the 84th Pennsylvania to the 1st United States Sharpshooters in order to connect with the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry, moving up on the brigade's right. Advancing through first one swamp and then another, Craig's men pushed the increasingly stubborn rebels back to their line of battle. The Federals then drove the Southerners across the road and beyond Fisher's Run.[19]

Chambliss' Brigade covered the retreat of Barringer's men. The 13th Virginia Cavalry drew picket duty along Fisher's Run. The rest of the brigade bivouacked two miles farther back at White's Tavern.[20]

On the Federal side of the run, the 2nd and 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry went on picket duty. Craig's men halted to await further orders.[21]

By the early afternoon, Hancock had grown impatient and sent his chief of staff to remind Birney of his original mission. Strongly desiring an attack before evening, Hancock insisted that Birney continue his reconnaissance, which Birney had actually never begun, to the right of the Fussell mill pond. Before 3:25 p.m., Birney had gotten the message and passed it down the chain of command.[22]

At about 3:30 p.m., William Birney ordered the 7th and 9th U.S. Colored Troops, under the command of Colonel James Shaw, Jr., to pile knapsacks and march.[23] These two regiments had suffered relatively few stragglers during the march from the Kingsland Road to the Federal right.[24] William Birney placed this demi-brigade on the right of his division's Third Brigade with orders to go straight ahead through a narrow strip of woods and attack the rebel works half a mile ditsant. The Third Brigade would also go straight ahead and attack as soon as Shaw's men commenced firing. Terry's division stood ready to attack farther left.[25]

At 4 p.m., Shaw's men moved out and began groping through the

underbrush in search of the left of the Confederate position near Fussell's mill pond. First they moved three quarters of a mile to their right, into a corn field. Next they moved into woods to their left. A road led to the left. Shaw's demi-brigade proceeded down the road. The road curved further to the left and took the two regiments back to their own lines. A fiasco followed as a firefight broke out between Shaw's men and the Third Brigade of the provisional division. Federal troops killed and wounded one another among the lengthening shadows before they recognized their error and ceased fire. Shaw's regiments returned to the corn field, where they bivouacked.[26]

Practically no time remained for an assault on the rebel line before dark, and the dense woods prohibited a night attack. Birney swept his inept older brother's bungling under the rug, withdrew Craig's men to the main position of the X Corps and promised Hancock a vigorous attack at daybreak.[27]

While the Northerners sought the Confederate line, the Southerners rearranged their lines to accommodate the reinforcements that had reached them on the previous night. Sanders' and Wright's Brigades occupied the works to the left of Field's Division, above Fussell's Mill. The Texas Brigade joined Gary's Brigade and W. H. F. Lee's Division on the Charles City Road.[28]

General Lee himself came over to the north side of the James. "Some of the boys say he came over to see what kind of a place Deep Bottom was, and how long it would take to fill it up at the rate of four guns a week," a rebel artilleryman on New Market Heights recorded in his diary, alluding to four 20-pounder Parrott rifles that Hancock had captured on July 27th during the First Battle of Deep Bottom.[29]

During the day, General Lee rode up to that portion of the parapet along New Market Heights held by the 5th South Carolina of Bratton's Brigade. Dismounting, Lee passed the regiment's commander, Colonel Asbury Coward, and went about twenty feet beyond a foundation that afforded some protection form Federal sharpshooters.

"General Lee, the sharpshooters near the battery down there have got the range of this," Coward said. "It would be better for you to stand back near the cornerstone of the house."

Unique in his ability to manage touchy, hot-tempered, honor-jealous Southern superiors and subordinates, Lee administered a typically muted rebuke.

"Well, Colonel, I think two men would be a better target than one," Lee quietly said. "I wish you would go on to that corner. I must see the whole field."

The General advanced to the front, field glass in hand. After looking

right and left, Lee turned and walked back to where he had left his horse. Before he reached his horse, he stopped, picked up an unfledged sparrow from the ground and gently placed it in the fork of a small tree. "How could he turn from the thoughts of savage war to pity for this infant bird?" the still awestruck Coward wrote many years later. "Here was the fullness of manhood: honor, courage, gentleness. Do you wonder what I saw in him to make me think that he was the greatest man in the world?"[30]

Disgusted with the results of the day's activities, Hancock later wrote: "Another day thus passed without accomplishing anything commensurate with my wishes."[31] That evening he issued a series of orders for the following day. Gregg and Miles would reconnoiter and, if possible, attack along the Charles City Road. Birney would attack between the Charles City Road and the Darbytown Road.[32]

CHAPTER 4

The Second Battle Of Deep Bottom, August 16, 1864

August 16th dawned still hotter than had the two previous days. The heat, lack of water and consequent sunstrokes made an unforgettable impression upon even the Southerners.[1] A member of the Texas Brigade later wrote:

> The sky was cloudless, the sun had a full head of steam on; not a breath of air was astir in the dense woodlands through which the infantry brigade marched and countermarched, and water was not to be had except at the slow-flowing wells of the few denizens of the section.[2]

At about 6:30 a.m., the infantrymen of Miles' brigade deployed as skirmishers on the left of the Charles City Road at Fisher's farm.[3] The skirmish line consisted of the 26th Michigan, with its right resting on the road, and the 5th New Hampshire, to the left of the 26th Michigan.[4] The 2nd and 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry of Irvin Gregg's brigade deployed as skirmishers on the right of the road.[5]

The Federals struggled through the underbrush and across the nearly waterless ravine of Fisher's Run. By about 7 a.m., they had flanked and driven back the pickets of the 13th Virginia Cavalry stationed on the other side of the ravine.[6] The 16th Pennsylvania Cavalry then charged across Deep Run in column of fours, followed by the 1st Maine Cavalry and the 8th and 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry. The charge routed the Confederate pickets. The Federals pushed the rebels back about half a mile into dense woods, where the Confederates took cover behind barricades. Here, at about 8 a.m., Irvin Gregg received a wound in the wrist, and command devolved upon Colonel Michael Kerwin.[7]

The Federals had encountered the remainder of Chambliss' Brigade. Early that morning, Brigadier General John Chambliss and his staff rode from his brigade's bivouac near White's Tavern toward Fisher's Run. Chambliss left orders that the remainder of the brigade, the 9th and 10th Virginia Cavalry, should follow. The 10th moved forward first. The 9th, unaware of any need for haste, waited while many of its men returned from searching for water. Shortly, however, a courier reached the 9th with an order to move up at a trot. The 9th had gone less than a mile when a sharp volley in the woods to the right made the regiment dismount immediately and form in line at right angles to the road, on the margin of a bottom densely covered with huckleberry bushes.[8]

The volley which caused the 9th to dismount had killed Chambliss.[9] Accompanied by a member of his staff, the general rode along the front lines in the woods where Irvin Gregg received his wound. The rebel horsemen saw a Federal behind a tree and fired upon him. Return fire from soldiers of the 5th New Hampshire separated Chambliss from his staff. The advance of the 16th Pennsylvania Cavalry spotted him on the Charles City Road and called upon him to surrender. He instead attempted to flee. A volley fatally struck Chambliss in the neck and upper chest. The Federals immediately began cutting buttons and ornaments off the corpse's uniform. Within moments, however, Gregg arrived upon the scene. Recovering from the body a small Testament and, more importantly, a map of the Richmond defenses, Gregg sent the corpse to the rear. Colonel J. Lucius Davis assumed command of Chambliss's Brigade.[11]

The Southerners became embroiled in a brief firefight with the dismounted Federal cavalrymen. The fight lasted until the Federal infantry came up and turned the flanks of the rebels, who retreated through the woods at the double-quick for a few hundred yards. The 16th Pennsylvania Cavalry had dismounted during the firefight and the 1st Maine Cavalry now led the pursuit.[12]

At the far side of an open field, the Confederates halted and began to erect another barricade. Before they had finished, a courier arrived with an order to continue to fall back. The rebels struggled back through the woods, across another bottom of dense undergrowth and clutching briars. Major General William H. F. Lee (hereinafter referred to as "Rooney Lee") halted them on the crest of the hill beyond, in an open body of large trees near White's Tavern. There, in the extreme heat, the Confederates rested unmolested for over an hour.[13]

The Federal advance had arrived within half a mile of White's Tavern. There the Union cavalry received orders to halt after an advance of three quarters of a mile from the bottom where Irvin Gregg had received his wound. The Federal infantry relieved Kerwin's men on both sides of the Charles City Road, and then the 2nd New York Heavy Artillery relieved the Twenty-Sixth Michigan and the 5th New Hampshire on the front line.[14]

News of the Federal success on the Charles Road flew quickly up the Federal chain of command. By 10:30 a.m., Grant had perceived that the Union force near White's Tavern threatened the route of retreat toward Richmond of the Confederates opposite Hancock. The general-in-chief ordered Butler to make a demonstration with his troops at Dutch Gap in order to threaten the Confederate route of retreat toward Chaffin's Bluff.[15]

At White's Tavern, the Union soldiers encountered the entire division of Rooney Lee, a son of the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia.[16] The dismounted rebel cavalrymen occupied hastily constructed breastworks with a battery in support and Gregg mistook them for infantry.[17] To

make matters worse, reports arrived of a line of rebel flankers marching toward White's Tavern from Fussell's Mill.[18]

The Federals had gone about as far as the commander of the Second Cavalry Division had thought they could go.[19] Under the circumstances, Miles thought it unadvisable to advance farther up the Charles City Road without connecting to Birney's right. He wanted to hold the ground gained and await orders.[20] Shortly after 11 a.m., however, orders came from Hancock for Gregg to push the reconnaissance as far as possible in order to create a diversion for Birney's attack and to have Miles close in toward Birney only if heavy and continuous firing came from Birney's position to Gregg's left.[21]

By 12:20 p.m., the situation had changed completely. Birney had successfully assaulted the Confederate main line above Fussell's mill pond. Hancock requested Gregg to cut short the reconnaissance and have Miles connect with Birney's right. By the time that Gregg received this request, though, Miles had become too heavily engaged for Gregg to release him.[22]

At noon, Gregg had attempted a movement that he thought would compel the retreat of the rebels, despite their artillery support. This advance proved Gregg's last of the day.[23]

The 183rd Pennsylvania, deployed as skirmishers, led the way. Using the dense cover to their advantage, the Federals quietly moved into the bottom and opened fire. The first volley killed a few rebels, but the Southerners checked the Union advance and repelled an effort to turn the Confederate right.[24] After a short engagement, the Pennsylvanians fell back on the rest of Miles' brigade.[25]

By now, rebel reinforcements had arrived. Chambliss' Brigade remained on the right side of the Charles City Road, with the 10th Virginia Cavalry on the left, the 9th Virginia Cavalry in the center, and the 13th Virginia Cavalry on the right. Gary's Brigade, reinforced by the 7th Georgia Cavalry, joined in the fight on the right of Chambliss' Brigade. Moving up from Fussell's Mill, the Texas Brigade came up on the right of Gary's Brigade.[27] The Texas Brigade and Gary's Brigade formed an ad hoc division under the command of Brigadier General Matthew Gary.[26] Barringer's Brigade took a position on the left side of the road. Butler's Division, diverted from its march to Culpeper Court House, arrived at this time and went into action dismounted on the right and rear of the Federals.[28]

At about 1 p.m., the rebels attacked.[29] The first shots caused the Federal infantry to break and fall back, leaving the cavalry to bear the brunt of the whole attack. The 2nd New York Heavy Artillery, which had earned Barlow's censure on August 14th, now earned the scorn of the Federal cavalrymen.[30] The historian of the 1st Maine Cavalry later wrote:

> Those who were there will remember how the infantry men (or rather heavy artillery men) ran through the cavalry lines, and long afterwards it was a saying in the regiment that the "heavies got round shouldered going under our horses in their skedaddle."[31]

The Union cavalrymen took up a position on the right of the road in a sort of basin. Kerwin's soldiers could see the Confederates working their way through the woods on the left of the road.[32] In those woods, the right of Chambliss's Brigade overlapped the left of Gary's Brigade — a situation which led to a fiasco similar to that experienced by the Federals on the previous day. Gary's men fired on the right of the 9th Virginia Cavalry, wounding several men and disordering the Virginia regiment's right squadron. The remainder of the 9th drove the Federal infantry across an open field and into another wood.[33]

The Union cavalry on the north side of the Charles City Road fell back to an open field abreast of the woods harboring the Federal infantry on the south side of the road. Chambliss' Brigade drove the Union infantry from these woods and exposed the flank of the Federal horsemen. Fortunately for the Union cavalrymen, the wooded nature of the terrain again caused confusion in the rebel ranks. After driving the Federal infantry out of the woods, some men of the 9th Virginia Cavalry saw a group of mounted Federals from the 1st Maine Cavalry on the Charles City Road. This little band of Confederates ran towards the Union horsemen across the front of the 10th Virginia Cavalry, which had not yet emerged from the woods. The greater part of the 9th and 13th Virginia Cavalry, supposing these men the line of battle, followed them. Though the Virginians caught the 1st Maine Cavalry in a fierce crossfire, the rebels subsequently required a halt in order to reform.[34]

As the Confederates drove back the first Federal line, which consisted of about half of the Union forces, Gregg and Miles formed a second line with their remaining troops about half a mile to the rear. This line occupied a crest astride the Charles City Road. The position afforded a good view of the terrain in its front. The front line soon passed by this position and in turn formed another line about half a mile to the rear of the second line, in the woods just north of Fisher's farm.[35]

At about 1:30 p.m., the rebels resumed their advance.[36] They moved across another bottom. About fifty yards beyond, half way over a narrow plateau covered with bushes, they got a rough reception from the second Federal line. The Union fire came from across yet another bottom — the bottom in which the 9th Virginia Cavalry had first dismounted and in which Chambliss had perished. The Virginians recoiled into the bottom behind them with a haste that drew a bitter denunciation from Rooney Lee. Recovering their composure, the Virginians returned the fire. As the


Little
Woods
Woods
CONNOR
6 A.M.
Second Ravine
First Ravine
Lane
Craig
Houser (Martin)
Pond
Hawley
12 P.M.
Robinson
Wright
Woods
Woods
Foster
9 A.M.
BIRNEY
Darbytown Road
Oblique Ravine
Johnson
"The Bastion"
Terry
6 A.M.
FIELD
Sanders
Rev. Fussell
Fussell's Mill
Woods
Anderson
Mitchell Fussell
Broady
MAP 2
Darbytown Road
6 A.M. - Noon
Bailey's Creek
Woods
Works Taken By Barlow August 14th

Union right crumbled under pressure from the Confederates on the other side of the Charles City Road, the 13th Virginia Cavalry turned the Federal left, which held a small barricade of fence rails. The 9th Virginia Cavalry then charged directly across the plateau. The Federals broke and ran, leaving the Southerners to occupy the barricade. There, exhausted and almost out of ammunition, Chambliss' Brigade finally received orders to lie down and rest.[37] "The day was the most trying our regiment had ever experienced," the commander of the 9th Virginia Cavalry later wrote.[38] The Virginians used the barricade as a shield from the fire of dismounted Union cavalry on the other side of the Charles City Road. It failed to protect them, however, from another volley of friendly fire.[39]

Barringer's Tarheels continued the pursuit down the Charles City Road.[40] The Federals retreated to their next line, in an open field on the north bank of Fisher's Run, under the fire of their artillery.[41] By about 3 p.m., firing had ceased on Gregg's front.[42] Barringer's men did not seem interested in assailing the Federal position.[43] The Confederate infantry appeared retiring in the direction of Fussell's Mill.

Employing his own men to erect breastworks and slash timber, Gregg finally allowed Miles to proceed to Birney's right.[44]

Under arms since 3 a.m., the X Corps began its advance at daybreak. Terry's division led the way. Intending to attack with his Second Brigade, Terry positioned his Third Brigade in rear of the Second and his First Brigade on the Second's left. In front of this formation, the divisional commander deployed the 3rd New Hampshire as skirmishers.

Terry's men began a slow left wheel through the underbrush. The skirmishers gradually drove back their Confederate opponents. The left wheel came to a halt at the brink of Fussell's mill pond. No one had told Terry of the pond's existence, even though Barlow had encountered it two days earlier.[45]

By about 9 a.m., recovering from this false start, Terry had changed his division's formation. Positioning the Third Brigade on the right of the Second to try and force a passage around the head of the mill pond, Terry swung the First Brigade from left to right and put it behind and in support of the Third.[46] Foster deployed the Third Brigade with the 10th Connecticut, 24th Massachusetts and 11th Maine in that order forming its front line from left to right. The 100th New York supported the left of the front line. The 1st Maryland Cavalry (dismounted) supported the right.[47]

Terry had also received as a reinforcement Craig's brigade of Mott's Division. The future captor of Fort Fisher assigned this brigade to protect the right of his division.[48] Craig deployed the 1st U.S. Sharpshooters and 5th Michigan as skirmishers extending back from the right flank of Foster's brigade. A battle line, consisting of the 93rd New York and the

84th, 105th and 141st Pennsylvania, supported Craig's skirmish line. The 57th Pennsylvania and the 1st Massachusetts Heavy Artillery, in column by division, massed in rear of the battle line.[49]

By about 9:20 a.m., Foster's brigade had encountered Confederate skirmishers on the opposite side of a deep ravine (hereinafter referred to as "the first ravine") that emptied into Fussell's mill pond. After a brief engagement, Foster's men drove the rebels from their rifle pits, taking about thirty prisoners.[50] This advance led Craig to deploy the 1st Massachusetts Heavy Artillery as flankers on the right of the 5th Michigan.[51]

Reforming, Foster's brigade shortly before 11 a.m. drove the Southerners from another line of rifle pits, taking about 40 prisoners.[52] The 11th Maine, ordered by Foster to "drive the enemy into his main works and ascertain whether the same could be carried by assault," rushed onward, followed by the 1st Maryland Cavalry (dismounted) and part of Craig's brigade.[53] These Federals reached another ravine which also flowed into Fussell's mill pond. This ravine (hereinafter referred to as "the second ravine") had sides at this point almost impassably steep. On the opposite side, the rebels occupied strong entrenchments protected by a slashing.[54]

The Federals met with a devastating volley.[55] "The woods fairly rang with the screeching of bullets," the historian of the 11th Maine later wrote.[56] Suddenly the 1st Maryland Cavalry (dismounted) broke and fell obliquely back into the line of the 11th Maine, causing that regiment to retreat as well. The terrible fire also threw the contingent of the II Corps into confusion.[57]

Terry reported this repulse to Birney, who instructed Terry to attack immediately. The divisional commander organized his outfit for the third time that day. First, Terry brought up a fresh brigade to spearhead the assault. He brought his First Brigade — the Western Brigade of the X Corps — out from behind Foster and placed it on Foster's right.[58] The Western Brigade formed about half a mile to the right of Fussell's Mill and approximately 100 yards from the rebel works, hidden from sight by the dense woods. Colonel Francis B. Pond, the brigade's commander, deployed as skirmishers the four companies of the 67th Ohio at his disposal. Behind the skirmish line, from left to right, the 39th Illinois, 62nd Ohio and 85th Pennsylvania formed the brigade's battle line. About thirty paces separated the adjacent regiments, and the men of each regiment formed a column two companies wide and four or five ranks deep. The 39th Illinois and 62nd Ohio received orders to swing to the left after carrying the Confederate works. The 85th Pennsylvania received orders to swing to the right.[59]

Next, Terry positioned his Second Brigade, under Colonel Joseph R. Hawley, in the rear of Pond's men. Hawley's brigade consisted of the 6th and 7th Connecticut and the 3rd and 7th New Hampshire. The divisional

commander wanted this brigade to follow Pond's brigade whether or not Pond's brigade succeeded in taking the rebel works. Terry's reorganization of his command took place under a steady fire from the rebel works. Hawley's brigade, when it reached its appointed position, received orders to lie down in line of battle and immediately began constructing breastworks.[60] According to the historian of the 7th Connecticut, Terry

> jokingly told the officers who were on their feet to get the best cover they could against the fire of small arms until we could get orders to move. He himself set the example by shielding his slim figure behind a tree about eight inches through. Most of the officers felt rather slim about that time and dutifully followed the general's example.[61]

While Terry redeployed Pond's and Hawley's brigades to the right of Foster's brigade, Foster conducted a reorganization of his own. The advance to the main rebel works had so separated the left of the 10th Connectiut from the 100th New York that the Confederates had infiltrated the gap between the two Union regiments and took three prisoners. To make matters worse, the six companies of the 10th Connecticut on the immediate left of the 24th Massachusetts had run out of ammunition. Foster relieved these six companies with 150 men from the 1st Maryland Cavalry (dismounted) and sent to the support of the 24th Massachusetts the four companies of the 10th Connecticut which had not expended all of their ammunition.[62]

The skirmish line of Craig's brigade remained on the right of Terry's division. Craig's battle line remained in support of his skirmishers.[63]

By about noon, for the third time that sweltering day, Terry's division stood ready to attack.[64]

Present during the repulse of the 11th Maine and its supporting troops, Field knew that the Federals had hit upon the most unfavorable point in his line of defense. A slashing of only about fifty yards protected the Confederate works at this position, about half a mile upstream from Fussell's Mill. Irregular ground and a dense forest of oak and pine would screen attackers from rebel fire beyond this distance.[65]

Ordinarily the commander of an infantry division, Field now commanded an ad hoc infantry corps of four divisions. Brigadier General John Bratton commanded a motley ad hoc division consisting of his own brigade, Johnson's Brigade and the 25th Virginia Battalion from the Department of Richmond, and detachments from Scales' Brigade and Thomas' Brigade of Wilcox's Division. Bratton's command held a line stretching from the James River to New Market Heights.[66] The brigades of Law and Benning, both under Brigadier General John Gregg, held the line from New Market Heights to Fussell's mill pond.[67] The provisional divi-

sion of Brigadier General John C. C. Sanders held the line for just over half a mile to the left of Fussell's mill pond. Sanders' command consisted of his own brigade and Wright's Brigade of Mahone's Division along with the 7th and 59th Georgia from Anderson's Brigade of Field's Division.[68] Early in the morning, Field had moved Conner's provisional division, still composed of Lane's and McGowan's Brigades of Wilcox's Division, from beside the James River to the left of Sanders' detachment.[69] Under Colonel Francis H. Little, the 9th and 11th Georgia of Anderson's Brigade took up a position on the left of Lane's Brigade and on the right of McGowan's Brigade.[70] Despite the reinforcements that Field had received, the extension of his left to meet Hancock's groping for the rebel flank kept the Confederate infantry from occupying the works with more than a single rank.[71]

Shortly after Wright's Brigade had repulsed the 11th Maine and its supporting troops, Field had dismounted. Tired from having ridden about since dawn, he and his staff sat down in a field in the rear of Wright's Brigade, with their horses hitched to some nearby bushes. About half an hour after the repulse of the first Federal attack, Field heard firing and cheering in the front of Wright's Brigade. Though Field knew that this meant another Union assault, he felt so sure that it would meet with the same fate as the first that he did not even rise from the ground.

Field's adjutant general did rise. With a better field of vision than his commander, this officer suddenly said, very excitedly: "General, they are breaking."

"Well, I knew they would," Field replied, thinking that his subordinate referred to Federals.

"But General, it's our men," the adjutant general said.

Jumping to his feet, Field saw what he later called "the most appalling, disheartening sight" in his life. Wright's Brigade, immediately in front of Field, and Lane's Brigade, on his left, had given way. Disordered squads of both brigades made their way past Field and his staff while the Federals jumped over the works just vacated "in close pursuit, and cheering like all the world." Immediately mounting his horse, Field tried to reach the brigades to his left. The Federals, however, poured through the gap left by the two brigades which had broken, cut Field's force in two and prevented him from reaching his left.[72]

Confederate soldiers regarded Federals from "the Great North West" as especially hard and tenacious fighters.[73] The performance of the Western Brigade of Terry's division bore out this reputation. When the command "Forward!" came, the brigade moved off in common time with arms at right shoulder shift.[74] The men went down into the second ravine, which marked the point at which the dense woods gave way to the slashing.[75] As soon as Pond's men reached the edge of the slashing, they

met with a volley from the Georgians of Wright's Brigade that almost annihilated the entire front line of each regiment.[76] This line "went down like so many ten-pins," the commander of the 85th Pennsylvania wrote in his official report.[77]

The Western Brigade staggered, but continued moving forward. "Away we went with a regular Western yell, on the full jump, over logs, tree-tops and stumps thrown about in inextricable confusion," a soldier of the 39th Illinois later wrote.[78] Pond's men negotiated the few yards of slashing that separated them from the Confederate works so quickly that the rebels could not deliver another volley.[79]

When the Westerners reached the rebel breastworks, Wright's Brigade still did not give way. A hand to hand fight began in which Pond's men employed bayonets and clubbed muskets. Federals continued to leap over the parapets into the Confederate works, however, while the rebels did not receive any immediately assistance.[80]

The Georgians broke between the 2nd Georgia Battalion and the 10th Georgia Battalion. Brigadier General Victor J. B. Girardey, the commander of Wright's Brigade, attempted to rally his men. This officer had just received an unprecedented promotion from the rank of captain and the position of assistant adjutant general on Major General William Mahone's staff. The promotion had come on account of Girardey's meritorious service at the Battle of the Crater, less than three weeks earlier. Now, with the colors of the 64th Georgia in his hand, this extraordinary young soldier fell with a mortal head wound.[81] Some Confederates surrendered. Others fled through a corn field into a wooded ravine.[82] This ravine (hereinafter referred to as "the oblique ravine") ran obliquely from about 300 yards behind the left of Wright's Brigade, through the breastworks on the right of the Georgians, and on down into the second ravine.[83]

As Wright's Brigade disintegrated in surrender and flight, the Western Brigade of the X Corps disintegrated in pursuit. The officers lost control of the men, who knew no impulse but "forward."[84] Most of the 39th Illinois headed down the trenches to the left, the direction in which most of the rebels fled. The Yates Phalanx took numerous prisoners and the flag of one of Sanders' Alabama regiments.[85] Nearly all of the 85th Pennsylvania, which had already taken two Georgia flags,[86] and the better parts of the 62nd and 67th Ohio also swung left and advanced all the way across the corn field into the ravine. Only fifty men of the 85th occupied their appointed position on the right of the breakthrough, where the rebels had already begun counterattacking down the trench.[87]

When the Western Brigade charged, on its left had charged Foster's brigade. Only the far right of this brigade, the 11th Maine and a few companies of the 24th Massachusetts, fought their way into the Confederate works. The sides of both the oblique ravine and the second ravine grew

impassably steep farther to the Union left and created a bastion from which the Alabamians of Sanders' Brigade enfiladed the works taken by the Federals. The 24th Massachusetts took up a line extending back from the works along the oblique ravine and down to the second ravine. Farther left, the 1st Maryland Cavalry (dismounted) and the 100th New York failed to enter the works across the second ravine and below the oblique ravine.[88]

Pistol in hand, Foster walked about in the rear of the 100th New York after the failure of the initial assault. The New Yorkers took offense at the display of the pistol. It implied that their attack had failed due to the feebleness of their effort, whereas they believed the Confederate position impregnable. In the face of the steep slope and deadly fire, a second effort proved no more successful and left many Marylanders and New Yorkers pinned down behind the bank of the second ravine.[89]

While the 7th New Hampshire remained lying down in reserve, the 6th and 7th Connecticut and 3rd New Hampshire of Hawley's brigade had advanced in support of Pond's men shortly after the Western Brigade's charge.[90] The historian of the 3rd New Hampshire later described the scene that confronted Hawley's men as they emerged from the woods into the slashing:

> It was almost like the rising of a stage curtain. The rebels were being taken prisoners by the first line, its attack having been too furious and precipitate to permit a retreat. . . .Between the edge of the woods and their works, the ground was rising, very marshy and well filled with fallen trees and other obstructions. Over all of these we clambered and, hastening up the declivity, entered the works and joined the first line in loud huzzas at the victory. . . .[91]

Confederate resistance had crumbled by the time Hawley's men reached the rebel works. Hawley's men arrived in time to map up the few remaining Georgians. After Terry had brought up the 7th New Hampshire to execute the task of the 85th Pennsylvania and guard the right of the breakthrough, the rest of Hawley's brigade charged directly across the corn field toward a crest on the right of the oblique ravine. Fire from the Confederates on the crest in front of Hawley's men halted the New Englanders. The 3rd New Hampshire, Hawley's left regiment, changed face to its left and desperately charged into the oblique ravine under a galling crossfire from the crest to the right and from the bastion behind the oblique ravine. Hawley's right regiment, the 7th Connecticut, changed face to its right in order to confront the rebels already massing on its right flank.[92]

Terry now brought up the uncommitted regiments of Craig's brigade and formed them into two lines parallel to and facing the oblique ravine,


McGowan
CONNOR
Little
Lane
Houser
(Martin)
Craig
Pond
BIRNEY
Robinson
Coan
Hawley
William Birney
Wright
Terry
Walrath
Pond
Craig
Foster
FIELD
Oates
Johnson
Shaw
DuBose
& Coward
Sanders
Rev.
Fussell
Fussell's
Mill
Anderson
Broady
Mitchell
Fussell
MAP 3
Darbytown Road
August 16
The Federal Assault

almost at right angles to the works. The front line consisted of, from right to left, the 93rd New York and the 84th, 141st and 105th Pennsylvania. The 57th Pennsylvania formed the second line.[93] Terry told Craig and his men to "go as far as you can and roll the rebels right up."[94] Craig led these five regiments across the corn field and into the oblique ravine under the same murderous crossfire that Hawley's men had endured. The 105th and 141st Pennsylvania briefly penetrated beyond the ravine, into an open field in which severe Confederate fire seemed to come from every direction.[95]

Having deployed all the men under his command, Terry asked Birney for reinforcements. Birney ordered his brother to send reinforcements to Terry. William Birney's Second and Third Brigades stood massed on a hill about half a mile east of the captured rebel works. The Third Brigade occupied the lead position. A spent bullet had already disabled the commander of the Third Brigade, Colonel Francis A. Osborn, and command of the brigade had devolved upon Major Ezra L. Walrath. William Birney ordered the Third Brigade forward at the double quick to the rebel works. This half mile run, made in heavy marching order, left the men of the Third Brigade winded. They formed as best they could on the reverse side of the Confederate works.[96]

William Birney's Second Brigade, under Lieutenant Colonel William B. Coan, followed the Third Brigade. Coan's men had a few more yards to travel than the Third Brigade in order to reach the captured works, and the Second Brigade also crossed them at the double quick. The exhausted men of this brigade took position on the right of the Third Brigade.[97]

Leaving Shaw's detachment of the Provisional Division's Colored Brigade to support the Union artillery, William Birney accompanied his white soldiers to the captured rebel works. Meanwhile, Terry's requests for reinforcements continued to bombard the commander of the X Corps. Birney finally ordered forward the 9th U.S. Colored Troops of Shaw's detachment, leaving only the 7th U.S. Colored Troops to guard the guns.[98]

Having committed all of his reserves to Terry's support, Birney called upon Hancock for reinforcements. Hancock sent his First Division's Fourth Brigade, previously deployed to the left of Fussell's mill pond in order to prevent a rebel thrust to Birney's left. Hancock also began calling upon Gregg to relinquish Miles' brigade to Birney.[99]

By about 12:30 p.m., the Federal breakthrough had reached its maximum penetration. On the extreme left, the 1st Maryland Cavalry (dismounted) and the 100th New York hugged the ground in the second ravine.[100] Behind the oblique ravine, the 24th Massachusetts held a line from the second ravine to the captured rebel works.[101] In front of the 24th Massachusetts, beyond the captured works, the 105th and 141st Pennsylvania had crossed the oblique ravine into an open field.[102] To the right

of the 105th and 141st, the 57th and 84th Pennsylvania and 93rd New York held the line of the oblique ravine.[103] Fragments of Pond's brigade occupied the oblique ravine to the right of these regiments.[104] On the right of Pond's men, the 3rd New Hampshire and 6th and 7th Connecticut defended the head of the oblique ravine and the crest to its right. A portion of the 39th Illinois guarded the right of Hawley's men.[105] Elements of the 62nd Ohio protected the right of the 39th. The 62nd had its right flank on the left of the 7th New Hampshire.[106]

The 11th Maine and a few companies of the 24th Massachusetts held the captured works to the right of the oblique ravine.[107] Farther right, Walrath's and Coan's brigades of William Birney's division held the works, with Walrath's brigade on the left and Coan's brigade on the right, the 9th U.S. Colored Troops not yet having reached the works.[108] Facing right, the 7th New Hampshire held a position on the rebel side of and at right angles to the works, with its right contacting them near the right of Coan's brigade and its left on the right of the 62nd Ohio.[109] The 1st U.S. Sharpshooters of Craig's brigade held the works to the right of Coan's brigade.[110] The 5th Michigan and 1st Massachusetts Heavy Artillery formed a skirmish line that extended back toward the first ravine from the right of the sharpshooters.[111]

The initiative now passed to Lee's lieutenants, who on this day served the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia extraordinarily well.

On the Confederate right of the breakthrough, Field immediately ordered John Gregg to send every available man. "At this time not only the day but Richmond seemed to be gone," Field later wrote. "I felt that nothing but a miracle could save us."[112]

A detachment of Law's Brigade consisting of the 15th and 48th Alabama, under Colonel Alexander A. Lowther, arrived first.[113] Lowther quickly suffered a wound and command of this detachment passed to Colonel William C. Oates.[114] The Alabamians found themselves nearly opposite the left of a Federal battle line almost a mile long, with heavy supports in its rear, moving steadily toward them through the corn field. The woods on the other side of the corn field hid the right of the Union line. Brigadier General George T. Anderson, whose 8th Georgia held a piece of woods on the north side of the corn field, told Oates to "just go tearing at them." Oates led the 15th Alabama to a rail fence at the edge of the corn field. Here the regiment overlapped the Union left.[115]

The 15th exchanged a terrible fire with the Federals, but held its position at the fence at the cost of many casualties. Oates sent the 48th Alabama over the fence to charge against the flank of the Northerners. The 48th overlapped and enfiladed the Union line, driving it back about 200 yards, but incurring heavy losses. With men falling dead or wounded

at every step, the Alabamians continued onward until they reached a trench on the hillside. Oates ordered his men to sit down in the trench and fire across the oblique ravine at the Federals on the opposite slope less than 100 yards away.[116]

The colonel, who later served Alabama as its Governor, soon suffered a wound that cost him his right arm. Before relinquishing command, Oates ordered his men to charge again. The Alabamians went down into the oblique ravine and then up the slope on the opposite side, sending back a stream of prisoners who had lain down in the oblique ravine's tall grass to avoid rebel fire. When the Confederates charged, they ran over these Federals, who threw down their arms and made for the Southern rear. The rebel line staggered under Federal fire at the top of the opposite slope, then rolled back down, recrossed the oblique ravine and came to rest in the trench once again.[117]

The performance of the Confederate commander isolated to the left of the breakthrough at least equalled, if it did not indeed surpass, those of Field and John Gregg. Conner, after the war Attorney General of South Carolina, displayed his initiative by instantly reacting to the breakthrough. Leaving the sharpshooter battalion of McGowan's Brigade to hold the brigade's position on the extreme left of the rebel line, Conner marched the rest of the brigade rapidly to the right in rear of the works.[118] After proceeding about half a mile through the woods, the South Carolinians formed their battle line. From left to right, the line consisted of the 12th South Carolina, 13th South Carolina, Orr's Rifles, 14th South Carolina and 1st South Carolina. The battle line slowly and steadily advanced through the thick, rough woods, halting in order to redress the smallest irregularities.[119] Little's detachment of Anderson's Brigade advanced on the right of these South Carolinians. Lane's Brigade, having rallied under its temporary commander, Colonel William M. Barbour, advanced on the right of Little's Georgians.[120]

The Northerners in the captured works opened fire on Conner's men, and the Confederates returned the fire, before either side could see the other in the pine thicket. Despite the musketry, the Southerners continued to advance. Connor's battle line ran obliquely to the captured breastworks, approaching them more closely with its left than with its right. The extreme left of the rebel line, the 12th South Carolina, struck the captured works first. Plunging into them at once, this regiment immediately recaptured a portion of them. Enfilading Federal fire from their right, however, quickly forced these South Carolinians to withdraw. Rallying, the 12th assailed the works again, recaptured the same portion of them again, and withdrew from them again under the same enfilading Union fire from their right. Rallying again on the rest of McGowan's brigade, the 12th continued to push forward.[121]

The Federals held the line of the oblique ravine and the woods beyond the corn field for about half an hour.[122] The Union soldiers could hear the cheers of arriving rebel reinforcements and see the Confederates massing around the Federal salient for a counterattack.[123] Half voluntarily, half driven, the outflanked Federals slowly retreated across the corn field. "Once they charged upon our line, forcing us back with greater speed than we cared to travel on that hot day," a soldier of the 6th Connecticut in Hawley's brigade later wrote, "and, although we did not run, we executed 'some pretty tall walking.' "[124]

As the Federal units that had advanced fell back, the rebels seriously threatened the left flank of the 7th New Hampshire of Hawley's brigade. This unit responded by recrossing the entrenchments and taking a position on a line with them. When the three other regiments of Hawley's brigade returned to the captured works, they took positions on the right of the 7th New Hampshire — except for the 7th Connecticut, which received orders from Terry to march to the rear and replenish its ammunition.[125]

Once Pond's men had arrived back at the breastworks that they had captured, the Westerners took up defensive positions in them.[126] Craig's brigade returned to the captured works shortly after the Second and Third Brigades of William Birney's division had arrived.[127] While giving orders in the course of reforming his brigade, Craig received a mortal wound and command passed to Colonel John Pulford. Ordered to the rear, Pulford's men retired about 600 yards and reformed.[128]

The men of Walrath's brigade had not yet recovered from their run to the captured works when William Birney ordered them to assault the bastion beyond the Union left.[129] While Walrath formed his brigade prior to the attack, Coan moved his troops by the left flank in order to fill the space vacated by Walrath's men.[130]. An officer of the 4th New Hampshire, which formed the extreme right of Walrath's brigade, reported to William Birney the rebels massing in the woods on that flank.[131] "Never mind," replied William Birney as he ordered the brigade to charge.[132]

The charge took Walrath's men over the same 400 yards that Craig's men had crossed.[133] The officer who had warned William Birney of the rebels on the right later wrote, "Soon we met with a scorching fire, not only from our front but an 'enfilading' fire as it is termed, that is, a sidefire as well as front."[134] Walrath's brigade became Parker's brigade during the course of this charge, as Walrath suffered a wound and command devolved upon Captain Frank W. Parker. Having briefly driven back the rebels, Parker ordered the 4th New Hampshire to change front in order to face the "sidefire" from the right. The brigade did not remain Parker's for long. As the brigade executed the captain's first orders, a Confederate bullet seriously wounded Parker in the neck and command devolved upon Captain Robert J. Gray. With almost as many men falling from the sun's


McGowan
Little
Lane
Hawley
Miles
Craig
9 U.S.C.T.
Pond
Robinson
Walrath
Coan
Wright
DuBose
Foster
Coward
Oates
BIRNEY
FIELD
Johnson
Sanders
Shaw
7 U.S.C.T.
Rev. Fussell
Fussell's Mill
Anderson
Mitchell Fussell
Broady
MAP 4
Darbytown Road
August 16
The Confederate Counterattack

heat as from rebel fire, William Birney's Third Brigade disintegrated and staggered back toward the Federal rear.[135]

The fire directed by the Confederates holding the bastion against the front of William Birney's Third Brigade enfiladed the men of his Second, who closely hugged the works. The foliage along the oblique ravine hid the rebel riflemen from Coan's men, who thought the fire came from sharpshooters in the trees. A staff officer who ordered the 48th New York to stand and fire at their invisible foes elicited from the Fighting Parson's Regiment threats that sent him scurrying rearward.[136]

Soon after Oates had sealed off the breakthrough at the line of the oblique ravine, detachments arrived from Bratton's Brigade and Benning's Brigade.[137] The antonymically named Colonel Coward led the 5th South Carolina of Bratton's Brigade into the struggle. On Coward's left, Colonel Dudley DuBose led into action part of a detachment from Benning's Brigade, consisting of the 15th, 17th and 20th Georgia.[138] The 17th Georgia had not yet arrived.[139]

On this blazing day, these Confederates had marched at the double-quick a distance of at least a mile.[140] Coward later described the effect of this march:

> The hurried march in the great heat was most trying. Most of my men had their tongues hanging out of their mouths, like hunting dogs on a hot day. The sweat was churning in my boots and my voice had an unnatural tone.[141]

Coward and DuBose led their men forward in an attack on the captured breastworks before all of DuBose's regiments had arrived.[142] While crossing a fence, the 5th South Carolina encountered General Lee on Traveler. Wanting his men to show up well before the army commander, Coward shouted, "Fifth Regiment, Right Dress," in order to straighten the line disordered while negotiating the fence. "No time for right dress, Colonel," said Lee, removing his hat. "Charge 'em boys with a hearty shout."[143]

With bayonets glistening and flags flying, the long gray line emerged from the woods and headed down the slope toward the works occupied by the 11th Maine and 24th Massachusetts. "There was nothing intervening to hide so much as a button, save a few straggling corn-stalks on their left," a sergeant of the 11th Maine's Company C later wrote. "Boys, now's our time," another sergeant of the same regiment's Company E said while he and his men awaited the order to open fire. After the order finally came, the Federals did not cease fire until they had blasted the Confederates back into the woods.

While awaiting the next charge, the Northerners dissipated the tension by cracking jokes among themselves. Soon they saw the top of a flag above the oblique ravine, not more than fifty yards away. The joking

stopped and the Federals prepared for action again. The flag began to move in a few moments. The whole rebel line came into sight. The Federals became too excited to maintain fire control. Instead of reserving their fire until the Confederates had cleared the ravine far enough to ensure their destruction, the Union soldiers started firing almost immediately. "The rebel color-bearer was shot dead on the brow of the hill, falling forward upon his staff," the sergeant from Company C said afterward, "and the line was driven back in less time than it would take to count twenty."[144]

On the other side of the battlefield, the right of Conner's line steadily closed the distance between itself and the captured works. When the right of McGowan's Brigade came within twenty steps of the works, the Federals occupying them coolly fired a fearful volley directly into the faces of the rebels. The Confederates recoiled several paces in shock and confusion, but continued firing at their adversaries. The rebels wounded by the volley lay between the two fires. Some of the wounded loudly called upon their comrades to charge.[145] Conner's entire line on the right now approached the works closely enough to deliver a fire that, in combination with the galling enfilade fire from the bastion beyond the Northern left, kept most Federal heads down and Union fire largely suppressed.[146]

The final charge began from far to Conner's right, which had linked up with Field's left. Reinforced by the 17th Georgia of Benning's Brigade, the 4th Alabama of Law's Brigade and the 2nd South Carolina of Bratton's Brigade, Field's men finally stormed into the captured works.[147] As regiment after regiment of Field's men entered the works, enthusiasm communicated itself to Conner's command. With a yell, Conner's men rushed the breastworks and drove out the Federals crowded there, taking prisoners and unprecedented plunder.[148] During the rebel counterattack, Lane's Brigade lost its temporary commander to a wound and command devolved upon Colonel William H. A. Speer.[149]

The Union line had collapsed from left to right, regiment by regiment, brigade by brigade, like the bursting bulkheads of a sinking ship. First the extreme left of the Federal line, the 100th New York and the 1st Maryland Cavalry (dismounted), dissolved.[150] Then the 76th Pennsylvania, sent from Coan's brigade to support the 11th Maine, instead fled back across the second ravine. Field's men drove the 24th Massachusetts from its position on the 11th Maine's left rear. They then rolled up the 11th Maine.[151] With its left rear and right front threatened, Coan's brigade departed next.[152]

The Confederate advance increased its momentum. In the dense woods, the Federal troops in the works had scarcely any warning before they found themselves completely outflanked on the left. With their line of retreat threatened, they had to skedaddle in order to avoid capture.[153] After the brigades of Foster and Coan had broken, Pond's men followed

them to the rear.[154] Hawley's brigade, on the far right, withdrew pursuant to Terry's orders in a more deliberate fashion.[155] At about 2 p.m., the 9th U.S. Colored Troops discovered itself the only Federal unit remaining in the works. The 9th, which had recently relieved the 85th Pennsylvania of Pond's brigade on the Federal right, lost its colors as it fell back before the onslaught of Lane's Brigade and Little's detachment of Anderson's Brigade.[156]

As General Lee oversaw the pursuit of the Federals, who quickly reassembled behind the second ravine,[157] the Confederates herded their prisoners to the rear under his eyes. An incident characteristic of the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia occurred. A Northern prisoner came up to Lee and complained that a rebel private had taken his hat, a matter of life and death in the murderous heat. Lee dropped everything, had the Federal point out the transgressing Confederate, and saw to the hat's return as if its recovery constituted as important a part of the General's duty as supervision of the fighting. "I wondered at him taking any notice of a prisoner in the midst of battle," wrote another Union soldier captured that day. "It showed what a heart he had for them."[158]

By the time that Miles' brigade left Gregg and the First Division's Fourth Brigade arrived from the left of Fussell's Mill Pond, the rebels had recaptured the works and Birney's men had begun to regroup for another attempt on them.[159] Gregg, however, soon had cause to rue Miles' departure.[160]

A section of Federal Artillery had unlimbered at the Charles City Road crossing of Fisher's Run. Mounted, the horsemen of Gregg's Second Brigade stretched away to the right, which left them poorly disposed to meet an attack from the left. Behind them stood a high rail fence. Further back flowed Fisher's Run, impassable except for the road crossing. In front of the Second Brigade's cavalrymen lay two hundred yards of open field. Beyond the open field, the dismounted skirmish line held the edge of the woods.[161]

Shortly after Miles' brigade had left, the rebel infantry that had disappeared in the direction of Fussell's Mill returned.[162] The Texas Brigade had done so much marching and countermarching in order to strike Gregg's left that even among such acclimated veterans, cases of sunstroke appeared. These elite soldiers still had enough fight in them, however, to inflict a blow that completely routed the Federals.[163]

At about 4 p.m., supported by artillery, Barringer's Brigade advanced along the Charles City Road while Gary's Brigade and the Texas Brigade struck Gregg's poorly guarded left. The Union artillery replied vigorously at first, but then limbered up and withdrew to a position behind Fisher's Run. The Confederates drove in the Federal skirmishers and quickly put the mounted line to flight.[164]

Gary's men brought under fire the Charles City Road crossing of Fisher's Run and cut off a substantial number of Northern cavalrymen. Of those cut off, some risked the rifle fire of the Texas Brigade in order to flee down the road across the run. Many horses returned to Union lines with empty saddles.[165] Others chose to negotiate White Oak Swamp, which bounded the Federal right. "Of those who plunged into the swamp," a member of the Texas Brigade later wrote, "a few excaped capture, but none a submersion, head and ears, in the foul-smelling ooze into which they and their steeds sank."[166] The Federals reformed and held on the south bank of Fisher's Run.[167] Opposite the Federals, the troopers of the 9th Virginia Cavalry enthusiastically took picket duty because it stationed them next to free, flowing water.[168]

During the collapse of Birney's position, Hancock had ordered Mott to make a demonstration against or, if possible, attack the rebel works on New Market Heights. Hancock suspected that the Confederates might have withdrawn so many troops from these works for counterattacks against Birney as to render the works vulnerable. At 3 p.m., Mott made the ordered demonstration and found the works too strong to attack. Toward evening, he made another demonstration, which found them still virtually impregnable. This demonstration, however, enabled his men to bring off the last of the seacoast howitzers captured by the 100th New York on August 14th.[169]

Meanwhile, Birney had regrouped his men for another attack on the rebel works above Fussell's mill pond. A reconnaissance indicated that so many Confederates had massed in his front that his force, even if it could take the works, could not exploit their capture. At 5:57 p.m., he called off the attack.[170]

Butler's men did not begin their advance until about 6 p.m., when Grant discouraged the advance and urged caution due to Hancock's standstill.[171] Around 950 men from Dutch Gap took a steamer about three quarters of a mile down river and debarked at Aiken's Landing, where they drove in the pickets of Johnson's Brigade.[172] About 700 men pushed out from Deep Bottom and drove in the pickets of the 25th Virginia Battalion.[173]

Thus ended the Petersburg campaign's most evenly contested day of fighting during August, 1864. The Federals had lost one flag and almost 2,000 men, including over 500 prisoners.[174] The rebels had lost three flags and about 1,000 men, including about 300 prisoners.[175]

The failure to position Terry to attack simultaneously with Gregg had eliminated any chance that Hancock had of driving the Confederates from the New Market Heights-Bailey's Creek position. Had Terry's division achieved its breakthrough before the arrival of Lane's and McGowan's Brigades on the left of the rebel infantry position behind

Bailey's Creek, the Southerners would not have had sufficient forces on their left to counterattack the right of the X Corps and the left of Gregg's force at the same time. Either the X Corps or Gregg's command would have had a better chance to hold on to a gain that would have rendered the New Market Heights-Bailey's Creek position untenable.

Despite the success of the Confederate counterattacks, the Federals had not fought for nothing. The Union attacks had forced Lee to summon Harris' Brigade from Mahone's Division at Petersburg and an ad hoc brigade under Lieutenant Colonel Frank Langley, consisting of the 1st, 11th and 19th Virginia, from Pickett's Division on the Howlett Line.[176]

That night Grant ordered a fleet of steamers to proceed to Deep Bottom and simulate a withdrawal in the hope that it would induce the Confederates to attack the supposedly weakened Union forces north of the James.[177]

CHAPTER 5

The Second Battle Of Deep Bottom, August 17-21, 1864

The Confederates did not take the bait, and no fighting of significance took place on August 17th.[1]

During the day, Grant evaluated his intelligence of Lee's dispositions and correctly determined that nearly all the Confederate cavalry south of Petersburg had come north of the James River along with three brigades of infantry. The general-in-chief decided to order the Army of the Potomac's V Corps, under Major General Gouverneur K. Warren, to proceed with the planned raid on the Weldon Railroad south of Petersburg.[2] At 10:15 p.m., Grant notified Hancock of Warren's projected movement and ordered Hancock to take advantage of any opportunity for success on his front.[3]

In the afternoon, the Federal high command determined that no benefit could arise from an advance from the position taken by Butler's men near Dutch Gap on the previous day. Butler's troops accordingly abandoned the position during the night.[4]

At about 4 p.m., a truce requested by Hancock went into effect to allow the removal of the wounded and the burial of the dead between the lines above Fussell's mill pond.[5] The truce provided Hancock with the first of the mortifications that he suffered during August, 1864. The Federals found not a single wounded man between the lines. The rebels had already removed them all. Under the circumstances, the request for a truce amounted to an admission of defeat. Hancock fumed over having admitted defeat for nothing.[6] To make matters worse, the admission diminished his outside chance of capturing a spot on the Democratic presidential ticket, whether as the candidate for president or for vice president.[7] Both sides exchanged the dead from within their lines, including the body of Chambliss.[8]

Field spent the day integrating into his position the two brigades of reinforcements that had arrived. Langley's provisional brigade from Pickett's Division marched and countermarched.[9] Harris' Brigade went toward the Confederate left, above Fussell's mill pond. There Brigadier General Nathaniel H. Harris took command of the entire detachment from Mahone's Division, and Colonel Joseph M. Jayne assumed command of Harris' Brigade.[10]

On August 18th, illness compelled Barlow to relinquish command of his division to Miles. Except for skirmishing and reconnoitering, no

significant fighting took place north of the James until near dark, when the Confederates attacked Hancock's right.[11]

Hampton and Lee had conceived an ambitious plan to drive Hancock's force back to the river. The plan called for the rebel cavalry to dislodge the Federals on the Charles City Road and then, with the assistance of the Southern infantry, to roll up the entire Union line. The Confederate horsemen had gotten into position to attack by 11 a.m., but a guide's mistake delayed Hampton's arrival at his command post at White Oak bridge. The firing of the gun assigned to signal the attack consequently did not occur until 5 p.m.[12]

As the shadows lengthened, W. H. F. Lee's Division attempted to cross Fisher's Run along the Charles City Road and Butler's Division advanced toward Riddell's Shop along the causeways crossing White Oak Swamp. Though the frontal attack of Rooney Lee's men stalled, Butler's Division advanced to Riddell's Shop and cut the Charles City Road in the rear of the Union position at Fisher's Run, forcing Gregg to communicate with the Federals to his left by means of a wood road. One-legged Brigadier General Matthew C. Butler (hereinafter referred to as "Matthew Butler") halted Young's Brigade at Riddell's Shop to await a linkup with W. H. F. Lee's Division. Rosser's Brigade, under Colonel Richard H. Dulany, pressed on for a mile and a half farther along the New Market and Long Bridge Road, into the rear of the Federals opposite the attacking rebel infantry. The Confederate horsemen captured 167 Federals.[13]

After the rebel cavalry had commenced the attack, Field sent forward the three left-most brigades of Southern infantry to feel the Union position, prevent Hancock from sending reinforcements to Gregg and assist in rolling up the Federal line. Conner's detachment of Wilcox's Division, with Lane's Brigade on the left and McGowan's Brigade on the right, formed the left of Field's ad hoc infantry corps. Harris' detachment of Mahone's Division, with Harris' Brigade on the left, Wright's Brigade in the center and Sanders' Brigade on the right, formed Field's center. The provisional divisions of John Gregg and Bratton formed the Southern right.[14] Lane's, McGowan's, and Harris' Brigades drove in the Federal pickets above Fussell's mill pond, "who came tumbling over the works like sheep," according to the historian of the 100th New York.[15] A shortfall of friendly artillery fire caused a momentary stampede of the 1st Maryland Cavalry (dismounted) and 100th New York of Foster's brigade, but Foster quickly reestablished his line with soldiers of the 10th Connecticut. The Confederate infantry found the Federal position too strong to attack.[16] After the firefight had gone on for half an hour, the Southern footsoldiers withdrew.[17] When darkness had fallen, Matthew Butler ordered Rosser's Brigade back to Riddell's Shop. There Dulany's men took up a position on the right of Young's Brigade, which had waited in vain for the arrival of Rooney's Lee's men.[18]

Later that night, in a driving rain, Langley's detachment of Pickett's Division relieved the Georgians of Wright's Brigade near Fussell's Mill.[19] W. H. F. Lee's Division of cavalry and Harris' three-brigade detachment of Mahone's Division departed for Petersburg in response to the request of General P. G. T. Beauregard for reinforcements to meet Warren's movements.[20]

Pursuant to orders from Grant, Hancock contracted his line and dispatched Mott's division to Petersburg, where it would take the place of part of the IX Corps sent by Meade to reinforce Warren. The departure of Mott's division left Hancock with Smyth's division on the left, then Miles' division, then the X Corps, and finally Gregg's cavalry on the right.[21]

By August 19th, things had become so quiet north of the James that the pickets of both sides began exchanging tobacco, coffee and newspapers.[22]

Before 10:30 a.m., Grant had determined that the Confederates had begun moving troops from north of the James to Petersburg. He ordered Hancock to attack with his whole force, screening the rest of his front with a mere skirmish line, if a weak spot appeared in the rebel dispositions.[23] At about 2 p.m,. pursuit to an order from the general-in-chief, Hancock sent the First Brigade of Gregg's cavalry division to Meade at Petersburg.[34] By the end of the day, Hancock found a weak spot in the Confederate line to the left of Fussell's Mill. He prepared to attack at daylight the following morning with part of Miles' division and William Birney's Colored Brigade. Hancock thought this force could carry the Confederate line, but he had little hope of holding the position or gaining any decisive advantage from its capture. After he had described the situation to Grant, the general-in-chief at 8 p.m. that evening suggested the abandonment of the plan, and Hancock followed Grant's suggestion.[25]

Early on the morning of August 19th, Confederate troops along the Howlett Line, facing Bermuda Hundred, detected the movement of Mott's division southward across the James.[26] In response to this movement, and to renewed fighting on the Weldon Railroad, Lee ordered to Petersburg Conner's two-brigade detachment of Wilcox's Division. Lee also ordered the ad hoc brigade from Pickett's Division to return to the Howlett Line. The withdrawals took place in the rain that night.[27]

No significant fighting occurred north of the James on August 20th. That night, pursuant to Grant's orders, Hancock withdrew the remainder of his command. The II Corps marched by way of Point of Rocks to Petersburg. The cavalry moved to Petersburg by way of Broadway Landing. The X Corps, which covered the withdrawal, itself withdrew to Bermuda Hundred.[28] The movement took place in another miserable downpour in which the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia himself travelled to Petersburg.[29]

At daybreak on August 21st, the rebel pickets found no Federals north of the James except for the garrison of the Deep Bottom bridgehead. Before 10 a.m., pursuant to orders from Lee, Field dispatched Anderson's Brigade to Petersburg. By 4:45 p.m., before Anderson's Brigade reached Swift Creek, Lee had reached Petersburg himself. At that time, he ordered Field to dispatch two more infantry brigades to Petersburg, and Field responded by sending Law's Brigade and Bratton's Brigade. At the same time, Lee ordered Hampton to Petersburg along with Butler's Division of cavalry.[30]

The Second Battle of Deep Bottom had ended. Hancock's forces had neither taken Richmond nor cut the Virginia Central Railroad. The threat that they had posed to those objectives, however, had prevented Lee from reinforcing Early with Field's Division of infantry and Butler's Division of cavalry. The same threat had also driven Lee to reinforce Field not only with a provisional brigade from Pickett's Division on the Howlett Line, opposite the Federal position on Bermuda Hundred, but with substantial forces from Petersburg — W. H. F. Lee's Division of cavalry and a three-brigade detachment from Mahone's Division of infantry — as well as Johnson's Brigade and the 25th Virginia Battalion from the Department of Richmond. When the Union V Corps reached the Weldon Railroad on August 18th, the rebels had one brigade of cavalry and fourteen brigades of infantry south of the Appomattox to oppose two cavalry brigades and twenty-seven infantry brigades.[31]

The Federals had lost 2,901 men north of the James, including 721 prisoners. The X Corps had suffered 1,678 casualties, including 311 prisoners. The II Corps had and suffered 964 casualties, including 321 prisoners. The Second Cavalry Division had suffered 259 casualties, including 89 prisoners.[32]

The rebels had lost around 1,500 men, including about 400 prisoners. Field's Division had lost approximately 600 men, including around 100 prisoners. The detachment of Wilcox's Division had lost just over 200 men, including about 35 prisoners. The detachment of Mahone's Division had lost over 400 men, including approximately 250 prisoners. The losses of the Confederate cavalry approached 300 men, including around 25 prisoners.[33]

The battle had used up most of the troops involved on both sides, though neither Grant nor Lee seemed to recognize this. A Confederate officer on Field's staff, writing to relatives shortly after the fighting north of the James had ended, said:

> Last week has been a very fatiguing one to us. For ten days we have not had time to pull off our boots; and as to sleep we have had to nap it, . . .at one time sleeping in a slushy rifle pit, at another in a shaky morass. This is very rough work. . .[34]

The historian of the 100th New York in Foster's brigade of the First Division of the X Corps later described what a week of fighting in hot, wet, vermin-infested woods did to those neither killed, wounded or captured in battle:

> On the arrival of the regiment in camp it was sent on picket. Dirty, sore of foot and stiff in body, we crawled to the picket line. So very warm had it been during the week of active service that the varnish "fried out" from the butt of my pistol at my back, and it was painful to touch the surface of my rubber blanket with my neck, and so pressed was my underclothing, that in removing it, the skin, in spots, came with it.[35]

Gary's Brigade of cavalry, Benning's and Gregg's Brigades of Field's Division, Johnson's Brigade and the 25th Virginia Battalion remained on the now silent battlefield, along with Brown's Battalion of light artillery.[36] Foster's brigade remained in the Deep Bottom entrenchments.[37] Except for this garrison, the X Corps occupied the relatively quiet Bermuda Hundred sector.[38] Opposite the X Corps, the ad hoc brigade from Pickett's Division helped man the Howlett Line.[39] Mott's Division held the Petersburg trenches from the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad to the Strong house.[40] The remainder of the Union and Confederate troops north of the James, as well as many others, headed for the Weldon Railroad and more fighting.[41]


MAP 5
Petersburg,
Globe Tavern and
Reams Station
Appomattox River
PETERSBURG
South Side R.R.
Cox Road
Confederate Works
Federal Works
Chieves
Jones
Strong
Johnson Road
Squirrel Level Road
Davis
Duncan Road
Hatcher's Run
Arthur Run
Flowers
Globe Tavern
Williams
Dr. Gurley
Halifax Road
Vaughan Road
White
Perkins
Jerusalem Plank Road
Boydton Plank Road
Armstrong's Mill
Wyatt
Weldon R.R.
Shay's Tavern
Quaker Road
Holly Church
Stage Road
Reams Station
Depot Road
Jones Hole Swamp
Tucker
Lanier
Temple
Vaughan Road
Monk's Neck Road
Smart
J. Parham
Shands
Haddon
Rowanty Creek

CHAPTER 6

The Battle Of Globe Tavern, August 18, 1864

Rain dominated the Battle of Globe Tavern almost as completely as heat dominated the Second Battle of Deep Bottom. The soldiers of both sides ate in the rain, slept in the rain, marched in the rain, entrenched in the rain and fought in the rain.[1] Mud and flooded passageways hindered their movements.[2] Wet ties hindered the Federals in their destruction of the Weldon Railroad.[3] Wet powder hindered the men of both sides in their destruction of one another.[4] The chaplain of the 1st New Jersey Cavalry of Gregg's division later wrote:

> The rain, which heretofore during the summer had been withheld to the point of utter drought, now seemed desirous to make up all arrears in the shortest time. All the approaches were flooded with standing water; and the passage of a wagon over the light, porous ground made deep ruts of gradually thickening mud. There seemed no really solid bottom to the soil. Wagon after wagon cut in deeper; until, on a road that three days sunshine would cover with incalculable dust, unloaded wagons sank above the axles, and had to be abandoned until the rains were over.[5]

On the afternoon of August 13th, as the men of the II Corps boarded the steamers at City Point for their trip to Deep Bottom, Meade ordered Warren to prepare his men to move upon short notice.[6] The V Corps occupied the extreme left of the Federal line outside Petersburg, within earshot of the rail traffic on the Weldon Railroad. "The whistle of the locomotive and the rattling of the trains could be distinctly heard in their passage to and from Petersburg," the historian of the 11th Pennsylvania in the Second Brigade of Warren's Third Division later wrote.[7]

That night, as Hancock's fleet approached Deep Bottom and the X Corps and cavalry plodded across the pontoon bridges, Major General Andrew A. Humphreys, Meade's chief-of-staff, explained to Warren the nature and objectives of the following day's movement north of the James. Humphreys told Warren that if the movement north of the James led to the almost entire abandonment of the rebel position at Petersburg, Meade would withdraw troops of the V Corps and the IX Corps from the trenches and send them upon an operation to take advantage of the situation.[8] At the time, the Army of the Potomac held a line extending from the Appomattox river to the Jerusalem Plank Road, with the XVIII Corps,

detached from the Army of the James, on the right, the IX Corps in the center and the V Corps on the left. The Cavalry Division of the Army of the James guarded the Army of the Potomac's left and rear.[9] According to a captain of the 83rd Pennsylvania in the Third Brigade of the First Division of the V Corps: "The army resembled a huge serpent lying coiled around the defenses of Petersburg, with its tail lapped around its chief artery of supply, and every now and then tightening its folds and giving the rebellion a more deadly hug."[10]

Opposite these Federals, four Confederate infantry divisions barred the way into Petersburg. Johnson's Division and Hoke's Division of the Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia, Beauregard's command, held the Confederate left. Johnson's Division had its left on the Appomattox and Hoke's Division on its right. To the right of Hoke's Division, Heth's Division of the Army of Northern Virginia's Third Corps occupied the rebel trenches. Mahone's Division, also of the Third Corps, defended the Confederate works to the right of Heth's Division.[11] Dearing's Brigade of cavalry, part of Beauregard's command, picketed the Weldon Railroad.[12] W. H. F. Lee's Division of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia held the extreme right at Reams Station.[13]

On the night of August 14th, as the X Corps slogged through the rain toward Fussell's mill pond, Meade withdrew the V Corps from the Petersburg trenches. The V Corps went into reserve while the IX Corps and the XVIII Corps shifted left and stretched to hold their extended lines. Now the XVIII Corps occupied the Union works from the Appomattox to the Crater, and the IX Corps defended the Federal trenches from the Crater to the Jerusalem Plank Road.[14]

By the evening of August 16th, Union intelligence officers had located two brigades from Mahone's Division north of the James.[15] Federal signal officers found indications of other rebel forces headed from Petersburg northward.[16] Though unsatisfied that the Confederates had weakened their Petersburg position enough that an attack by Warren would result in a material advantage, Meade at 9:20 p.m. ordered Warren to move out at 3 a.m. on the following morning by way of the Strong house and the shortest road and strike the Weldon Railroad near its intersection with the Vaughan Road, about two miles south of Petersburg. If the rebels held their entrenchments in that area weakly, Meade wanted Warren to carry them and occupy the crest behind the Confederate works opposite the IX and XVIII Corps.[17] Brigadier General August V. Kautz, the commander of the Cavalry Division of the Army of the James, at 9:45 p.m. received orders to guard Warren's left against an attack by rebel cavalry coming up from Reams Station.[18]

In issuing these orders, the commander of the Army of the Potomac and his chief-of-staff had anticipated Grant's reaction to the rebel move-

ments. Meade and Humphreys had misread the mind of the general-in-chief, however. Grant did not yet consider the situation ripe for the "grand raid" on the Weldon Railroad. He wanted the Confederates to commit still more of their forces to the battle north of the James before he unleashed Warren. At 10:15 p.m., orders went forth suspending the planned movement.[19]

By the early afternoon of August 17th, Grant had weighed the available intelligence and determined that nearly all the Confederate cavalry south of Petersburg and also three brigades of infantry from the Petersburg trenches had gone north of the James. Based on this estimate, he unenthusiastically ordered Meade to loose Warren on the Weldon Railroad on the following morning. The general-in-chief expected no decisive results under the prevailing circumstances. He ordered this movement in the hope that, with Kautz's aid, Warren might get to the railroad and destroy it for a few miles. Grant also still wanted to force Lee to withdraw men from Early in order that Sheridan might advantageously strike the balance of Early's troops.[20]

More optimistic than the general-in-chief, Meade anticipated no difficulty in Warren making a lodgement on the railroad and doubted that the rebels had men enough available to do more than slow the destruction of the railroad by keeping Warren on the alert by means of threats.[21] At 2:30 p.m., Meade ordered Warren to march at 4 a.m. on the following morning and try to strike the railroad in the vicinity of the Dr. Gurley house, or as near the rebel entrenchments as practicable. The commander of the Army of the Potomac told Warren to destroy the railroad as far to the south as possible and to take advantage of any Southern weakness, but not to assault fortifications.[22] The recent rains had made moving wheeled vehicles through the mud of the roads and fields nearly impossible, and Meade ordered Warren to travel light, with only part of the V Corps' ambulances and medical wagons.[23] Placing under Warren's orders a brigade of cavalry from Kautz's division, the commander of the Army of the Potomac emphasized his inability to reinforce Warren and warned that the V Corps must fend for itself. By 5:45 p.m., the quartermaster at City Point had forwarded to Warren 440 sets of implements for destroying railroad.[24]

Before 10 p.m. that night, Grant had grown more optimistic about Warren's movement. The general-in-chief had received intelligence that Mahone's Division and Johnson's Brigade had come north of the James, leaving the force at Petersburg reduced to a mere three divisions.[25] "Warren may find an opportunity to do more than I had expected," Grant telegraphed Meade.[26] Forwarding Grant's dispatch to Warren, Meade in his own accompanying message revived and reimposed the third and most ambitious of the objectives set forth in his orders of the previous

night — an attack that would flank the rebels out of their line opposite the XI and XVIII Corps.[27] In fact, the Confederates had two brigades more than three infantry divisions in the Petersburg trenches.[28]

At 4 a.m. on August 18th, as his troops broke camp, Warren expressed satisfaction with his orders in a telegram to Humphreys.[29] The V Corps moved out with the First Division in the lead, respectively followed by the Second Division, the Third Division and the Fourth Division. These divisions moved with their previously assigned batteries. The reserve artillery, half of the ambulances and four medicine wagons travelled in rear of the corps. No ordnance trains, battery wagons, forage wagons nor baggage wagons, except for spring wagons, encumbered the column.[30]

The V Corps marched at 5 a.m. Warren's men went south on the Jerusalem Plank Road for three miles from their camp near the Chieves house. Then the V Corps made a right turn on to the Vaughan Wagon Road, which intersected the Weldon Railroad at Globe Tavern about three miles farther west.[31]

As the Federals plodded along, the excessive heat prostrated about fifty men with sunstroke and caused straggling that temporarily cost some units up to half of their strength.[32] A soldier later wrote: "The day was one of those exceedingly close, sultry August dog-days, well known to every one who has served in Virginia, extremely debilitating and exhausting to both man and beast."[33]

By about 7 a.m., the head of the column had reached the Gurley house.[34] Near there, within a mile of the railroad, Brigadier General Charles Griffin, the commander of Warren's First Division, deployed his division's First and Second Brigades in line of battle.[35] The First Brigade, under Colonel William S. Tilton, formed to the right of the wagon road, with its left on the road. The Second Brigade, under Colonel Edgar M. Gregory, formed to the left of the road, with its right on the road.[36] By about 8:20 a.m., Griffin had completed his dispositions.[37] The V Corps resumed its advance.[38] The Federals, who had marched through thick woods all the way from the Jersualem Plank Road, now emerged into a corn field that stretched beyond the Weldon Railroad.[39] Soon they drove in the rebel cavalry pickets from Dearing's Brigade, and Griffin's First Brigade captured about twenty of the Confederate horsemen.[40]

Griffin's men reached the railroad and cut the telegraph line that ran beside the tracks at about 9 a.m.[41] The skirmishers who had preceded the battle line advanced about 500 yards west of the railroad and formed a line parallel to the tracks. Parts of the First and Second Brigades commenced the destruction of the railroad by tearing up the rails and ties.[42] A sergeant of the 121st Pennsylvania later described the destruction of the Weldon Railroad:


MAP 6
Globe Tavern
August 18
Woods
Woods
W. P. Davis
Wells
HETH
Weldon R.R.
Corn
Corn
Davis
Walker
Hartshorne
Newcomb
Hayes
Dushane
Lyle
Woods
AYRES
15 N.Y.H.A.
Wheelock
Woods
Bragg
CRAWFORD
Vaughan Road
Corn
Hofmann
CUTLER
Corn
Flowers
Blick
Dunlop
Gwyn
Corn
WARREN
Tilton
Globe Tavern
Woods
GRIFFIN
Gregory
Halifax Road

> . . .at the word of command, every man took hold of the rail and lifted the track, ties and all, bodily from the road-bed. While the troops on the right rolled the huge ladder in one direction, those on the left rolled it in the opposite direction, forming an immense screw, until finally it was forced to pieces, when the ties were gathered together in piles short distances apart, and the rails laid crossways on top, and fire applied, and the destruction was complete. The rails becoming red-hot in the middle were taken off and bent round and round a telegraph pole or a tree most convenient, and not a rail left was used again. . .[43]

Though the Union soldiers stacked the ties with the rails on top of them, the showers that had made the roads nearly impassable seriously interfered with the heating of the rails.[44] When the weather permitted, the men of the V Corps formed the heated rails into rough Maltese crosses — the emblem of their corps.[45]

Having attained the first of his objectives, a lodgement on the Weldon Railroad, Warren pursued the second, to extend his hold on the railroad as far as possible toward the enemy's entrenchments.[46] Another part of the First Brigade received orders to remain in line of battle, position itself astride the railroad and proceed about a third of a mile up the tracks toward Petersburg. The as yet uncommitted portion of the Second Brigade began building breastworks.[47] Rails and ties that the V Corps did not burn found their way into some of these works.[48] The Third Brigade, which reached the railroad soon after the rest of Griffin's division, went into reserve.[49]

Warren's Second Division, commanded by Brigadier General Romeyn B. Ayres, reached the railroad at about 10 a.m.[50] The sunstroke and straggling caused by the terrible heat compelled the V Corps to move slowly, however. Not until nearly 11 a.m. had Ayres completed his dispositions for advancing up the railroad toward Petersburg.[51] Ayres deployed his men near the Blick house, less than a quarter mile north of where the V Corps had first struck the railroad.[52] The First Brigade, under Brigadier General Joseph Hayes, formed a double line of battle across the railroad, with the 12th U.S. Infantry, the 146th New York and part of the 140th New York thrown out as skirmishers.[53] This brigade relieved the men from the First Division's First Brigade who had advanced up the railroad toward Petersburg, and these men returned to their command and began turning over track.[54] The Second Division's Second Brigade, the Maryland Brigade, under Colonel Nathan T. Dushane, formed in line protecting the left flank of Hayes.[55] Ayres positioned the 15th New York Heavy Artillery, which constituted the Third Brigade, in support of Hayes and Dushane.[56] Battery C of the 1st Massachusetts Light Artillery unlimbered its four

Napoleons near the Brick house in order to reply to the fire of a pair of rebel guns about three quarters of a mile north on the railroad.[57]

Shortly before 11 a.m., Ayres began moving up the Weldon Railroad toward Petersburg. The effects of the heat on his men still compelled him to proceed slowly.[58] Soon the Federals entered the dense growth of pine and oak that near the railroad formed the northern border of the clearing around Globe Tavern. The clutching underbrush further slowed movement. At about 1 p.m., after an advance of about 1,100 yards under a heavy artillery fire, the Union skirmishers began to engage a rebel skirmish line.[59] Soon afterward, the rain that had fallen all day began to come down hard.[60]

Warren decided to extend his line to the right until he could turn the rebel left flank.[61] He ordered his Third Division, under Brigadier General Samuel W. Crawford, to advance in line of battle and connect its left with the right of the Second Division, which extended fifty to 100 yards east of the railroad. Crawford had his First Brigade on his left, his Second Brigade as his center and his Third Brigade on his right. Deploying the 107th Pennsylvania as skirmishers, Crawford sent them forward into the dense, swampy, almost impenetrable thicket to the right of the railroad.[62] The 107th advanced about twenty yards into the woods and then halted for further orders.[63] Discovering that this regiment did not properly cover his front, Crawford shifted it to the right and replaced it with the 190th Pennsylvania, the "Seven Shooters."[64]

While arranging his skirmish line in the pouring rain and under artillery fire from the Confederate guns near the W. P. Davis house, Crawford sent a staff officer to locate the right of the Second Division.[65] The terrain proved so difficult that, when the staff officer returned with the desired information, Crawford began moving his division forward one brigade at a time, from left to right.[66] As the First Brigade advanced into the woods, its commander, Colonel Peter Lyle, found the underbrush so thick and tangled that he decided to send his brigade forward one regiment at a time, also from left to right. The 16th Maine, on the extreme left of Lyle's brigade, drew the assignment of going forward first. When the 16th Maine located the Second Division, Lyle brought up the 39th Massachusetts on the right of the 16th, then the 90th Pennsylvania on the 39th's right.[67] A gap of 150 yards still remained between the Second Division, which by now had moved completely west of the railroad, and the 16th Maine, however.[68]

As Crawford's division inched forward and Ayres' battle line slogged into position, the Second Division's skirmishers continued their advance. The Union skirmish line drove the rebel skirmishers back and soon emerged from the northern edge of the belt of woods that formed the northern border of the fields surrounding Globe Tavern.[69] The belt of woods

had proven about 500 yards wide.[70]

Threatened by this advance, the Confederacy battery limbered up and withdrew to a safer position nearer Petersburg.[71] Battery C, 1st Massachusetts limbered up, advanced and unlimbered at the northern edge of the woods. The artillery duel resumed.[72]

Ayres' skirmishers pushed their rebel counterparts through the Davis corn field and beyond the Davis house toward another belt of woods.[73] The Davis house stood where the Vaughan Road slanted off southwestwardly toward Dinwiddie Court House from the Halifax Road, which ran parallel to the railroad.[74] The Union skirmishers halted short of the woods beyond the Davis house, waiting for their battle lines to arrive within supporting distance.[75]

Hayes' battle line came to a halt about thirty yards back from the northern edge of the woods between the Davis house and Globe Tavern.[76] Dushane's brigade stopped about seventy yards back from Hayes' left.[77]

At about 2 p.m., as the skirmish line of the Second Division moved forward again toward the woods north of the Davis corn field, Ayres' skirmishers saw two strong Southern battle lines rise fifty yards in front of them and heard the eerie ululation of the rebel yell. The Confederates blasted the skirmishers with a volley, then charged.[78]

Throughout the morning, Brigadier General James Dearing had forwarded reports of the progress of the Federal column to General P. G. T. Beauregard near Petersburg. Beauregard commanded at Petersburg in the absence of Lee, who remained north of the James. Around 10 a.m., Beauregard received from Dearing a report that Union infantry and cavalry had driven in Dearing's pickets and reserve in front of Glove Tavern just as he prepared to lead another one of his regiments to that location. Beauregard immediately forwarded this message to Lee's headquarters at Chaffin's Bluff with a request for cavalry reinforcements.[79]

Just before noon, Beauregard received a dispatch from Dearing reporting the Federals advancing on the railroad and the Vaughan Road, which intersected the railroad at the Davis house and led southwest. This movement posed a threat to all the Confederate supply lines south of the Appomattox — the Weldon Railroad, the Boydton Plank Road and the South Side Railroad.[80] Beauregard decided to commit half of his reserve to support Dearing. Through Lieutenant General Ambrose P. Hill, the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia's Third Corps, Davis' Brigade and Walker's Brigade of Heth's Division received orders to move out under the command of Major General Henry Heth.[81] Davis' Brigade, stationed a mile behind the front line, went at two thirds strength. One third of its men, detailed that morning, remained at work on the breastworks.[82] Because the departure of Heth's force left Beauregard with only

two brigades in reserve, he ordered Heth to return his brigades to their positions at Petersburg that evening.[83] The four Napoleons of the Letcher Artillery accompanied Heth's men.[84]

Soon afterward, displaying the boldness which had characterized his brilliant defense of Petersburg during the initial Federal onslaught in June, Beauregard ordered Colquitt's Brigade of Hoke's Division to join Heth's men.[85] This left Beauregard with only four regiments in reserve, one from each of the brigades of Johnson's Division, in case of a Federal attack on the Petersburg trenches by the Union XI or XVIII Corps.[86] Colquitt's Brigade began its march shortly after 1 p.m.[87]

Around the same time, the Union skirmishers emerged from the belt of woods north of Globe Tavern and drove Dearing's men through the Davis corn field and beyond the Davis house.[88] This advance compelled the retreat of the section of the Petersburg Artillery that had harassed the Federals for the past two hours.[89] The Northern skirmishers halted short of the woods beyond the Davis house in order to wait for their battle line to catch up with them.[90] Dearing mistakenly thought that his force of about 500 cavalry had checked the Federals, and he underestimated Union strength as only a few regiments of infantry and one or two of cavalry.[91]

As the Federal skirmishers marked time near the Davis house, Heth's men completed their march of about three miles.[92] As soon as the Confederate infantry came within sight of the Federals, the rebels formed in line of battle.[93] Brigadier General Joseph Davis's brigade formed on the right of the railroad, with its left resting on the tracks. Walker's Brigade, under the command of Colonel Robert M. Mayo, formed on the left of Davis' Brigade, with its right resting on the tracks. Heth put out skirmishers, who relieved Dearing's men. Then Heth ordered an attack.[94]

The Confederates charged "with dash and spirit, at double-quick."[95] The Union skirmishers panicked and fled without firing a shot.[96] The Southerners drove the Federal skirmishers through the Davis corn field into the belt of woods between the corn field and Globe Tavern.[97] The rebels then struck Hayes' battle line, thirty yards deep into the woods. Overlapping the flanks of Hayes' brigade, the Southerners quickly took advantage of the seventy yard gap between the battle lines of Hayes and Dushane, and the 150 yard gap between Hayes' battle line and the 16th Maine. Hayes' brigade rapidly gave way and retreated to the rear edge of the woods.[98]

On the right of the railroad, the Mississippians and North Carolinians of Davis' Brigade briefly paused to reform after entering the woods and putting Hayes' brigade to flight. Then they continued their charge, but they had not gone more than forty yards through the thick brush before they encountered the Maryland Brigade. At the first crash of musketry, Dushane had at once formed his men in line of battle on the left of the

First Brigade, leaving nothing to protect his own left flank but skirmishers. Now, crouching unseen behind hastily erected breastworks around fifty yards away from Davis' Confederates, the Marylanders stood and fired a volley that seemed a sheet of flame in the darkness of the woods. Stunned, the center of Davis' Brigade momentarily fell back about fifty yards.[99]

Dushane's men no sooner repulsed the rebels in front of them than they found themselves outflanked. The retreat of Hayes' brigade had created a gap which the Confederates immediately exploited, and the rebels curled around the right flank of the Maryland Brigade. The far right of Davis' battle line, overlapping Dushane's brigade, assailed the left flank of the Marylanders. Rallying, the center of Davis' Brigade resumed its advance. Dushane ordered his Marylanders to retreat, but the density of the woods and the proximity of the rebels turned this retreat into a rout. The collapse of Dushane's brigade endangered Battery C, 1st Massachusetts Light Artillery and forced the artillerymen to draw their guns rearward by hand.[100]

Ayres reacted rapidly to the sound of heavy firing and committed his divisional reserve. The 15th New York Heavy Artillery formed line near the rear edge of the woods. The First Brigade reformed on the 15th's right. The Marylanders, after disentangling themselves from the woods, rallied on the left of the heavy artillerymen. Ayres additionally asked Warren for reinforcements.[101]

East of the railroad, the Alabamians, Marylanders, Tennesseans and Virginians of Walker's Brigade also took advantage of the gap created by Hayes' retreat. The 16th Maine briefly held its ground against them, but soon the rebels worked their way around this regiment's flank and into its rear. Discovering this, the men from Maine fell back along with the 39th Massachuetts and the 90th Pennsylvania, the only other regiments that Lyle had managed to bring up through the thicket at this time.[102]

After retreating about 150 yards southeastwardly, which widened the gap between Ayres and Crawford, those of Lyle's men who had escaped encountered the left of the Third Division's Second Brigade. Under the command of Colonel Richard Coulter, the Second Brigade by now had advanced into the woods north of the Globe Tavern clearing.[103] Upon meeting the fugitives from Lyle's brigade, Coulter, who had not completely recovered from previous wounds, relinquished command to Colonel Charles Wheelock. This officer immediately threw forward three companies of the 97th New York as skirmishers and deployed the brigade into line extending to the right, with the 88th Pennsylvania faced to the right on the right flank. Lyle's men reformed on Coulter's left.[104]. Lyle's three leftmost regiments, the 16th Maine, 39th Massachusetts and 90th Pennsylvania, formed on the left of the 104th New York.[105]

Warren responded as quickly to the unmistakable sound of battle as had Dushane and Ayres. The commander of the V Corps ordered Brigadier General Lysander Cutler, commander of the Fourth Division, to send his Second Brigade, commanded by Colonel J. William Hofmann, to cover the interval between Ayres and Crawford. Half of Hofmann's men had fallen out during the morning's march, but most of the stragglers had reported during the two hours that the brigade had spent resting near Glove Tavern.[106]

Hofmann's brigade marched to the edge of the woods north of the Tavern. There Hofmann deployed his men in line of battle, with their left on the railroad. He sent the 147th New York forward as skirmishers.[107] The 147th advanced through the forest until it encountered the rebels, and then the New Yorkers fired blindly at them in woods and brush that limited visibility to less than twenty yards.[108]

Warren also called upon the commander of his artillery brigade, Colonel Charles S. Wainwright, for support. Wainwright brought six batteries into position in a line running from just west of the Blick house to east of the railroad. As Ayres' men emerged from the woods, twenty-four guns opened fire. They soon silenced the Letcher Artillery, which had unlimbered near the Davis House, and they slowed the advance of Davis' Brigade.[109]

Meanwhile, Warren received Ayres' request for reinforcements. The commander of the V Corps ordered Cutler to send one of his two brigades to the aid of the Second Division. Cutler decided to send Hofmann's brigade.[110]

The commander of the Fourth Division then dispatched his First Brigade, under Brigadier General Edward S. Bragg, to cover the interval between Ayres and Crawford. As Hofmann's brigade, except for the 147th New York, shifted to the west of the railroad, Bragg's brigade took its place. Bragg sent forward the 6th Wisconsin as skirmishers while he entrenched his main line.[111] The 6th Wisconsin advanced until it joined the 147th New York and came under the command of the 147th's Lieutenant Colonel George Harney.[112] Left of the railroad, Hofmann's brigade relieved the Maryland Brigade and engaged Davis's Mississippians and Tarheels.[113] Ayres now had Hayes on the railroad, the 15th New York Heavy Artillery to the left of Hayes, Hofmann's brigade on the left of the heavy artillerymen and the Maryland Brigade on Hofmann's left, curving to the rear.[114]

Finally, Warren ordered the First Division's Third Brigade out of reserve and into the fight on the right of the railroad.[115] The Third Brigade, under the command of Colonel James Gwyn, formed line of battle, and moved to support the Third Division.[116] Mindful of Meade's admonition that the V Corps must fend for itself, Warren left the rest of the First Divi-

sion in reserve to look out for flank attacks.[117]

The commander of the V Corps then rode into the struggle on Whitey, his bay horse. Whitey made a good target for a Confederate sharpshooter, who shot the animal between the eyes. Horse and rider both went down, but Warren survived unhurt and Whitey survived miracuously — the bullet had deflected instead of penetrating the horse's skull.[118]

Outnumbered in manpower approximately three to one and in artillery support by at least four to one, Heth's men finally came to a halt about 2:30 p.m.[119] The Confederates had pushed Ayres' soldiers back from the edge of the woods north of the Davis house to the northern edge of the clearing around Globe Tavern, a distance of about three quarters of a mile. The rebels had taken two lines of hastily constructed breastworks.[120] They had also retaken the Rev. Thomas B. Flowers house, which stood near the Vaughan Road approximately due west of the Blick house and which the Union cavalry had occupied around 11 a.m.[121] "The enemy was found to be in much stronger force than was at first supposed," Heth later wrote, "and the two brigades had done all that could be expected of them."[122] A static firefight with the Federals now began.[123]

The crisis had passed before Gwyn's brigade engaged the rebels, and Gwyn received orders to move left of the railroad and build breastworks. Griffin put Gwyn's men on the extreme left of the First Division.[124] With Tilton's brigade on its right, Gregory's brigade in the center and Gwyn's brigade on the left, the First Division stretched from the left of the Maryland Brigade to a point about a mile south of the Blick house.[125]

By about 4 p.m., Warren had reorganized his corps and resumed his advance toward Petersburg.[126] Though both Ayres and Crawford received orders to advance, Ayres had almost all of his men entrench.[127] Not until shortly before dark did he attempt to advance, and then he sent forward only a skirmish line formed of the 76th New York and 157th Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant Colonel John E. Cook. Under a heavy skirmish fire, this detachment from Hofmann's brigade found it impossible to advance farther than half way through the woods to the Davis corn field, its objective.[128]

The advance by the men east of the railroad took the form of a slow left wheel. Skirmishing all the way, Harney's ad hoc brigade from the Fourth Division on the left and Crawford's division on the right slowly drove Walker's Brigade back from two chains of hastily constructed rifle pits to the rebel entrenchments on the north edge of the Davis corn field.[129] "To advance my line was a matter of the greatest difficulty," Crawford later wrote. "So dense and tangled was the undergrowth, and so interspersed with swamps, that it was almost impossible to keep up the connection or to see beyond twenty or thirty feet."[130] Losing contact with the Third Brigade's 191st Pennsylvania, deployed as skirmishers on

Wheelock's right, Wheelock's brigade stumbled into a point blank volley when it unsuspectingly came upon the Confederate works about 100 yards beyond the right of the Second Division.[131] As night came on, a picket line from Lyle's brigade relieved Harney's men.[132] Crawford's division entrenched.[133]

Shortly before Wheelock reached the rebel works, the Georgians of Colquitt's Brigade had finally arrived in the rear of Walker's Brigade and formed line of battle. heth did not attack with Colquitt's men, but the Federals captured a number of the Georgian pickets.[134]

While Crawford advanced, Wainwright rearranged his batteries. He ordered the four Napoleons of the 15th Battery, New York Light Artillery 100 yards farther to the west of the brick house and the four Napoleons of Battery H, 1st New York Light Artillery west of the Halifax Road in order that these batteries might fire to the north or west. To the right and rear of the easternmost battery of the line of six that crossed the railroad, Wainwright emplaced four more batteries along the Halifax Road facing east.[135]

Having decided to hold his position, Warren ordered all timber slashed and all obstructions thrown down between the railroad and the Vaughan Road. He ordered Ayres to slash all the timber in his front. Ayres went Warren one better and on his own initiative ordered a deep ditch dug across the railroad and the Halifax Road. Warren ordered Crawford to make himself as strong as possible and hold his position until morning, when he would receive Bragg's brigade as a reinforcement with which to replace the cavalry pickets who connected with the pickets of the IX Corps. The commander of the V Corps thought that only a very large Confederate force could succeed in driving him from his present position.[136]

Despite Meade's admonition that the V Corps must fend for itself, he and Grant had every intention of reinforcing Warren. At 10:30 p.m. on August 17th, while informing Hancock of Warren's orders for August 18th, Grant had told Hancock that Warren's movement might lead to a withdrawal of troops from Hancock's front.[137] At 10:30 a.m. on August 18th, before receiving any word whatsoever of Warren's progress, Grant telegraphed Hancock that if he could spare a division and still hold his position, he should send one to Meade that night. Hancock replied that he would send Mott's division.[138] Shortly after noon, Grant telegraphed Meade that after withdrawing from the north side of the James, Hancock would go to Warren's support.[139] Between 6 p.m. and 7:15 p.m., Grant informed Meade that Hancock would not bring his entire corps but would send a single division.[140] At 8:20 p.m., Mott received orders to report to Meade.[141]

Because the distance precluded Mott's arrival at Warren's position

before noon on August 19th in any state other than exhaustion, at 7:40 p.m. Grant suggested that Meade use Mott's division of about 5,000 men to relieve an equivalent number of troops from the IX Corps and then use those troops to reinforce Warren.[142] Meade immediately began to implement the general-in-chief's suggestion.[143]

Mott's division could not reach the IX Corps before morning. Meade and Humphreys on their own initiative figured out a way to send reinforcements to Warren sooner.[144] At 9:50 p.m., Meade ordered Major General Edward O. C. Ord, the commander of the XVIII Corps, to send his reserve of 1,500 men to the IX Corps.[145] Major General John G. Parke, the commander of the IX Corps, would use Ord's reserve to relieve his Third Division of 1,000 to 1,200 men.[146] The Third Division would leave for Warren's position at 3 a.m. and would arrive around daybreak.[147] The First and Second Divisions of the IX Corps would leave to join Warren as soon as Mott's division relieved them.[148] Though Warren had used less than half of the cavalry directed to report to him, at 8 p.m. Kautz received orders to put another cavalry regiment at Warren's disposal.[149]

The Confederate high command also hastened forces to the Weldon Railroad.

By 7 p.m., Beauregard had received Heth's account of the battle. Heth reported driving the Federals about a mile from the Davis house and taking over 150 prisoners from three divisions of the V Corps. He believed that, if reinforced, he could drive the Federals from the railroad. Beauregard forwarded to Lee Heth's report and request for reinforcements with the comment, "He has already all I can spare, three brigades of infantry, which must return to vicinity of lines during night."[150] In fact, Heth's two brigades remained near the Davis house.[151] Only Colquitt's Brigade returned to Petersburg. Held in reserve in case of a seemingly imminent attack on the eastern approaches of Petersburg by the IX and XVIII Corps, Colquitt's Brigade did not get much rest.[152]

Upon receipt of Beauregard's message, Lee did not follow up the late afternoon's attack north of the James. That night the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia ordered back to Petersburg W. H. F. Lee's Division of cavalry and Harris' three-brigade detachment of Mahone's Division.[153] Though Lee had written off the Weldon Railroad as indefensible within days of Grant's June crossing of the James, the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia did not intend to abandon the railroad without a fight. If he did not succeed in driving the Federals from the railroad, he intended to make them pay as dear a price as possible for cutting the important supply line.[154] "It is touching a tiger's cubs to get on that road!" an officer on Meade's staff wrote on the following day in regard to Heth's August 18th attack. "They will not stand it."[155]

In the fields, scrubs and swamps along the Weldon Railroad, firing had died out by midnight.[156] The Federals had lost over 900 men, including almost 200 prisoners.[157] Rebel killed, wounded and missing totalled about 350.[158]

As on the first day of battle north of the James, Grant had attained his less ambitious objectives on the first day of this operation. His forces had gained a lodgement on the Weldon Railroad and entrenched as closely as practicable to Petersburg.

That the movement north of the James had drawn away from Petersburg three brigades of Confederate infantry had proven truly fortunate for the Union. The qualitative superiority of the Army of Northern Virginia over the Army of the Potomac had reached the point where Warren had needed almost three Union divisions with overwhelming artillery support to stop the less disciplined half of Heth's Division.[159] In all probability, a five-brigade attack by the Confederates on August 18th would have driven the V Corps from the railroad.

In the days to come, however, the rebels trying to drive the Federals from the railroad would have to contend with more than just the V Corps, and Warren would no longer have the element of surprise working to keep down the number of Confederates opposing him. Both sides had entered into a race to reinforce their forces on the railroad, with the railroad itself as prize.

CHAPTER 7

The Battle Of Globe Tavern, August 19, 1864

At about 2 a.m. on the morning of August 19th, Warren ordered Bragg's small brigade of 760 men to report to Crawford. Bragg and his brigade reached Crawford around an hour later. Crawford ordered Bragg to proceed to his right flank and take position there until further orders came. A captain on Crawford's staff conducted Bragg to his assigned position.[1]

The troops from the XVIII Corps arrived behind the sector of the Third Division of the IX Corps shortly after 2 a.m. The relief and assembly of the Third Division took place under a heavy fire from Confederate artillery and sharpshooters. At about 3:30 a.m., Brigadier General Orlando B. Willcox, the commander of the Third Division, gave the order to march. The Third Division set off to join the V Corps on the Weldon Railroad.[2]

At daybreak, Colonel Samuel Spear's brigade of the Cavalry Division of the Army of the James advanced southward down the Weldon Railroad from Globe Tavern. His horsemen drove the Confederate cavalry pickets to within a mile of Reams Station. Halting, Spear picketed all the roads between that point and Globe Tavern coming in from the west.[3]

Bragg's brigade finally reached the right of Crawford's position at daybreak. Bragg deployed the 1st Battalion New York Sharpshooters and a portion of the 7th Indiana to relieve the 88th Pennsylvania, which faced to the right on the right of Wheelock's brigade. The left of Bragg's picket line connected with the right of Crawford's Third Brigade, commanded by Colonel William R. Hartshorne. Crawford had assigned Hartshorne's brigade the duty of picketing the front of Lyle's and Wheelock's brigade. Bragg slightly refused the right of his picket line, which rested in the air. He entrenched the remainder of his command at a cross-road about 100 yards behind his picket line.[4]

At 7:00 a.m., the captain from Crawford's staff who had led Bragg to his current position brought to Bragg's headquarters a captain from Warren's staff.[5] The captain from Warren's staff brought verbal orders for Bragg that gave rise to misunderstandings which had nearly fatal consequences for the entire V Corps.[6]

Warren wanted Bragg to push out a line of skirmishers by the flank a few degrees north of east from the right of Crawford's line until the skirmishers met the rebels. The commander of the V Corps then wanted the skirmishers to fall to the rear a short distance and push on by the flank as

closely as possible to the Confederates until the skirmishers made contact with the pickets of the IX Corps.[7]

Instead of communicating those orders directly to Bragg, however, Warren's staff captain communicated them to the captain from Crawford's staff.[8] Worse, the captain from Warren's staff failed to make clear exactly where Warren wanted Bragg to establish the line. Warren wanted Bragg's picket line to connect with the IX Corps about three quarters of a mile north of the Strong house. This line would have extended from the right of Hartshorne's brigade a few degrees north of east and would have detected any Confederate force moving around Crawford's right and into his rear.[9]

In the presence of Warren's staff captain and Bragg, the captain from Crawford's staff interpreted what the captain from Warren's staff said to mean that Warren merely wanted Bragg to deploy his brigade along the shortest line to connect with the pickets of the IX Corps. The captain from Warren's staff replied uncertainly. Crawford's staff captain indicated that Bragg ought to connect with the IX Corps near the Jones house, about three quarters of a mile northeast of the Strong house.[10] This line would have stretched southeast by east from the right of Hartshorne's brigade and would have permitted a rebel force to move into Crawford's right rear before encountering Bragg's pickets.

After listening to this confusing colloquy, Bragg sent an officer from his own staff to find the near end of the IX Corps line.[11] Soon Bragg located the pickets of the IX Corps on the road passing the Aiken house, a mile and a half behind his refused right. A "dense tangled thicket" filled the intervening distance, and Bragg deployed his men on the Johnson Road until he established contact with the IX Corps pickets.[12] After a ride over to the IX Corps line as far as the Strong house, Bragg determined that he should position his right at that location.[13] A line from Hartshorne's right to the Strong house would stretch southeastward and would allow a force of Confederates to move undetected even farther into Crawford's right rear than a line with its right at the Jones house.

At about the same time as Warren's staff captain reached Bragg, Mott and his division began arriving in the rear of the IX Corps.[14] Mott's rain-soaked, exhausted men had crossed the James at 10 p.m., paused on Jones Neck, resumed their march at 1 a.m. and crossed the Appomattox at 3 p.m. The II Corps soldiers began relieving the First and Second Divisions of the IX Corps immediately.[15] Waist-deep water in the covered way compelled the troops to expose themselves to enemy fire during this relief operation and delayed it considerably.[16] The II Corps troops did not complete the relief of the IX Corps' First Division, commanded by Brigadier General Julius White, until 2 p.m. After assembling near divisional headquarters near the Jones house, White's division did not march


MAP 7
Globe Tavern
August 19
The Confederate Attack
HILL
W. P. Davis
Wells
HETH
Hartshorne
Walker
Clingman
Bragg
1
Clingman
Wheelock
CRAWFORD
2
MAHONE
Davis
Newcomb
Lyle
Hayes
Colquitt
Colquitt
Weisiger
15 N.Y.H.A.
Hofmann
Dushane
AYRES
WARREN
Flowers
Blick
Dunlop
Aiken
Gwyn
Lanier
GRIFFIN
Hartranft
Tilton
Globe
Tavern
Humphrey
WILLCOX
Gregory
Dr. Gurley

until 3 p.m.[17]

Returning to the right of his brigade at about 8 a.m., Bragg ordered a left half-wheel, guiding his right by the front of the IX Corps line.[18] "This movement was attended with great difficulty," Bragg later wrote. "The nature of the wood, the pelting storm, and the extended line encumbered and seriously embarrassed the whole operation; . . ."[19] The 9th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery near Globe Tavern shelled the woods on the far right in order to dislodge rebel skirmishers, and this also hindered Bragg's deployment. The right of Bragg's line floundered toward the Strong house for hours.[20]

At about 7:30 a.m., having marched by way of the Gurley house, Willcox's division of the IX Corps reached Globe Tavern. The division received orders to bivouac in the field to the east of the Tavern. Willcox formed his division in two lines in the field, positioning the first line about 500 yards behind and nearly parallel with the right of Crawford's division. Willcox sent staff officers to ascertain the positions of and routes to the various divisions of the V Corps. His men drew rations in the pouring rain.[21] The historian of the 50th Pennsylvania later wrote:

> Some of us were sent after wood, while others commenced building fires, and our Regimental Commissary Sergeant issued a ration of salt mackerel, which caused considerable amusement among the men. Instead of putting them in pans, as we did at home, we threw them into holes filled with rain water, to soak.[22]

Before 8:50 a.m., Grant had decided that Hancock, by detaining a large force of rebels north of the James, made the Federal force at Petersburg as strong as if he had his men there. Noting the sensitivity of the Confederates to thrusts toward Chaffin's Bluff, Grant determined to threaten as long a line as possible as the best way to force the rebels to withdraw reinforcements sent to Early in the Shenandoah.[23]

By 9 a.m., the pickets in front of Hayes and Lyle had advanced. In front of Lyle's brigade, the 190th Pennsylvania discovered that the rebels had pulled back. Hayes' men pushed forward to the southern edge of the Davis corn field, recovering a number of Federal wounded who reported the Confederates feeling their way toward the Union left.[24]

Shortly before 10:15 a.m., Warren learned from Crawford that Bragg had established contact with the IX Corps pickets a quarter of a mile northeast of the Aiken house. Warren's staff captain had not yet returned, but a discussion with another member of his staff convinced Warren that Crawford had not established the picket line where Warren had intended. At 10:15 a.m., Warren sent Crawford a written message that Bragg's skirmishers should stretch northeastward, not southward, from the extreme

right of Hartshorne's brigade.[25]

Satisfied of Bragg's compliance with Warren's orders by an 8 a.m. trip along the IX Corps line to the Strong house, Crawford did not act upon this message until about noon.[26] He and a member of his staff rode up the line held in the morning by the IX Corps, which soldiers of the II Corps had already relieved, in search of the right of Bragg's picket line. Crawford departed for his left without finding the junction of Bragg's right with the II Corps line, but the staff officer located it at about 2:30 p.m. in the woods opposite the Strong house, where Bragg's men had just arrived after struggling for hours through the thick underbrush and dense timber.[27]

Shortly after noon, Meade headed for Warren's headquarters.[28] "It was raining steadily, and we went slop, slop along," wrote a member of Meade's staff who accompanied Meade.[29] Near the Chieves house, Meade encountered "a damp brigade of Potter's division." The commander of the Army of the Potomac prodded along these rain-soaked soldiers, in case Warren should need them. Meade then proceeded along the Vaughan Wagon Road past the Aiken house to the headquarters of the V Corps at Globe Tavern.[30]

The flaw in Warren's position cried out for rectification.[31] A member of Meade's staff later wrote: "It could scarcely fail to strike me that, while his left flank was well protected, his right was 'in the air,' having nothing in connection with it but the picket line."[32] Warren, however, failed to correct his dispositions. Meade did not even notice the problem.[33]

At about 1 p.m., the rebels advanced a strong skirmish line through the Davis corn field and into the woods, striking the right of the 190th Pennsylvania and the front of the 191st Pennsylvania. After a short struggle, the Seven Shooters forced the Confederates to withdraw.[34]

Approximately an hour later, Hartshorne recalled his pickets, contracted his line to the right and put his veterans to work entrenching.[35] The brigades of Hayes, Lyle and Wheelock shifted to the right in order to cover the ground evacuated by Hartshorne's skirmishers.[36] The 12th and 14th U.S. Infantry of Hayes' brigade found themselves on the front line to the right of the railroad. The 14th had its left on the railroad and its right on the 12th. The rest of Hayes' brigade remained on the left of the railroad.[37]

As soon as Bragg had established the right of his line near the Strong house, at 2:30 p.m., he returned to his headquarters. There he met a major from Warren's staff who wanted Bragg to advance his left across a corn field. Bragg thought it impossible to do this without bringing on an engagement with the rebels, but he proceeded to his left in order to reconnoiter.[38]

At 3:30 p.m., Meade returned to his own headquarters by the way that he had come. "Both going and coming I quite expected to see the picket

line tumbling in on top of us," Meade's staffer wrote.[39] As Meade and his staff rode past the Aiken house a few minutes later, they heard a number of dropping shots to their left.[40]

While Bragg established his right near the Strong house, Warren received word that the rebels had begun massing in front of Hayes and Lyle.[41] At 3:45 p.m., Warren notified Griffin and Willcox of this situation and ordered them to put their commands in readiness to move to the front.[42]

Meanwhile, Crawford returned to his left along the rear of his line. When behind the 19th Indiana of Bragg's brigade, Crawford met soldiers from that regiment on the Johnson Road, along which Bragg had strung his pickets that morning before ordering them into the thickets. Asked why they had left the front, the men of the 19th told Crawford that the rebels had driven them back and asked him if he had heard the firing. Crawford ordered the second lieutenant in charge to reform his line, return to his position and reestablish his connections to his right and his left. The commander of the Third Division also ordered Bragg to send a portion of the 6th Wisconsin, his reserve regiment, to support the 19th Indiana's line. Crawford then continued to ride down the rear of his line.[43]

At about the same time, near the Strong house, the commander of Bragg's rightmost regiment, the 7th Wisconsin, reported to a member of Crawford's staff that the rebels had broken Bragg's line to the 7th's left. The 7th's commander expected an attack at any time.[44]

As Meade and his staff reached the Jerusalem Plank Road and Warren prepared for an attack on the front of Ayres' division and Crawford reached the center of his division and Bragg examined his line's connection with Hartshorne's brigade, heavy firing erupted on the left center of Bragg's line.[45]

One of the war's most confusing fights had begun.

The Alabamians, Georgians and Mississippians of Harris' detachment of Mahone's Division, having crossed the James on the pontoon bridge at Drewry's Bluff, began arriving at Petersburg at 4 a.m.[46] The three brigades of this detachment had participated in the fighting north of the James, and they proved unfit for anything but sleep after their all night march in the rain. Even in this state, however, they furnished a reserve that permitted Beauregard to commit more men to attack the Federals on the Weldon Railroad.

By 8 a.m., Beauregard knew that the three Federal divisions which Heth had stopped on the previous evening had not withdrawn from the Weldon Railroad, but had begun fortifying. Beauregard had decided that he would try to dislodge the Federals with four brigades of infantry, as well as the division of cavalry that Lee had promised to send him. The


MAP 8
Globe Tavern
August 19
The Federal
Counterattack
HILL
W. P. Davis
Wells
Colquitt & Clingman
With Prisoners
Walker
Wheelock
Newcomb
Davis
15 N.Y.H.A.
Hofman
Hayes
AYRES
Dushane
187 Pa.
Blick
Flowers
Humphrey
Hartranft
Dunlop
Gwyn
GRIFFIN
Tilton
Globe
Tavern
Gregory
MAHONE
Colquitt & Weisiger
Robinson
Aiken
Barnes
Lanier
White
WARREN
Dr. Gurley

commander of the Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia believed, however, that a stronger force of infantry would make the result more certain.[47]

Before 9:20 a.m., disturbing information from a captured Union captain had reached Beauregard. The Federal captain had said that Grant had sent the V Corps to break the Weldon Railroad in order to draw enough rebels from the Petersburg trenches that another blow might break that Confederate line.[48] If Beauregard committed too many of his men to strike Warren, the Federals might break into Petersburg. Despite this information, the daring Beauregard committed a fifth brigade of infantry to the attack on the Weldon Railroad.[49]

On the afternoon of the previous day, Major General William Mahone had proposed a plan of attack to an officer of A. P. Hill's staff.[50] "I knew every foot of the ground around Petersburg," Mahone laster boasted.[51] The thirty-seven year old native of Virginia's Southampton County, terminus of the Jerusalem Plank Road, had surveyed the Petersburg area for the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad several years earlier. A dyspeptic who always kept a cow and chickens near his tent, he had served without distinction as a brigade commander from late 1861 until his elevation to divisional command on May 6th, 1864. Command of Anderson's Division had devolved upon Mahone as its senior brigadier general when Lee had chosen Anderson to command the Army of Northern Virginia's First Corps after Lieutenant General James A. Longstreet's debilitating wound in the Battle of the Wilderness.[52]

Mahone had quickly distinguished himself as a divisional commander. On June 22nd, with three brigades of his division, Mahone had routed all three divisions of the supposedly elite Union II Corps near the Johnson farm, capturing almost 1,800 prisoners, nine flags and four guns. On June 23rd, his division had bagged almost 500 prisoners from a party of the Union VI Corps engaged in wrecking the Weldon Railroad near the Gurley house. On June 29th, two of his brigades had participated in the capture of about 1,000 Federal cavalrymen at the First Battle of Reams Station. On July 30th, three of his brigades had captured about 1,000 prisoners and a dozen flags, and had recaptured four guns, in the counterattack that had driven the Federals from the Crater. By August of 1864, if not earlier, the Federals had come to consider Mahone Lee's most effective divisional commander.[53]

As Dearing's guns sounded the arrival of the V Corps on the Weldon Railroad, Mahone pointed out to Hill's staff officer that the Federals could not possibly have covered the heavily timbered space between the termination of the Union main line near Fort Sedgwick and Warren's right. Mahone proposed to move a column of attack southward up the ravine west of his headquarters at the Branch house, the ravine that flows into

the present Wilcox Lake. The Virginian had utilized the same route to position his forces for his June 22nd surprise attack on the II Corps. The ravine would keep the rebel column out of the view of the Federals until the column reached the woods skirting the field east of the Johnson house. Mahone expected to encounter a Federal vidette line in the woods south of the field, and he intended to plunge through the Union videttes into the right rear of Warren's position on the Weldon Railroad. After explaining the proposed movement to the officer from Hill's staff, Mahone rode out to Heth's line on the Weldon Railroad.

Before noon on August 19th, Mahone's suggestion had made its way up the chain of command through Hill to Beauregard. The commander of the Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia decided to employ Hill's plan of attack, which incorporated Mahone's suggestion. Hill's plan called for Heth to attack with Davis' and Walker's Brigades as soon as Mahone struck the right rear of the V Corps. Sending two brigades from Hoke's Division to Mahone, Beauregard ordered Mahone to take one of his own brigades as well to make up the attacking force.[54]

Mahone did not like this arrangement, and the cantankerous native of Southampton County did not hesitate to voice his disapproval. "I suggested that as troops always fought better under their own commander than under a stranger," Mahone later wrote, "and both commander and troops generally did their best when accustomed to each other, it would be best for Gen. Hoke to take charge of the attacking force."[55] This suggestion fell on deaf ears. Mahone also strenuously urged the use of more than three brigades for the flanking movement, but Beauregard could not spare a larger force.[56] Shortly after noon, Colquitt's and Clingman's Brigades arrived at Mahone's headquarters.[57] Meanwhile, Mahone had quietly withdrawn from the trenches the Virginians of his old brigade, under the command of Brigadier General David A. Weisiger.[58]

After the column had formed, the Southerners entered the ravine and moved in the direction of the Johnson house with Colquitt's Brigade leading, Clingman's Brigade following and Weisiger's men bringing up the rear.[59] According to an officer of the 61st Virginia, the column "moved forward during a rain storm, which made marching through the bushes very disagreeable, but our soldiers pressed on, hastily gathering and eating ripe whortleberries, that were plentiful along the route."[60] Soon the Confederates entered the woods near the Johnson house and hurried onward until they pierced the Union vidette line anticipated by Mahone. This penetration gave rise to the gunfire heard by Meade and his staff as they passed the Aiken house. Had Mahone swung a little wider to his left, he might have taken prisoner the commander of the Army of the Potomac.

Capturing from the Federal videttes their cooking dinner of pork and beans, the Confederates did not return the shots fired at the attack col-

umn. Adjudging his force in the right rear of the Federal battle line facing Heth, Mahone formed line of battle with Colquitt on the left, Clingman on the right and Weisiger in column of regiments behind Colquitt's left. Mahone apprehended that any counterattack from Federal reinforcements sent over from the Jerusalem Plank Road would come on his left.[61]

After forming his battle line, Mahone called his three brigadiers to a conference at which he explained to them the location of the Globe Tavern and that a steady advance would bring the attacking force into the rear of the Union line facing Heth and upon Warren's headquarters. Brigadier General Thomas L. Clingman asked what would protect the rear of the attacking force from an advance of the enemy on the plank road.

"That is my look-out, General," Mahone replied. "Your duty is in front."

Mahone told the brigadiers to pay no attention to the fire of any vidette or picket line, but hold their fire until they reached the works and the main body of the Federals.[62]

Late in the afternoon, Mahone's force advanced. The Confederates soon struck the skirmishers of the 19th Indiana on the right center of Bragg's line. The surprised Hoosiers, who because of the dense brush first sighted the Southerners at a distance of about twenty yards, drew the fire of the rebel front line. Breaking through the 19th Indiana, Mahone's men encountered the 24th Michigan, which had shifted to its right from its position on the 19th Indiana's left. The soldiers from Michigan briefly plugged the gap, but then had to fall back for want of support. Clingman's men, moving to their right, surrounded and captured the 1st Battalion New York Sharpshooters and a detachment of the 7th Indiana.[63] The historian of the 24th Michigan later wrote: "Every man then took care of himself, and there was a lively foot race amid shower after shower of bullets, as the men had no desire to visit Georgia and other Southern prison pens."[64]

The 24th Michigan fled toward the Aiken house. On Bragg's right, the 7th Wisconsin and that part of the 19th Indiana to the right of the rebel penetration fell back to the Union works near the Strong house. The gunfire did not reach alarming proportions until the Confederates had reached the left center of Bragg's line. Then Bragg, pursuant to Crawford's orders, brought up his reserve regiment, the 6th Wisconsin, 74 men strong. The 6th behaved as it had in the heyday of the Iron Brigade. As the rebels proceeded westward along the base of an L-shaped cornfield, the 6th made them pause to reform twice before the vastly outnumbered men in black hats had to retreat in order to avoid encirclement.[65]

While Mahone's Virginians drove the old Iron Brigade, Clingman's men struck Hartshorne's brigade from behind. Within minutes, the rebels

had surrounded the 190th and 191st Pennsylvania. After a "short but determined fight," the Seven Shooters destroyed their repeating rifles by breaking their stocks against trees and surrendered.[66] Clingman's Tarheels captured about three quarters of the Keystoners.[67] Those who escaped took the nearly suicial risk of running through the gap in the Confederate lines. One of these Federals "heard men call 'Halt! Halt!' on every side; but he looked neither to the right nor left, and went ahead."[68]

At the sound of the gunfire of Mahone's attack, Heth sent Davis' and Walker's Brigades into action. Once again, Heth had positioned Davis' Brigade to the right of the railroad and Walker's Brigade to the railroad's left. Colonel William S. Christian had taken command of Walker's brigade due to the illness of Colonel Mayo.[69] Heth also had at his disposal eight guns from three batteries of Pegram's Battalion.[70] Heth had posted two guns east of the railroad and six guns west of the railroad near the Davis house.[71]

As soon as Heth's batteries opened fire, two or three Federal batteries replied and gave the Major General and the rebel gunners a severe shelling. "I was never before or after, subjected to such a terrible fire of artillery," Heth later wrote.[72]

Driving the Federal pickets before them, Heth's infantry entered the woods beyond the Davis corn field. West of the railroad, Davis' Tarheels and Mississippians drove the Federal pickets of Hayes' left and Hofmann from three successive lines of rifle pits and back on the main Union line. There the attenuated rebel line suffered a repulse in which the 55th North Carolina lost its colors to the 56th Pennsylvania of Hofmann's brigade.[73]

East of the railroad, Christian's men drove the Federal pickets of Hays' right and Lyle back on the main Union works, behind a slashing thirty yards wide with the trees felled with their tops toward the rebels.[74] A firefight began between Christian's soldiers and the Federals. The Union soldiers had also heard the gunfire on their right that had preceded Christian's attack, and the Federals grew increasingly apprehensive as the fire on their right grew in volume.[75]

Meanwhile, a few Confederates from Mahone's detachment had penetrated into the rear of Wheelock's brigade. Wheelock's first intimation of this came from the unexpected appearance

> of a squad of Confederates, led by a hatless and excited officer, coming directly through the woods from a direction that every man in the 88th was fully convinced was the rear. They were immediately halted and ordered to surrender, but decidedly objected, explaining that we were the ones to surrender, as they had us surrounded; this story was not credited, and, taking the officer's sword, Sergeant John Wallace, with an

escort, proceeded with the prisoners back through the woods, where they ran into a moving column of the enemy, and were in turn captured and run Dixieward without further ceremony.[76]

Some of Clingman's North Carolinians took by surprise the three right companies of the 94th New York, Wheelock's rightmost regiment. The men of these companies, mostly new recruits, panicked when the Confederates opened fire on them. The three companies surrendered without any effort to repulse the assault.[77]

When the rebel guns at the Davis house opened fire, Wainwright's batteries immediately replied slowly and soon silenced the Confederate cannons. Moments later, Bragg's pickets tumbled in upon the butchers of the V Corps as they slaughtered cattle near the northern edge of the Globe Tavern clearing. Though Warren and Wainwright rode over from Globe Tavern to the Dunlop house, neither could see the rebels who had flushed Bragg's men. The belt of woods in which Warren had positioned Crawford's division hid the westward progress of Mahone's detachment from the view of any of the Federals in the Globe Tavern clearing.[78]

Shortly afterward, the extreme left of Mahone's front line emerged from the southern edge of the woods north of Globe Tavern around 500 yards east of the railroad. At first, Wainwright hesitated to fire upon the approximately 200 Confederate visible with their battle flag because few of Crawford's men had come out of the woods. Upon reflection, however, Wainwright recalled that during the previous night Warren had instructed the infantry to retire by the flanks if unable to hold their advanced position, 600 yards in front of Wainwright's batteries. This method of withdrawal would unmask Wainwright's guns. Wainwright therefore concluded that the rebels must have driven Crawford's men to the left and out of the line of fire. After the rebels had proceeded about 300 yards closer, within 400 yards of his guns, Wainwright opened fire. The Confederates, Georgians of Colquitt's Brigade, immediately fell back toward the Federal right.[79]

Crawford's men, however, had not retired. Many of Wainwright's shells fell among them. Crawford had stationed himself near the place where Wheelock's left met Lyle's right. When the shells began striking the works of the Third Division from the rear, Crawford decided to implement Warren's orders of the previous night and dispatched a staff officer with orders directing Wheelock's brigade to march by the left flank and leave the works. The 97th New York, the brigade's extreme left regiment, had complied before Wheelock could reach his left and countermand the order. As the 97th headed for the Glove Tavern clearing, the New Yorkers ran into the rebel battle line in the woods and lost about 100 men.[80]

Aware of the rebels in the rear and not pinned down by Confederates to the front, Wheelock halted the rest of his brigade and ordered his men

to leap over the works and lie down on the other side in order to avoid the shells. Shortly afterward, a stray group of Southerners appeared in the rear that had now become Wheelock's front. When the rebels ordered Wheelock to surrender, his men drove off the Confederates and recaptured thirteen of their comrades. Ordering his right to form and cut off the rebels, Wheelock only captured a few more of the Confederates in woods where visibility did not exceed fifty yards. Wheelock then pulled all of his men back into the works.[81] The historian of the 88th Pennsylvania later wrote that between Wainwright's fire and that of the enemy

> it appeared as if Crawford's division would be wiped out, — a veritable case of between the devil and the deep sea; but the Confederates, sweeping across our rear, quickly disappeared, capturing in their erratic course a large number of the 5th Corps who were so unlucky as to be in their way.[82]

This large unlucky number included the better part of Lyle's brigade, on Wheelock's left. While Wainwright hesitated to fire on Colquitt's left, the right of Colquitt's Brigade had advanced all the way to and beyond the Weldon Railroad. Pinned down by Walker's Brigade in their front, Lyle's men did not fare as well as did Wheelock's brigade. When first shells and then bullets suddenly began to come from the rear, Lyle's exhausted and rain-soaked men panicked.[83]

"All was now confusion," a captain of the 39th Massachusetts later wrote.[84] Half of Lyle's men surrendered on the spot. The other half bolted for the second line of Federal works in the Globe Tavern clearing. As Lyle's soldiers thrashed their way through the thorny vines and slashing branches in the midst of the rain storm, friendly fire from Wainwright's guns inflicted a number of casualties on the Federals. Before the Union soldiers reached the Globe Tavern clearing and relative safety, Mahone's front line intercepted and captured almost all of Lyle's men who had tried to escape.[85]

Not in the line of fire of Wainwright's guns, Hayes' brigade did not suffer the unnerving effect of shells striking from the rear. Ordered by Hayes to hold their lines at all cost, the 12th and 14th U.S. Infantry remained in their works east of the railroad until Lyle's men fled. The commanders of the two regiments then independently ordered their men to fall back, "deeming it folly to remain longer."[86] The major in command of the 6th Georgia, however, at the head of about fifty of his men, had already reached the rear of Hayes' brigade.[87] The 6th Georgia captured the 10th, 11th, 12th, 14th and 17th U.S. Infantry.[88] The Georgians failed to bring off all these Regulars as prisoners, though. Discovering the weakness of their captors, the Federals attempted to turn the tables and capture the vastly outnumbered Georgian guards. The 6th Georgia's commander managed to escape with his men, three stands of colors, about

250 prisoners and Hayes himself, whom the rebels had captured when he attempted to reach his regiments east of the railroad. Too closely pressed to bring off a Union captain of the 12th U.S. Infantry as a prisoner, a Georgian officer put a pistol to the Federal's breast and mortally wounded him.[89]

West of the railroad, Ayres ordered a retreat in order to prevent the rebels from enveloping the rest of his division.[90] The remainder of Hayes' brigade, now under the command of Colonel Frederick Winthrop, abandoned its breastworks and retreated about 700 yards to the cover of the artillery. The 15th New York Heavy Artillery shifted in order to maintain its connection with Winthrop's brigade in its new position and Hofmann's Brigade, which had not moved.[91]

In the woods east of the railroad and north of Globe Tavern, there now prevailed a chaos complete except for Mahone's Virginians and part of Wheelock's brigade. Colquitt's and Clingman's Brigades had disintegrated in the thick brush under the weight of captives from the brigades of Bragg, Hartshorne, Lyle and Hayes.[92] Stragglers, fugitives and small bands of rebels shepherding large groups of Federal prisoners floundered through the woods and swamps in the midst of the rain and the shells. A historian of the 51st North Carolina in Clingman's Brigade later wrote:

> This was a regular woods scramble, it being impossible to preserve anything like a line of battle on account of the density of the woods; the result was that we captured a large number of prisoners, and suffered considerable loss ourselves, some of our men being captured and recaptured several times.[93]

A captain in the 8th North Carolina of Clingman's Brigade found himself captured and recaptured three times. During this Tarheel's second captivity, a Union officer wrote down his address and handed it to the rebel in the midst of the battle. The Federal said that he would assist the North Carolinian if the Southerner wrote to him from prison.[94]

"The men of both sides were now pretty well mixed up in the woods," a lieutenant of the 39th Massachusetts in Lyle's brigade later wrote. "Whichever squad was the larger would capture the other."[95]

While a prisoner of the 18th North Carolina with about 300 other soldiers of Lyle's brigade, a private of the 107th Pennsylvania rallied his comrades, obtained the surrender of their guard, seized the colors of the Tarheels and brought them, along with the rebel color bearer, within Union lines. Lyle himself, in order to avoid capture, had to abandon his horse.[96] The colonel emerged from the woods with a command the size of a color guard.[97]

The Confederates even captured Crawford. The Southerners failed to

hold him, however. "The rebels passed freely around me on every side," the commander of the Third Division of the V Corps later wrote, "and I was once in their hands, but escaped almost miracuously."[98]

A captain of the 39th Massachusetts later wrote:

> The men of the 3d Division, such of them as had not been captured, every man being for himself, turned in all directions for escape. The experience of the individual was about the experience of the whole. Now dodging behind trees, running now east, then turning west, those of this fated division that were left finally got the true direction and came out at the edge of the clearing looking towards our artillery.[99]

As Colquitt's and Clingman's men emerged from the woods into the Davis corn field herding more than their own number of prisoners up the Halifax Road toward Petersburg, the captured Federals narrowly escaped the fire of the two rebel guns stationed on the east side of the railroad. Thinking so large an array of men in blue necessarily an attacking party, the artillerists prepared to open fire. A timely disclosure of the actual state of affairs prevented the possible slaughter.[100]

Wheelock wisely waited until the rebels had departed from his rear before he retreated in order to avoid Wainwright's shells.[101] Cautiously, his three remaining regiments marched back to the Globe Tavern clearing.[102] During his brigade's retreat, it captured about sixty rebels and liberated many Federal prisoners.[103] When Wheelock's men emerged from the woods, Wainwright realized what had happened and ceased fire.[104]

By this time Mahone's Brigade had reached a small clearing near a branch just northwest of the Aiken house. The decisive moment of the battle seemed to have arrived. Globe Tavern stood in view, less than half a mile away. It appeared that an advance the rest of the way to the Tavern would bag the entire Federal force on the Weldon Railroad.[105] One of Mahone's officers, a lieutenant colonel in the 61st Virginia of Weisiger's brigade, later wrote:

> . . .[W]e had now arrived at that point in the enterprise when its consummation was capable of completeness. So perfect had been the surprise, three brigades might possibly have done the work, certainly five would have effected it. . .[106]

Mahone paused to reorganize his detachment for the delivery of the coup de grace.[107] The inadequacy of his force for such a task quickly impressed itself upon him, however. First he met litter-bearers carrying off Clingman, who had suffered a leg wound and relinquished command of his brigade to Colonel Hector McKethan. Mahone could not see any of McKethan's men. Then Mahone rode to Brigadier General Alfred H. Col-

quitt, whom Mahone observed on the fringe of the small clearing. When Mahone asked Colquitt what had happened to the rest of his brigade, Colquitt pointed to a small body of about 150 of his men and said: "These are all I have left."[108]

The indomitable Mahone did not give up yet, though. Putting Colquitt's remaining men on the left of Weisiger's Virginians, Mahone sent two staff officers and a courier to contact Hill, who had accompanied Heth. Mahone wanted Hill to order Heth to extend his left, connect with Mahone's right and to press the enemy immediately in Heth's front.[109]

One after the other, the two staff officers took a short road to the right. This road took them over the ground that Mahone's Brigade had just crossed. Though by this time most of Clingman's and Colquitt's men bringing off the Federal prisoners had reentered Confederate lines, many stragglers and fugitives of both sides still roamed the woods. A squad of Union fugitives captured the lead staff officer. The other staffer saw his colleague captured, rallied a few Confederate stragglers, and in turn captured the Federals, thus releasing his colleague.

Moments later, another group of Federals captured this whole party and took it with them through the rear of Mahone's Brigade toward Union lines. Observing this, Mahone put himself at the head of a group of his men and rushed on the Federals. Capturing them, the Major General freed the captive rebel staffers and stragglers.[110]

The courier got lost. Taking a cart path that ran through a dense thicket almost impossible to penetrate on horseback, he soon came to a clearing where he saw, no more than 150 yards away, two limbered batteries of Federal artillery, followed by infantry and a train of ambulances. Turning back in order to avoid capture, the courier retreated to a sharp turn in the path about 100 yards from where he had left Mahone. At the turn, the courier found himself face to face with Hartshorne and another mounted Federal. Drawing a revolver captured at the Crater and not in working order, the courier took the bewildered Northerner's prisoners and delivered them to Mahone.[111]

Though Mahone's attack had ground to a halt, his three depleted brigades had struck the Northerners a terrible blow. Four Union brigades had practically ceased to exist. Before Mahone could link up with Heth and resume the advance toward Globe Tavern, however, troops of the Federal IX Corps led a counterattack.

Shortly after Wainwright opened fire, Warren ordered the Third Division of the IX Corps forward in the direction of the rebel breakthrough on the right. Willcox ordered his First Brigade, under Brigadier General John F. Hartranft, to proceed to Crawford's support.[112] Hartranft's 1,100 man brigade began with its left about 400 yards from the railroad and advanced

in the direction of the rebel attack, which seemed 700 or 800 yards to the northeast. The First Brigade encountered a line of rebels at a distance of 150 yards near the northeast corner of the clearing around Globe Tavern. The Confederate line extended into the corn field from the eastern edge of the woods and had a full view of the clearing. Hartranft's brigade had its left four regiments in the corn field and its right three regiments in the woods east of the corn field. While the regiments in the corn field engaged the rebels, the regiments in the woods advanced, met the Southerners advancing and took fifty or sixty prisoners. The Federals on the left drove the rebels in the corn field into the woods at the northern edge of the clearing. Hartranft's men advanced seventy-five to 100 yards before the Confederates rallied in a smaller adjacent clearing and resumed the attack. Both battle lines blazed away at one another at a distance of about seventy-five yards for a few moments before the rebels withdrew again.[113]

Meanwhile, slowed by roads rendered exceedingly bad by the rain, White's division approached along the Vaughan Wagon Road. Shortly after passing the Aiken house, White heard musketry to the right and front. Sending a staff officer to Warren for instructions, White sent his men at the double-quick in the direction of the firing. The firing seemed to approach rapidly. White formed line with his right resting on a road a short distance east of the Globe Tavern clearing. By the time that White had formed his First Brigade, under Lieutenant Colonel Joseph H. Barnes, the staff officer sent to Warren had returned with orders for White to connect his left with the right flank of Willcox's division. White moved his First Brigade by the left flank until it contacted Hartranft's men. Then White formed his Second Brigade, under Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert P. Robinson, on the right of the First Brigade.[114]

At about the same time, Willcox's Second Brigade, under Colonel William Humphrey, arrived in the rear of and in support of Hartranft's brigade.[115] Humphrey moved far enough to his left to uncover his front and then received orders to move forward again. This movement brought his line in contact with a force of rebels coming out of the woods at the northern edge of the Globe Tavern clearing. Halting and opening fire at once, Humphrey's men drove the Confederates back into the woods.[116]

Pursuant to orders from Warren to move to the left toward Ayres' division, Willcox dispatched Humphrey in that direction.[117] Humphrey received orders to form his brigade in two lines, move a distance farther to the left, charge into the woods and recapture the works abandoned by Crawford's division. Hartranft's men moved to the left along the edge of the woods and connected with Humphrey's brigade.[118] This brigade moved into the woods without connection to its left and opening a gap between its right and Hartranft's brigade.[119] Before Hartranft's brigade could

advance on Humphrey's right, fighting broke out again near the northeastern corner of the Globe Tavern clearing.[120]

As Willcox's men had shifted to the left, Barnes' brigade of White's division had occupied the position vacated by Hartranft's soldiers and Robinson's brigade had formed on the right of Barnes' men. Barnes' left rested in the corn field while his right rested in the woods.[121] White shortly received orders to advance. The First Division of the IX Corps quickly encountered Mahone's Confederates and a sharp engagement began.[122] A committee of the 35th Massachusetts in Barnes' brigade later wrote:

> The Confederates — Colquitt's brigade. . . — were coming through the woods upon the charge. Kneeling in the mud, the word was, "Fire, and give them hell!" and at it we went, firing and loading as rapidly as nimble fingers could. The only command of the officers was, "Fire low, men, fire low!" and the carnage was deadly.
>
> As soon as our line of fire became distinct, the artillery in rear opened, throwing shells so closely to our heads that the boys asserted they cut the tops of the corn stalks.[123]

Ordered to the right in support of White's division, Hartranft's brigade moved along the edge of the woods until its right was about seventy-five yards from White's left. White's men did not appear to require any assistance, however, and Hartranft's men prepared to advance into the woods north of the Globe Tavern clearing. The remnant of Crawford's division reformed with its right at the Dunlop house, about 100 yards to the left of Hartranft's brigade. Crawford placed Lyle's men on the left of Wheelock's brigade. Scarcely a third of the strength with which Crawford's division had begun the day remained. Even Wheelock had lost half of his men.[124]

Instead of delivering the coup de grace, Mahone found himself fighting a rear guard action. An officer of the 61st Virginia in Mahone's Brigade later wrote:

> The Virginia brigade was in an exposed and most desperate situation. It was cut off from the other brigades and faced the enemy's fire on three sides, but held its grounds with stubborn valor. It was in what seemed to be the "last ditch." . . .The position was one of the most perilous the old brigade ever held during the war.[125]

After about half an hour, satisfied that Colquitt and Clingman had brought off their prisoners, Mahone ordered his Virginians to retreat. The rebels left their dead, many wounded, about 60 prisoners and around two hundred small arms.[126] A flag of truce to inform the attendants left with the wounded to surrender delayed the Federal advance.[127]

Robinson had deployed the 179th New York as skirmishers on his right flank extending to his rear until the First Brigade of Brigadier General Robert B. Potter's Second Division advanced from the Aiken house.[128] The First Brigade, under the command of Colonel Zenas R. Bliss, had arrived at the Aiken house during the beginning of Mahone's withdrawal.[129]

Meanwhile, Humphrey's brigade advanced cautiously until near the works occupied by Walker's Brigade. Humphrey then ordered a charge at the double-quick. Without halting to fire, the Federals surprised Walker's Brigade and threw the rebels into a panic. Humphrey's men captured the breastworks, the colors of the 47th Virginia, and 100 prisoners.[130]

About a hour later, toward dusk, elements of the V Corps camp up and retook the empty works on both sides of Humphrey's brigade. The remnant of Crawford's division, with Hartranft's brigade on its right, occupied the works to the right of Humphrey's brigade. Hartranft's advance opened up a potentially dangerous gap between his right and White's division, which did not advance and close the gap until after night had fallen. To Humphrey's left, Winthrop's brigade of Ayres' division occupied the rifle-pits that the brigade had abandoned under Hayes a few hours earlier.[131] Several hundred yards to Humphrey's rear, Gwyn's brigade of Griffin's division returned to its former position.[132] Tilton's brigade, however, advanced into the woods with its left on the railroad.[133]

About ten minutes after the survivors of the V Corps and Hartranft's brigade joined Humphrey's men in the works, Heth's men began feeling the Federal position. Three times the Confederates felt the Union line. Three times the Federals drove off the rebels. By the third Southern push, Winthrop's brigade had grown so tired that Winthrop called for reinforcements. Drawing upon the reserve provided by Tilton's brigade, Ayres sent the 187th Pennsylvania. The Keystoners took position on the right of the 5th New York and saw off the last rebel thrust, again relieving from danger Battery C, 1st Massachusetts Light Artillery. By 8:30 p.m., quiet reigned. The remainder of Tilton's brigade came up and took over from Winthrop's men the line that they held to the right of the railroad. The 140th and 146th New York of Winthrop's brigade still held the front line to the left of the railroad.[134]

West of the railroad and south of Globe Tavern, Dearing's cavalry probed Spear's picket line. Spear learned from a prisoner that a rebel cavalry brigade occupied the Vaughan Road to his front. Strengthening his outposts, Spear prepared for a reconnaissance in force at daylight.[135]

Mahone's detachment withdrew to Petersburg. Colquitt's and Clingman's Brigades had disintegrated during their "woodlands scramble," and Hill ordered them back to their original camps as rallying points. Hill also ordered Mahone's Brigade inside the Petersburg lines. Leaving

Heth's two brigades in position on the Weldon Railroad, Hill ordered Rooney Lee to move down to the Davis house at 3 a.m. Hill thought that this would put the Confederates in position to push the Federals in the morning if Hill could obtain more troops. "The indications are that the enemy are leaving," Hill wrote to Beauregard at 10 p.m. Hill expressed regret that the weakness of his force prevented him from following up the severe blow he knew that he had struck.[136]

Warren did not realize the extent of the disaster that had befallen his corps. Consequently, his dispatches to Meade that night unintentionally misled the commander of the Army of the Potomac as to the condition of the Union forces on the Weldon Railroad. Though Warren mentioned that he had lost very considerably in prisoners. Meade had no reason to expect that the number of prisoners would prove extraordinary. Meade focused primarily on Warren's report of repulsing the rebels and regaining the position. As a result, the commander of the Army of the Potomac declined Grant's suggestion that Meade send Mott's division of the II Corps to Warren. Meade even began prodding Warren to attack the rebels in the morning, before they could draw reinforcements from north of the James. Warren, whose awareness that something awful had happened to his men grew with each moment, hedgingly replied: "I have given orders to advance at daylight in every direction and will govern my movement according to the developments under your sanction where it is practicable."[137]

The Union forces under Warren on the Weldon railroad had lost about 3,000 men, including an astonishing 2,700 prisoners in addition to seven flags.[138] The rebels had lost under 600 men, including around 300 prisoners.[139] "We did not do but little fighting: we got badly scattered," a captain of the 27th Georgia in Colquitt's Brigade wrote that night. "I do not think there were many killed on either side."[140] Outnumbered by seventeen brigades to five in infantry, and even more disproportionately in artillery, the Confederates had performed one of the war's most amazing feats of arms.

Until the end of his days, Mahone believed that with two or three more brigades at his disposal at this point, he would have bagged the entire V Corps and driven the Federals from the Weldon Railroad.[141] "With the force of a division at his command no doubt he would have captured Warren and all of his people, and repossessed the Weldon Railroad," one of Mahone's officers later wrote.[142] Beauregard's enemies in the administration joined in the criticism of Beauregard for attacking with insufficient force, though Lee came to the defense of the Louisianian and ascribed the failure to the scarcity of troops.[143]

In fact, the Federal counterattack did not even employ all of Warren's reserves. Only a single regiment of Griffin's three-brigade division became engaged on August 19th, and the two-brigade Second Division of

the IX Corps arrived just as Mahone began to withdraw.[144]

Grant and Meade shared much of the responsibility for the disaster. They had ordered Warren to maintain his hold on the railroad at all hazards, to extend to connect with the IX Corps if practicable and to push the enemy back nearer their own lines.[145] "These were too many conditions to impose upon him on ground of the character he was operating in," Humphreys later wrote. "Informed of the general object he was to accomplish, everything else as far as possible should have been left to his judgement."[146] The requirement that the V Corps entrench as close up to the Confederate works as possible had contributed most to the catastrophe:

> The necessity of remaining stationary, even a single day, in a dense wood like that in which the greater part of General Warren's troops were posted, subjects a command to having some part of it taken suddenly in flank or rear, broken, thrown into confusion, and many of them captured.[147]

The remainder of the responsibility for the disaster rested upon Warren. If initially he had specified in writing the desired location of Bragg's line, or drawn it on a map, the commander of the V Corps would have elminated the possibility of the misunderstanding that arose. Properly positioned, Bragg's men would have given Crawford and Ayres "time to prepare to meet the emergencies of the occasion" and prevented the disaster.[148]

On the night of August 19th, "all was joy" among the Southerners in Petersburg, though the Federals still held the railroad.[149]

Little joy existed among the Federals, though they remained on the field. The 50th Pennsylvania of Humphrey's brigade lay in pits full of water that night in order to avoid rebel fire.[150] To the right of Humphrey's brigade, as the historian of the 97th New York in Wheelock's brigade later wrote, "The ground was low and somewhat swampy, a drizzling rain set in, and to keep themselves out of the water, many cut small poles and lay upon them during the night."[151] Further right, according to an officer in the 39th Massachusetts of Lyle's brigade, "But few slept that night, and the weary hours rolled on and it seemed as if daylight would never come to bring relief to the suspense and dread that hung over the command that night."[152] The 35th Massachusetts of White's division, still further to the right, occupied higher ground and according to its historical committee enjoyed a measure of luxury: "Upon corn-stalk beds, the men got such sleep as the care of watching and the dripping rain allowed."[153]

CHAPTER 8

The Battle Of Globe Tavern, August 20, 1864

Little fighting took place on August 20th, and for that very reason this day proved the decisive day of the Battle of Globe Tavern.

On the night of August 19th, Beauregard and Hill began to organize an attack for August 20th.[1] Things went wrong almost immediately.

At 9 p.m. on August 19th, Brigadier General Johnson Hagood received orders to turn over command of his brigade of Hoke's Division to the senior officer present and report to Hill. The commander of the Third Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia ordered Hagood to take command of a brigade of Johnson's Division near the Lead Works, where the Halifax Road and the Weldon Railroad passed southward through the fortifications of Petersburg, and prepare to participate in the renewal of the fight on August 20th.

Major General Bushrod Johnson, whose division held the line between the Appomattox and Hoke's Division, habitually kept one regiment from each of his four brigades resting in the rear of his lines. Instead of sending an established brigade to the rendezvous near the Lead Works, Johnson sent the four individual regiments in reserve at that time. Johnson's regiments began arriving at about 11:30 p.m., and Hagood required until 3 a.m. to organize the four regiments into the semblance of a brigade. Haphazardly appointing an acting staff, Hagood learned only the names of his staff officers and of his regimental commanders. Darkness prevented him from learning their faces.

After imposing this minimal degree of organization, Hagood reported to Hill. The South Carolinian found the Lieutenant General asleep in his nearby ambulance. As Hagood later wrote: "When General Hill learned the heterogeneous character of the brigade sent him, he, much to Hagood's relief, declined to receive it, and directed the regiments returned to their division."[2]

Hill's rejection of this provisional brigade contrasted with Field's acceptance of a similarly constituted brigade from Pickett's Division on the evening of the 16th north of the James.[3] Hill needed men capable of an attack, however, whereas Field required men capable only of defense, universally acknowedged as an easier task.[4]

Another attempt to concentrate Confederate forces for an attack on the Weldon Railroad began to go awry shortly after Hagood reported to Hill. W. H. F. Lee's Division of cavalry, ordered to leave Petersburg for the

Davis house at 3 a.m., ended up north of the Appomattox at Swift Creek.[5]

Shortly after dawn, the Confederates began felling timber beyond the Vaughan Road in order to prepare artillery placements.[6] By 8 a.m., Harris' detachment of Mahone's Division arrived in front of the V Corps after another night march in the rain. The three brigades of the detachment camped behind their old positions near the Branch house.[7] Rain, night marches and fighting had worn out the soldiers of these units.[8]

Before 8:15 a.m., Beauregard and Hill knew that, contrary to the expectations of the previous night, the Federals had not only remained on the railroad, but had continued to fortify. Beauregard persisted in his attempt to make the necessary arrangements to dislodge Warren on August 20th.[9]

At 1:30 p.m. and 1:45 p.m., Lee exhorted Beauregard to make a concentrated effort to dislodge the Federals, rather than piecemeal attacks as on the preceding days.[10] The rain-soaked and exhausted condition of the men, the muddy, impassable roads and the force lured north of the James by Hancock's movement had made impracticable an attack on Warren on August 20th.

Later during the afternoon, Beauregard abandoned the attempt to attack the Federal position on the Weldon Railroad on August 20th and began preparing for an attack on the following day.[11] Beauregard started by using troops exhausted by the fighting on the railroad to relieve relatively fresh troops in the trenches. Mahone's Brigade relieved Finegan's Brigade of Mahone's Division. Colquitt's Brigade of Hoke's Division relieved Ransom's Brigade of Johnson's Division. Clingman's Brigade of Hoke's Division replaced Hagood's Brigade of Hoke's division. Davis' and Walker's Brigades of Heth's Division relieved Cooke's and MacRae's Brigades of Heth's Division. Finegan's and Hagood's Brigades headed for the vicinity of the Lead Works. Ransom's Brigade took up a position near the Davis farm while Cooke's and MacRae's Brigades plodded toward that same destination.[12]

The brigades coming out of the trenches did not arrive in much better condition than their relief. Debilitating service in the trenches had rendered the men sickly and feeble. "They tired badly in the short evening march," Hagood later wrote of his own brigade, which he asked Hill to excuse from participation in the next day's attack, if possible.[13] The condition of Hagood's Brigade quickly improved, however:

> The change from the cramped and noisome trench to the freedom of the bivouac, and the call upon the men for action, instead of endurance, aroused their spirits wonderfully. And although it rained all night, the fires of the brushwood crackled merrily, and there was once more heard the light laugh, and

ready joke, and the busy hum of voices as the men prepared their suppers or smoked their pipes stretched at length before the exhilarating blaze.[14]

By 7 p.m., Beauregard had withdrawn from the Petersburg trenches every available man he could spare for the following day's attack.[15] To replace these soldiers, Beauregard had put into the works the Virginia Reserves and rear echelon men of all types — even clerks and musicians.[16] That night, pursuit to orders from Lee, Beauregard called upon Major General Cadmus M. Wilcox for a further brigade.[17] Wilcox sent Scales' Brigade and a detachment of Thomas' Brigade to the Lead Works.[18] North of the James, Anderson's Brigade of Field's Division trudged through the mud toward the railroad from Richmond to Petersburg.[19] Lee planned to call on Field for more reinforcements as soon as Hancock, as expected, left Field's front.[20]

Beauregard and Hill entrusted the formulation of a plan of attack to Mahone. In formulating his plan, Mahone relied upon intelligence provided by one of the few men alive who might have known the ground around Petersburg as well as or better than did Mahone himself.

Private Roger Atkinson Pryor had the blood of several old Petersburg families in his veins. Before the war, he had served Virginia as a politician. Until August of 1863, he had served the Confederacy as a brigadier general in the Confederate Army. Deprived of troops to command, Pryor had resigned his commission in order to remain in the field.

Pryor spent much of August 20th reconnoitering the woods in front of Warren's left. In order to study the Federal position, Pryor climbed a tall tree. From this perch, Ayres' left appeared unguarded. The tree did not afford a view of Griffin's division behind Ayres' left, and Pryor failed to reconnoiter further. Satisfied that the Union left hung in the air, he returned to report this information to Mahone.[21]

Mahone took for himself the most important role in the attack. While Heth drove straight down the railroad with the three infantry brigades near the Davis house, Mahone would move down the Vaughan Road from the Lead Works with six infantry brigades and part of a seventh, strike the Federals from the left rear and finally drive them from the Weldon Railroad. This time the Confederates would employ what they considered a sufficient force — not two infantry brigades, as on August 18th, nor five infantry brigades, as on August 19th, but nine full infantry brigades and a portion of a tenth.[22]

Grant's wisdom in feinting north of the James before striking for his real objective, the Weldon Railroad, had become apparent. The Federal general-in-chief had placed Beauregard on the horns of a dilemma. If Beauregard attacked the Federals with the forces that he had at hand, he

would encounter insurmountable numbers. If, on the other hand, he waited for reinforcements, he would give the Federals time to consolidate their position.

Warren utilized for precisely the latter purpose the respite afforded him by the Confederate failure to attack on August 20th. The commander of the V Corps began by straightening the northern stretch of his line. First, Warren advanced Potter's division half a mile from the Aiken house. Next, at about 9:05 a.m., Potter's right linked up with the detachment of Bragg's brigade — the 7th Wisconsin and part of the 19th Indiana — to the right of Mahone's breakthrough on the previous afternoon. Since this detachment connected with Mott's division, Warren had closed the gap through which Mahone had penetrated.[23] At the same time, White advanced to close a gap between his division's left and Hartranft's right occasioned as Hartranft moved into contact with the rebels.[24]

West of the railroad, Ayres consolidated Winthrop's brigade with the 15th New York Heavy Artillery. This force relieved Tilton's brigade, which returned to its place in Griffin's line.[25] The pickets of Ayres' division found Confederate pickets still occupying part of the Federal works abandoned on the previous day. The Federal pickets began skirmishing with their rebel counterparts.[26]

By 9:10 a.m., Meade had begun to prod Warren to attack. Warren, however, had decided to adopt a defensive posture. Though he still did not know the full extent of the catastrophe that had befallen his men, he realized that his command lacked the capacity to deliver a successful attack. Convinced that he could not hold a line across the area between his right and Mott's division without reinforcements, the commander of the V Corps determined to select a line suitable for artillery defense and keep his infantry in reserve in order to meet a rebel advance from any direction.[27] By 10 a.m., Warren's engineers had begun marking out a line that ran along a crest which roughly paralleled the Vaughan Wagon Road from the Lanier and Dunlop houses to Globe Tavern.[28]

Before the engineers had finished their work, Gregg's First Brigade, under Colonel William Stedman, arrived at Warren's headquarters.[29] The all night ride from north of the James in the rain had exhausted Stedman's troopers.[30]

Shortly after noon, the divisions of the IX Corps and, on their left, the remnants of Crawford's division left their pickets in place and withdrew into reserve positions behind Wainwright's guns.[31]

During the afternoon, the commander of the V Corps shifted Bragg's brigade west of the railroad. Bragg's men demolished the Federal works along the Vaughan Road and dug in along a line parallel to and about a quarter of a mile west of the railroad, from the left of Wainwright's line of

guns to a little ravine.[32]

Also during the afternoon, in a small, vicious, hand-to-hand affair, the pickets of Ayres' division, including the 1st Maryland, recaptured the works abandoned during the previous day and took prisoner about thirty rebels of the 2nd Maryland Battalion in Walker's Brigade.[33]

Constant demonstrations, Confederate infantry moving down the Halifax and Vaughan Roads and the felling of timber for artillery placements beyond the Vaughan Road alerted Warren to the possibility of an assault on his left during the late afternoon.[34] The day ended without a rebel attack, however.

Before dark, a 200-man working party from the Quartermaster's Department at City Point reached Warren's headquarters.[35] Pursuant to orders from Meade, Warren immediately put these men to work burning ties and twisting rails. As the railroad wreckers worked their way southward, Stedman's brigade escorted them. Spear's brigade, 700 strong, felt toward Reams Station, on the Weldon Railroad about five miles south of Globe Tavern.[36]

After nightfall, Ayres put his soldiers to work slashing timber and throwing down their breastworks west of the railroad in preparation for a withdrawal similar to that effected earlier by the infantry east of the railroad.[37]

At about 8 p.m., Warren sent Hofmann's brigade to join Bragg's men and reconstitute the Fourth Division of the V Corps. Cutler deployed Hofmann's soldiers on Bragg's left. Hofmann's brigade occupied a crest that extended south from the Blick house and ran parallel with and about a quarter of a mile west of the railroad.[38] The commander of the 147th New York later wrote:

> Through the night, cold and rainy, the men labored faithfully, and the morning dawned upon a formidable line of breastworks, stoutly made and tastefully finished. These works were erected under peculiar disadvantages. The night was very dark, with frequent showers, which kept the clothing of the men saturated with water during the entire night, this rendering labor very difficult, and added to this, the men were almost broken down from the effect of the excessive fatigue of the three days previous. For the erection of these works, under the circumstances, I think the One hundred and forty-seventh is entitled to as much credit as if it had fought and won a great battle.[39]

By 2 a.m., Ayres' men had finished slashing timber and demolishing their breastworks. Leaving his pickets in place, Ayres withdrew the remainder of his troops about 700 yards. This took them out of the pines and

placed them on the crest of a gentle slope in the large open field north of Globe Tavern, with Winthrop's brigade on the right and Dushane's brigade on the left. The exhausted soldiers began throwing up another line of earthworks. The front of those works, the Federals constructed abatis and stretched trip wires just above the ground.[40]

By dawn the Federals had demolished their old works, which ran along the southern edge of the Davis corn field and then southwestwardly along the Vaughan Road. In place of the works, the Federals left a picket line with orders to weaken the rebels before they reached the main line hundreds of yards in the rear.[41]

Warren had conducted a tactical withdrawal similar to that employed by Beauregard on the night of June 17th during the initial assaults on Petersburg. When the Confederates attacked on August 21st, Warren would have in store for them a surprise as unpleasant as the Federals had encountered on June 18th.[42]

CHAPTER 9

The Battle Of Globe Tavern, August 21, 1864

At 2 a.m. on August 21st, Mahone's officers roused the men of the brigades of his command. His force began moving out from the vicinity of the Lead Works at about 3:30 a.m. Rain continued to fall as his soldiers marched first southwestwardly along the Squirrel Level Road and then southeastwardly along the Vaughan Wagon Road. Mud and standing water slowed the march. Near the Poplar Spring Church, halfway between the Squirrel Level Road and the Vaughan Road, Mahone ordered Hagood's Brigade to halt by the roadside and go into reserve. By this time, the rain had stopped and given way to the fog of early morning. Fatigued by the march, Hagood's men lay down and rested. The other brigades moved onward along the Vaughan Wagon Road toward the Vaughan Road, where Mahone deployed them.[1]

Finegan's and Sanders' Brigades formed line of battle to the left of the Vaughan Wagon Road. Sanders' Brigade formed with its right on the Vaughan Wagon Road, and Finegan's Brigade formed on the left of Sanders' Brigade. Harris' Brigade, under Jayne's command due to Harris' illness, formed as a flank guard behind the left of and at a right angle to Finegan's Brigade. Wright's and Scales' Brigades and the detachment from Thomas' Brigade formed to the right of the Vaughan Wagon Road.[2]

Before 9 a.m., Mahone had finished deploying.[3] At about the same time, the fog gave way to sunshine.[4] Skirmishing began almost immediately as Mahone sent his men forward through the tangled woods and gallberry swamps to drive in the Fedeal pickets on the western face of Warren's position.[5]

The guns of Pegram's Battalion opened fire, twelve firing from the Flowers house on the Vaughan Road and eight firing from near the Davis house at the junction of the Vaughan Road with the Weldon Railroad and the Halifax Road.[6] A few long-range Confederate guns in the Petersburg lines to the northeast also opened fire.[7] The rebel guns put the Federals under what Wainwright later called "a very ugly cross-fire."[8] The opening around Globe Tavern afforded no cover, and some Federals amused themselves by dodging cannon balls or watching skulkers cower.[9] The rebel artillery drove Winthrop's brigade, on the railroad, and Crawford's division, east of the railroad, to the outer side of their earthworks.[10] West of the railroad, a Confederate cannon ball decapitated Dushane and left the Maryland Brigade under the command of Colonel Samuel Graham.[11]

The converging fire of the Southern guns soon silenced the 15th Battery, New York Light Artillery. This battery occupied the angle where the Iron Brigade's line, which faced west, joined the Maryland Brigade's works, which faced north.[12]

When the rebel battle line, which faced northeast, emerged from the woods just east of the Vaughan Road, the Confederates found themselves confronting not what Pryor had led Mahone to expect but the remnants of the works that the Iron Brigade had razed during the previous night.[13] Hill and Mahone had planned the attack with these works as their objective. The fog had prevented the commander of the Third Corps and his subordinate from detecting the change in the Federal dispositions.[14] Now, for the first time, Hill and Mahone saw the new Union position to the east across a corn field several hundred yards wide.[15] Rather than withdraw into the woods and formulate a new plan of attack, they elected to send their main force across a much longer stretch of open ground than they had anticipated and employ Hagood's Brigade to outflank the Federals.[16]

Sending a courier to Hagood directing the South Carolinian to bring up his brigade on the rebel right, Hill and Mahone briefly paused to realign their force. The razed Federal line ran parallel to the Vaughan Road. The rebel battle line faced northeast in order to enfilade the razed Federal line. The Southerners partially executed a right wheel in an attempt to parallel the newly sighted Union works. Mahone's battle line then resumed its advance.[17]

The 15th Battery, New York Light Artillery remained silent due to the casualties inflicted by the Confederate barrage. The battery's commander begged Bragg for crews, which the Iron Brigade provided. The rebels continued onward through the open field.[18] When the Confederates had reached a point about 500 yards west of the Federal works, the 15th Battery, New York Light Artillery opened up on the Southerners with grape and canister.[19] While Hill oversaw the attack of the main rebel force, Mahone rode off to a rendezvous with Hagood's Brigade.[20]

Hill's courier reached Hagood as the sound of firing increased in volume. The courier guided Hagood's Brigade to the Vaughan Road by a short cut, then up the Vaughan Road to within 600 yards of the Flowers' house. Turning across a field to the right, the courier led Hagood's Brigade in the direction of the railroad. The South Carolinians passed between Confederate guns firing blindly toward the Federals rendered invisible by intervening woods. Shells from the vigorously replying Union batteries frequently burst in the field, which Hagood's Brigade crossed at the double-quick. As the South Carolinians proceeded, the Federal shells took their toll.[21] "A file of four men was killed in the company just in front of the Edisto Rifles," a sergeant in the Edisto Rifles of the 25th South

Carolina later wrote, "and all of the troops in rear had to pass over these poor fellows."[22]

When Hagood reached the far edge of the field, Mahone rode up and took over from the courier. The Major General led the South Carolinians into position along the edge of the wood and facing the railroad. The brigade formed at the edge of the woods, fifty yards behind the swamp of a branch.[23] The Federals had felled trees in the swamp, forming an abatis.[24] On the other side of the branch lay an unoccupied clearing at the foot of a hill that screened everything beyond it from sight.[25]

"Now," Mahone said to Hagood, "you are upon the flank and rear of the enemy. I have five brigades fighting them in front and they are driving them. I want you to go in and press them all you can."

Mahone pointed to the branch.

"When you have crossed the branch swamp," he added, "you will come upon a clearing in which some 300 yards further is the enemy's line, and they are not entrenched."

The Major General urged Hagood to attack promptly, and the South Carolinian immediately gave the order to advance.[26]

Meanwhile, to Hagood's left, Hill's battle line pressed forward. The Iron Brigade, reinforced by the 4th and 7th Maryland, prepared to deliver a devastating volley. When Hill's men arrived within musket range, little more than a fizzle initially greeted them. The constant rain had wet the Iron Brigade's powder.[27] The historian of the Sauk County Riflemen — Company A, Sixth Wisconsin — later wrote:

> It was a continuous snapping of caps with here and there a p-i-s-h until the exploding caps had dried the powder sufficiently to burn and generate gas enough to blow the ball out of the gun. The enemy continued to advance and it began to look like a bayonet fight for a finish. Finally the old charges began to explode and eject the ball. . .[28]

The delay had only made the Federal fire deadlier when it finally came. "The fire poured on our ranks was the most severe of the war," a captain of the 8th Alabama in Sanders' Brigade wrote on the following day.[29] While twenty-four year old Brigadier General John C. C. Sanders advanced on foot with his brigade, a minie bullet passed through both of his thighs and severed the femoral artieres. Without falling, this hero of the Battle of the Crater said quietly, "Take me back." Removed a short distance to the rear, he asked those carrying him to lay him down. A few minutes later he breathed his last and Lee's army lost another superlative brigade commander.[30]

As a result of the adjustment while crossing the Vaughan Road,

Hill's line proceeded toward the Union line at nearly the same angle that the Vaughan Road made in relation to the Federal works. As a result, the left of the Confederate line neared those works first.[31] Finegan's Brigade, disease-wracked and depleted by desertion, no more than 800 strong, came within 100 yards of the Federal breastworks before breaking.[32] The Confederates to the right of the Vaughan Wagon Road marched steadily through the corn field to within fifty feet of Hofmann's brigade before they broke.[33] After attempting in vain to reform, the Florida Brigade fell back in confusion and disorder.[34]

Harris' Brigade, which had rapidly formed line of battle and advanced at the double-quick to the support of the Floridians, passed through and over Finegan's Brigade as it retired. The Mississippians then charged. The left regiments of the brigade, the 12th and 16th Mississippi, came within thirty yards of the Iron Brigade's works. Harris' Brigade received no assistance, however.[35] The panic of the Floridians had spread to the other brigades of the assault formation, and their men headed for the woods west of the Vaughan Road.[36] A Confederate battery attempted to unlimber near the Flowers house, but the fire of the Federal batteries drove the rebel artillerymen away.[37] The Federal fire became unbearable for Harris' leftmost regiments. Many of the soldiers of these regiments sought cover in the ditch which drained the meadow over which they had charged.[38] A soldier of the Iron Brigade's 24th Michigan later wrote:

> Some concealed themselves in a ditch near by, and it being death to advance or retreat, they dropped their guns and, waving their hats or anything they had in token of surrender, rushed pell-mell over the Union works as if Satan would get the last man. Our men took them by the hand in many instances and helped them over the works.[39]

Harris' Brigade lost at least 250 of the 450 men that it took into action.[40] Bragg's soldiers captured the flags of the 12th and 16th Mississippi.[41] The survivors of Hill's attack returned to the woods west of the Vaughan Road and rallied.[42]

No sooner had the Iron Brigade repelled Mahone's assault, than the Maryland Brigade had to repel part of Heth's attack.[43] Heth commanded a force consisting of Cooke's and MacRae's Brigades of his own division and Ransom's Brigade of Johnson's Division.[44] On the previous afternoon, Ransom's Brigade had relieved Walker's Brigade on the left of the railroad and pushed forward pickets to the southern fringe of the Davis corn field.[45] Cooke's and MacRae's Brigades, each a crack unit, had not reported to Heth until after midnight.[46] Cooke's Brigade went into reserve. MacRae's Brigade relieved Davis' Brigade on the right of the railroad.[47]

At dawn on August 21st, Brigadier General William MacRae formed

line and advanced his sharpshooters to clear his front. After a sharp skirmish, MacRae's sharpshooters drove the pickets of the Purnell Legion and the 146th New York through the Davis corn field and back to the belt of woods north of the Globe Tavern clearing.[48] At about the same time, east of the railroad, the battle line of Ransom's Brigade moved down and formed on its picket line.[49] Heth kept Cooke's Brigade in reserve in order to protect the left flank of the attacking force.[50]

When Mahone's artillery opened, Heth ordered his own guns to fire. Heth's infantry took cover. An officer of the 11th North Carolina in MacRae's Brigade later wrote: "We lay between our batteries. . .and theirs during the artillery duel which opened the ball, and came in for some pretty severe shelling."[51] As soon as Mahone opened, Heth sent forward his infantry.[52] MacRae's Brigade moved forward into the dense undergrowth of pine and oaks to the west of the railroad.[53] East of the railroad, Lieutenant Colonel John L. Harris led Ransom's Brigade into the dense, swampy, almost impenetrable thicket that had retarded the progress of Crawford's Federals on August 18th.[54]

MacRae's Tarheels encountered the Federal pickets along the razed line of works at the northern edge of the woods.[55] The North Carolinian battle line drove through the pines and oaks, mauling the Purnell Legion in the process.[56] At the southern edge of the woods, MacRae's men stormed another lightly held line of razed Union works.[57] As they ran for the main Union line and safety, the hapless Federal pickets fell prey to the trip wires that they and their comrades had strung during the previous night.[58] According to a soldier in the main Federal works observing the fleeing pickets:

> Suddenly a number of men fell flat on their faces and we thought that they had been hit by the enemy's fire. To our surprise, they hurriedly scrambled to their feet again and continued toward us. A few steps more and again they plunged to the ground. It dawned upon us then what was the cause of their strange behavior. They had tripped over the telegraph wires stretched about a foot high along the ground. The men, too, realized what was the matter and they carefully picked their way the rest of the distance, being greeted with laughter as they approached. They, however, were in no mood to enjoy the merriment.[59]

MacRae's crack soldiers rushed for the main line of Federal works.[60] Canister from four Union batteries drove MacRae's battle line back into the woods, though some of his skrimishers made it to the cover of a ravine quite close up to the main Federal works.[61] Describing the corn field between the woods and the works occupied by the Maryland Brigade, a soldier of the 118th Pennsylvania later wrote: "The corn-stalks were cut

off by the bullets as if by a knife."[62] While MacRae's battle line attempted to reform, word arrived to halt.[63] The Federal artillerymen blasted the woods with solid shot as the Tarheels hugged the ground, awaiting the signal of Mahone's success before they rushed the main Federal works.[64] Mahone's attack had failed, however, before MacRae's brigade, with more distance to cover, tougher terrain to negotiate and stronger resistance to overcome, had reached the southern edge of the woods. In the words of a historian of MacRae's Brigade, the brigade "found itself alone in front of the works, too weak to go on and too near to retreat."[65] The sniping of the Tarheel skirmishers and sharpshooters annoyed the Federal gunners, and Winthrop assigned the 5th and 140th New York to maintain a scattering fire upon the North Carolinians.[66]

East of the railroad, the five regiments of Ransom's Brigade moved forward across the Davis corn field by company front, with intervals corresponding to regimental strength. At the northern edge of the woods, each regiment formed line on its right company.[67] With Cooke's Brigade in echelon behind it and to its left, Ransom's Brigade moved forward in line of battle through a swamp and came to a level pine wood, where the rebels halted and reformed their lines. A narrow road ran through the pines out toward the Union line.[68]

The Federal and Confederate artillermen exchanged shells above the heads of the men of Ransom's and Cooke's Brigades as the North Carolinians drove the Union skirmishers back upon the razed works of Crawford's division. Despite the demolition of the breastworks of the Third Division of the V Corps, the abatis in front of those works remained. The criss-crossed tree trunks and sharpened limbs that had impeded the advance of Walker's Brigade on August 19th now hindered the advance of the two Tarheel brigades.[69] In order to reach the Union works, some of the rebels had to remove the timber and make a passageway for themselves.[70] Other Confederates, according to a historian of the 35th North Carolina, "had to pick their way through the interlaced timbers and advance without regard to company or regimental formations."[71] While this work went on, the Federals kept up a galling fire.[72] Once through the abatis, the Southerners reformed under the same fire and moved forward again.[73]

A historian of the 56th North Carolina later described what happened next:

> And now in the face of the foe, who are still doing all the shooting, our line of battle, under the severe punishment it is receiving at short range, staggers and writhes like a monster serpent, mortally wounded, and as if about to snap at every vertebrae. A beardless youth shouts: "On with the yell, boys; on with the yell."

> . . .The old Fifty-sixth, in the centre, responds with a will and volume that the Comanche tribe might have envied; the deadly aim of the enemy is diverted at random, and the fusillade slackens perceptibly, while the brigade, like a human tornado, rushes over their line.[74]

The commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, who had arrived in Petersburg from Chaffin's Bluff in order to oversee the attack, witnessed this charge.[75] According to a historian of the 35th North Carolina, the advance evoked from Lee the compliment that "he had often heard of men straggling to the rear, but he had never before seen men straggle to the attack."[76]

After taking the razed line of works just south of the Davis corn field, Ransom's and Cooke's Brigades reformed again and rushed forward to the next Union line, along the southern edge of the woods. The Federals had dismantled this line during the previous night and did not reoccupy it as they fled from the rebels. The Confederates soon encountered the direct fire of the Federal artillery, posted on elevated ground across the Globe Tavern clearing. Besides Union shell and canister, shortfalls of friendly fire also struck the Tarheels.[77] The Federal guns broke up the battle lines of the two brigades before they emerged from the woods.[78] More difficult terrain, more formidable fortifications and more resistance had delayed the progress of Ransom's and Cooke's Brigades so much that the Federals thought the attack of these brigades separate from that of MacRae's Brigade.[79]

After reforming at the edge of the woods, Ransom's and Cooke's Brigades continued their advance through another abatis of trees felled with their tops facing the Southerners.[80] A soldier of the 49th North Carolina described the results:

> We soon became so entangled in the fallen trees that we could make no headway whatever. John Landen, the color bearer of the 49th, was up in the tree tops with the flag in one hand and fighting his way through the limbs with the other. The enemy opened on our left with all their artillery, double-shotted with grape and cannister, giving us an enfilading fire which mangled our men terribly. Seeing that we would all be uselessly slaughtered in that death trap, Colonel Davis shouted to us to fall back to the other line; but in the din of shouts, crashing tree tops, and bursting shells only about half the regiment heard the order and fell back, while the other half were still trying to get through the pines. Adjt. J. H. Sherrill, of the 49th, ran back, found Landen with the flag, and, collecting the men as best he could in the storm of grapeshot, brought them back to the line. To make bad matters worse, we had a battery of artillery in a

field half a mile off on our right which, mistaking our retreat for a charge of the enemy, opened all their guns on us, killing and wounding a number of our own men who had escaped death in the battle.[81]

This charge had not gotten within 300 yards of the main Federal works on the Vaughan Wagon Road. A direct fire of canister and a crossfire of case shot from twenty-six guns had driven most of the rebels back into the woods.[82] Some Confederate skirmishers hid in a ditch and tried to pick off the Federal gunners.[83] A Union counterattack resulted in the capture of at least sixty-five prisoners, mostly from Ransom's Brigade, which had advanced farther than Cooke's men.[84] A soldier in the 11th Pennsylvania in Wheelock's brigade of Crawford's division of the V Corps captured the flag of the 24th North Carolina.[85]

While Ransom's Brigade reformed for yet another charge and Cooke's Brigade braced for an expected counterattack on its left, word arrived to halt any further attacks on account of the failure of Mahone's assault.[86] The attack on Cooke's left did not materialize, and the main bodies of MacRae's and Ransom's Brigades withdrew to the first line of captured Federal works.[87] A historian of the 11th North Carolina in MacRae's Brigade, commenting on the predicament of the pinned down portions of MacRae's and Ransom's Brigades, later wrote, "If Warren had known how few we were in his front, and had sent out an adequate force, he might have captured the most of these two brigades, isolated as we were."[88]

Meanwhile, Hagood's men had made their way across the swamp. On the other side, they found themselves in the clearing under the hill which blocked their view. Some Federal pickets had noticed the advance of the brigade and had begun to fire in its direction. Crossing the swamp had considerably disordered the line of the brigade. Hagood immediately pushed skirmishers up the hill for reconnaissance and protection from enemy attack while he and his staff reformed the brigade's line of battle. The future Governor of South Carolina reformed the brigade in a matter of minutes, but not until the other Confederate thrusts had met with bloody repulses at the hands of the Federals.[89]

As Hagood's Brigade reformed line of battle, a rider passed who had in front of him across his horse the body of Sanders.[90] A report came back to Hagood from the skirmishers that the Federals occupied rifle pits but a short distance ahead, thus confirming Mahone's statement. Dismounting and placing himself in front of the center in order to steady his men and stifle excitement, Hagood cautioned his men to move only at a quick step until he gave the order to charge. The South Carolinian ordered his brigade to advance and moved backward in front of the line for a short distance as if on a drill. While he halted below the crest of the hill, the line

MAP 9
Globe Tavern
August 21
W. P. Davis
Wells
HETH
HILL
3
Cooke
Ransom
2
MacRae
Newcomb
MAHONE
Harris
Finegan
Sanders
Flowers
1
Cutler
AYRES
Willcox
Potter
Blick
White
Dunlop
Gwyn
Thomas, Wright & Scales
4
Hagood
Tilton
Crawford
GRIFFIN
Globe Tavern
Gregory
WARREN
5
Barringer
121, 143 & 187 Pa.
White
Stedman

passed and he followed with his staff behind the right of the 21st South Carolina. This regiment had the 25th South Carolina on its left and the brigade's other three regiments on its right.[91]

A captain in the 83rd Pennsylvania of Gwyn's brigade later described how Hagood's Brigade first appeared to the Federals: "They advanced in the most splendid order through the cornfield which lay before them, and their heads could be just seen above the tall corn, with their red battle flags moving over it."[92] Soon after Hagood's Brigade became visible ascending the hill, the Federals in the rifle pits opened fire upon the South Carolinians. Without firing a shot in reply, Hagood's men moved forward steadily at quick time with arms at right shoulder shift. As the South Carolinians approached the line of rifle pits, the Federal pickets bolted and fled. The rebel yell rose from the ranks of Hagood's Brigade, and the men spontaneously broke into double-quick time in pursuit.

At this time, Hagood perceived that this Federal line constituted only an entrenched skirmish line, though so heavy as to have deceived his skirmishers into thinking it a line of battle. 250 yards beyond, Hagood observed a strongly entrenched line, crowded with men and guns. This line extended right and left as far as Hagood could see. Nowhere could Hagood detect Mahone's force, now already under cover in the woods west of the Vaughan Road. Hagood's Brigade headed at an oblique angle for the Federal main line, an infantry parapet five feet high behind a ditch eight or ten feet wide with artillery at intervals. Immediately to the right of where the brigade struck the line, a small bastioned work for field artillery thrust forward. The oblique angle of approach subjected the South Carolinians to a flank fire from the Federal main line, besides the unavoidable flank fire from the artillery bastion.

Hagood saw at a glance the hopelessness of the assault. Stopping, he shouted again and again for his command to halt, but the roar of artillery and crash of musketry drowned out his voice. His men moved forward "with the steady tramp of the double-quick." Dressing on their colors, they neither broke ranks nor stopped to fire.[93] The brigade moved with its line perpendicular to the 3rd Delaware of Hofmann's Brigade. Refused at a forty-five degree angle, the 3rd Delaware formed the left of the Fourth Division of the V Corps.[94]

When Hagood saw that his efforts to save his men from certain destruction had failed, he felt obliged to share their fate. With his orderly and two members of his staff, Hagood followed the advancing line. Before they had gone fifty yards, one staffer fell with a leg wound. A few steps further, the other staffer fell with a mortal head wound. Only Hagood and his orderly reached the Federal works, and on the way there the orderly had suffered a wounded shoulder.

The 21st and 25th regiments on the left struck the works first due to

the oblique direction of the advance. While they struggled in vain to penetrate the abatis in front of Hofmann's breastworks, the other three regiments continued onward. Those three regiments came to a halt in the thick bushes of the ravine to the left and about 150 yards in the rear of Hofmann's brigade. This ravine ran between the line of Cutler's division and the line of Griffin's division, in echelon about 300 yards behind Cutler's left. Seventy-five to 100 yards separated the two sections into which Hagood's Brigade had broken.[95]

By this time, however, Federal fire had so fearfully cut up Hagood's Brigade that the rebel assault seemed to have no hope of success, in which the only hope of safety appeared to lie.[96] Some of the South Carolinians held up their hands and the butts of their guns. Others ran to the rear and escaped. The Federals thought that the Confederates had surrendered.[97] A captain on Cutler's staff galloped out of a sally port, seized the flag of the 11th South Carolina, on the left of the portion of the brigade in the ravine, and demanded the surrender of the brigade. Parleying began around him and led to confusion. Some South Carolinians surrendered, but the Federals did not take them into custody. Others refused to surrender, but stopped fighting. Still others continued to fight. Meanwhile, the Federals pushed out from the right and left a line behind Hagood's Brigade to cut off its retreat.[98]

Hagood called to his men and told them to shoot the Federal officer and then retreat. They either did not hear him or, bewildered by the surrender of part of their number, failed to obey. "It was a critical moment and demanded instant and decided action," Hagood later wrote. "In a few minutes the disposition to surrender would have spread and the whole brigade would have been lost."[99] Hagood rapidly covered the distance between the two fragments of his brigade. He made the brief journey under the fire of the 3rd Delaware, scarcely thirty yards distant. The South Carolinian again shouted to his men to fall back, and again they failed to obey.

Approaching the mounted Federal officer, Hagood demanded the colors and declared the officer free to go back within Union lines.[100] Extending his left hand to receive the colors, Hagood stood on the ground near the captain.[101] The officer, a captain on Cutler's staff, began arguing with Hagood. The captain pointed out the hopelessness of further struggle and pointed to the line of Federals in the rear of Hagood's Brigade.

"The battle seemed to halt," a private of the 25th South Carolina later wrote. "Firing had practically ceased on both sides, and both armies stood in breathless expectancy awaiting the issue of the momentous parley between these two brave, determined men."[102]

Hagood cut the captain short and demanded a categorial reply.

"Yes or no," the South Carolinian said.

The captain raised his head proudly.

"No!" said the Federal.

Hagood thereupon shot the captain, who reeled from the saddle on one side as Hagood seized the bridle and mounted from the other. Hagood's orderly seized the flag as it fell from the captain's hands.[103] Hagood later wrote:

> There was no thought of surrender now. The yell from the brigade following the act and ringing out above the noise of battle told their commander that they were once more in hand and would go now wherever ordered — whether to the front or rear.[104]

Waving his hat over his head, Hagood shouted to his men to face about and follow him out of the encirclement. He led all who could at a run against the line in their rear, passing over many of their comrades who had fallen during the advance. "This line melted before our charge," Hagood later wrote.[105] Until now, the surrounding Federals had largely held their fire — in part out of bewilderment and in part out of fear of hitting their own men.[106] After the South Carolinians broke through the line blocking their retreat, however, the Union fire intensified severely. Many rebels fell before the remnant of Hagood's Brigade reached shelter in the valley of the branch. Upon its margin, after a ride of about 200 yards, a shell fragment mortally wounded the horse upon which Hagood rode. Struggling as it fell, the horse kicked in the head a lieutenant of the 7th South Carolina Battalion and rendered him temporarily so confused that one of his men had to lead him from the field.[107]

Hagood's Brigade had lost 449 of the 740 men who had gone into action.[108]. "It was a heartrending sight to look along the line of the brigade, as it mustered in the Vaughn road after the action," Hagood later wrote. "It was now shrunk to the proportions of a small battalion."[109] As he moved about among the pitiful remnant of his once magnificent brigade, the dignified, reticent Hagood's eyes welled up with tears. Hagood for some time kept a line of skirmishers as near as possible to the Federal works while the stretcher bearers removed the wounded. Many wounded crawled within the line and thus escaped captivity.[110]

The commander of the Artillery Brigade of the V Corps later wrote:

> Thus ended a battle in which the artillery on our side bore a more prominent part than in any other action of this campaign. Our lines being formed entirely in open ground, though within short range of the surrounding woods, afforded the very best opportunity possible for an effective artillery fire, which was so

> well employed that the infantry had comparably little opportunity to take part in the fight. Particular instructions had been given the day before that in firing into the woods only solid shot should be used, and fired at so low an elevation as to strike the ground at the edge of the woods and enter on the ricochet. The appearance of the woods and the enemy's dead left there gave ample testimony to the excellence of this practice.[111]

The rebels did not consider the battle over yet, though. Undaunted by the repulse of the attack based on intelligence of the previous day's Union line, Hill and Mahone immediately began looking for a weak point in the new Federal position. Shortly before noon, they sent Barringer's Brigade of cavalry on a reconnaissance in force about a mile to the right of Globe Tavern, beyond Warren's left.[112]

Barringer's Brigade moved along the road from Poplar Spring Church to White's farm on the Weldon Railroad. East of the Vaughan Road, Barringer put in the 3rd and 5th North Carolina Cavalry to charge. After a sharp resistance, the Tarheels started the Federal skirmishers and carried the entrenched Union picket line. For a time, the North Carolinians swept everything before them. Soon they came within a few yards of the railroad. There, according to a survivor of the 5th North Carolina Cavalry, they met "the deadliest and heaviest single discharge we had ever known." The fire came from an infantry breastwork covering the railroad.[113]

The 121st, 143rd and 187th Pennsylvania of the First Brigade of the First Division of the V Corps, the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry of Stedman's brigade and the 11th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery of the IX Corps had just rushed down from the vicinity of Globe Tavern and thrown up the breastworks.[114] "By this time the men had become so accustomed to throwing up works as soon as a halt was made that one of the natural consequences of a halt was the erection, in a remarkably short space of time, of a line of breastworks," the survivors association of the 121st Pennsylvania later wrote.[115] The 1st Massachusetts Cavalry, a battalion of the 10th New York Cavalry and the 11th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery assisted the Pennsylvanians in the repulse of the Tarheel horsemen.[116]

The 3rd and the 5th North Carolina Cavalry fell back under heavy fire, but still in order. The Federals took the offensive and sought to envelop the North Carolinians as they had enveloped Hagood's Brigade. The 1st New Jersey Cavalry hurried up through flooded fields, dismounted and threatened Barringer's right while other Federal units threatened the North Carolinian's left. The 1st and 2nd North Carolina Cavalry took position on each flank of the retiring Tarheel regiments and checked the Federals.[117]

After this reconnaissance of the Federal position, Mahone encountered Lee near the Davis house. Mahone told Lee that if given two fresh brigades, he would guarantee to drive the Yankees from the Weldon Railroad. Lee sent for Anderson's, Bratton's and Law's Brigades of Field's Division but called off the attack when Field's men failed to arrive at the agreed upon time.[118]

By cutting the Weldon Railroad, Grant had attained one of his less ambitious goals in launching his Fourth Offensive. The general-in-chief sought to push his advantage to the utmost. Unfortunately for the Federal rank and file, he did not realize that none of his troops still had the capacity to execute his aggressive designs. The relentless Grant characteristically responded to the first attack on Warren by ordering the XI and XVIII Corps to threaten the rebel lines by opening fire. The bloody repulse of the morning's rebel assault did not satisfy Grant and Meade. They wanted Warren to assume the offensive and annihilate the defeated Confederates. The commander of the V Corps, aware of the piteous condition of his own men and the IX Corps, wisely contented himself with preparing to meet further Confederate attempts to recapture the railroad. Warren's failure to attack robbed the day's victory of its sweetness, as far as Grant and Meade were concerned.[119]

The general-in-chief and the commander of the Army of the Potomac did not repose the same confidence in Warren as they did in Hancock. They gave the commander of the II Corps the benefit of the doubt, which they did not give the commander of the V Corps. Whenever Hancock declined to attack, Grant and Meade believed that the commander of the II Corps had good reason for his decision. If Warren declined to attack, Grant and Meade ascribed the decision of the commander of the V Corps to a lack of aggression. Grant and Meade wanted corps commanders who would follow orders and not give them any backtalk. Unlike Hancock, Warren did not fit this description. Years later, Grant wrote of Warren:

> He could see every danger at a glance before he had encountered it. He would not only make preparations to meet the danger which might occur, but he would inform his commanding officer what others should do while he was executing his move.[120]

Meade had seriously considered sacking Warren in June.[121] Grant would invite Sheridan to sack Warren the following spring, and Sheridan would take Grant up on the invitation — ironically, after Warren had won for Sheridan the Battle of Five Forks.[122] On August 21st, Grant prodded Warren to attack until the commander of the V Corps in none too subtle a fashion suggested that Grant put in charge of any such operation the commander of the IX Corps, who ranked Warren and had arrived on the field. Backing down, Grant looked for an opportunity to strike the enemy

elsewhere.[123]

On the previous day, Butler had detected a weakness in the rebel Bermuda Hundred lines opposite Port Walthall due to the departure of Langley's detachment and the detachments from Scales' and Thomas' Brigades. The commander of the Army of the James proposed using the X Corps, when it returned from north of the James, to exploit the weakness.[124] At 1 p.m. on August 21st, Grant ordered Butler to make a reconnaissance with the X Corps on the following morning, to take the rebel line if possible and if not successful to relieve the disease-wracked XVIII Corps and leave it free.[125]

The Federal high command continued to move up reinforcements in order to secure the position on the Weldon Railroad. Shortly after 11 a.m., the Fourth Division of the IX Corps received orders to reinforce Warren. At about the same time, Hancock's First and Second Divisions, making coffee near the Deserted House, got word to reinforce Warren in case of an emergency.[126]

The II Corps had reached the Deserted House at daybreak after the all night march. At 11:30 a.m., the Corps moved toward the Strong house, where it again encamped for a few hours. They arrived in the rear of Warren's position at 3 p.m. in terrible condition.[127] Hundreds fell out during this march.[128] Hancock's men did not recover until the month of August, if not the entire year of 1864, had ended.[129] In a letter written during the night of August 21st, a member of Meade's staff commented on this march:

> Last night, Hancock, with his two remaining divisions, marched from Deep Bottom and took position on our left, ready to support Warren. The long, rapid marches of this Corps have given it the name of "Hancock's cavalry." When a halt was ordered, one soldier said to the next: "O Jim, what er we a-stoppin' for?" "The Staff is getting fresh hosses!" replied James.[130]

Gregg and his Second Brigade had ridden along the nearly impassable roads since 6 p.m. the previous evening in their march to the Weldon Railroad from Deep Bottom. They reached Prince George Court House at daylight. After a pause there, they pushed on to McCann's house on the Jerusalem Plank Road, which they reached by 4:45 p.m. After another pause, they rode the rest of the way to the Gurley house, which they reached at 10 p.m.[131]

The destruction of the Weldon Railroad continued in accordance with Grant's wishes. The general-in-chief wanted not only to hold the railroad, but to destroy it as far south as possible.[132]

Spear rode out around noon with three regiments. By 1 p.m., he had reached the Vaughan Road and found that the rebels had withdrawn even

their outer pickets. Spear pushed on to Wyatt's house, farther southwest on the Church Road. There he found the extreme right of the Confederates held by W. H. F. Lee's Division. Picketing strongly every point, Spear skirmished with the advance posts of the rebels. Late in the afternoon, Spear's men drove a seventy-man Confederate detachment from Reams Station. The Federals destroyed two large water tanks, pumps and a large storehouse, then destroyed the telegraph wires for a distance two miles south while in pursuit of the fleeing rebels.[133]

By nightfall, the 200 railroad wreckers had destroyed the track for a mile and a half south of Globe Tavern. Stedman's brigade had guarded the work party.[134] According to the chaplain of the 1st New Jersey Cavalry, the wreckers employed in their destruction of the Weldon Railroad

> a machine patented for that purpose; but the road was in such bad condition that the machine could not add seriously to its worthlessness. The ties were so rotten, the rails so poorly tempered, that there was no purchase afforded for the instrument, no sufficient resistance to call forth its powers.[135]

Around nightfall, the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia withdrew his infantry from Warren's front and conceded the loss of the Weldon Railroad.[136] The day's operations had cost the rebels about 1,300 men.[137] The Federals had lost under 500 men.[138] During the entire Battle of Globe Tavern, the Confederates had lost approximately 2,300 men, including around 800 prisoners.[139] The losses of the Army of the Potomac neared 4,300, including over 3,000 prisoners.[140]

In a letter to President Davis written on August 22nd, Lee summed up the Battle of Globe Tavern, enumerated the considerations leading him to abandon the effort to dislodge the Federals and set forth his understanding of Grant's strategy:

> The enemy availed himself of the withdrawal of troops from Petersburg to the north side of James River, to take a position on the Weldon Railroad. He was twice attacked on his first approach to the road, and worsted both times, but the attacking force was too small to drive him off.
>
> Before the troops could be brought back from north of James River, he had strengthened his position so much, that the effort made yesterday to dislodge him was unsuccessful, and it was apparent that it could not be accomplished even with additional troops, without a greater sacrifice of life than we can afford to make, or than the advantages of success would compensate for. . . .The proximity of the enemy and his superiority of numbers rendered it possible for him to break the road at any time, and even if we could drive him from the posi-

tion he now holds, we could not prevent him from returning to it or to some other point, as our strength is inadequate to guard the whole road. . . .

I think it is his purpose to endeavor to compel the evacuation of our present position by cutting off our supplies, and that he will not renew the attempt to drive us out by force.[141]

As early as June 19th, just after the repulse of the initial Federal assaults on Petersburg, Lee had written off the Weldon Railroad as indefensible. The commander of the Army of Northern Virginia had urged the government to prepare the South Side Railroad and the Richmond and Danville Railroad to carry the supplies necessary to compensate for the Weldon Railroad's loss.[142]

The late June Federal cavalry raid that culminated in the First Battle of Reams Station had prevented the Confederate government from complying with Lee's request. The South Side Railroad and the Richmond and Danville Railroad had not yet recovered from the damage that this raid had inflicted.[143] To make matters worse, the loss of the Weldon Railroad came at a time when the Confederates had exhausted their corn reserves in Richmond.[144] As a result, the long anticipated loss of the Weldon Railroad seriously constricted Lee's supply. The commander of the Army of Northern Virginia soon had to cut rations by at least a quarter[145] and perhaps by as much as from a half a pound of bacon and a pound and a half a pound of corn meal per day to a quarter pound of bacon and half a pound of corn meal per day.[146] Previously occasional shipments of sugar and coffee stopped altogether.[147] As time went on, meat became even scarcer.[148] Civilians suffered worse than did soldiers as the price of commodities on the Richmond market skyrocketed.[149]

Though Lee did not contemplate abandoning Petersburg and Richmond, six lean weeks loomed ahead before the harvest would replenish the exhausted corn reserves. Soon after the Federals had cut the Weldon Railroad, the commander of the Army of the Northern Virginia dispatched wagon trains to haul supplies along a thirty mile route from Stony Creek to Petersburg in order to minimize the damage caused by the railroad's loss. The wagon trains travelled from Stony Creek to Dinwiddie Court House on the Flat Foot Road, and then from Dinwiddie Court House to Petersburg on the Boydton Plank Road.[150]

Lee appreciated how effectively Grant had utilized the Federal superiority in numbers. On August 23rd, Lee recommended to the Confederate Secretary of War "that all details of arms bearing men be revoked, except in cases of absolute necessity." The commander of the Army of Northern Virginia declared that "the time has arrived in my opinion when no man should be excused from service, except for the purpose

of doing work absolutely necessary for the support of the army." Lee finished by warning: "Without some increase of strength, I cannot see how we are to esape the natural military consequences of the enemy's numerical superiority."[151]

The loss of the Weldon Railroad itself amounted to such a consequence.

Lee perceived a silver lining to the cloud that arose from the demise of the Weldon Railroad, however. The Federals had incurred casualties out of all proportion to the military advantage gained, and long lists of killed, wounded and missing could only affect Northern morale adversely. Indeed, perhaps as Lee wrote, Lincoln began to take steps to prepare for an orderly transition to the next administration in the increasingly likely event of his losing the November election.[152]

CHAPTER 10

Cavalry Skirmishes, August 22 - August 24, 1864

At 2 a.m. on August 22nd, Grant suspended the attack that Butler had prepared for later that day on the Bermuda Hundred front.[1] Intelligence had arrived that the Confederates weakening the Howlett Line by their absence had returned from north of the James.[2] Grant ordered Butler to keep the X Corps ready for another day or two, however, because the general-in-chief anticipated that Union operations south of Petersburg would induce the Confederates to weaken their Bermuda Hundred sector again.[3]

South of the James, the Confederates had withdrawn from Warren's front during the previous night.[4] Meade worried that the rebels might assault the thin line of the disease-wracked XVIII Corps, which Grant wanted to relieve. During the morning, V Corps pickets allayed Meade's fears by locating the Confederates about a mile back from the previous day's position.[5]

Grant wanted "to hold the Weldon road. . .and to thoroughly destroy it as far south as possible."[6] At about noon, Meade sent Miles' division of the II Corps to assist the work party in tearing up the tracks south of the Globe Tavern and to assist Gregg's cavalrymen in covering the work party.[7] Placed under Gregg's command, Spears received orders to move out and attack the Southerners. During the afternoon, Spears' brigade engaged a small force of Confederate cavalry on the Church Road near Wyatt's house. In a fight about three quarters of an hour long, the Federal horsemen drove the rebels cross country toward Petersburg. The Confederates found refuge by burning a bridge over a branch of Arthur Swamp.[8]

By 6 p.m., Miles had wrecked the railroad to within one and a half miles of Reams Station.[9] Gregg's cavalrymen proceeded to Reams Station at dark and found no opposition there, though they learned of the proximity of a brigade of rebel cavalry — Chambliss' Brigade, encamped at Tabernacle Church, six miles southwest of Reams Station.[10]

That night a very heavy rain fell which left the country roads impassable for artillery and wagons. Only the main roads remained capable of bearing traffic. On the morning of August 23rd, the same day on which Lincoln began preparing for the possible loss of the November election, Meade perceived that the condition of the roads posed serious problems for large-scale troop movements because of the difficulty of supplying any large force at a distance from the main army.[11]

Before 10:45 a.m., Grant for the first time learned of the actual proportions of the disaster that the V Corps had suffered on August 19th. He had the unpleasant experience of learning them not from Warren or Meade, but from the Richmond newspapers. Queried by the general-in-chief as to the accuracy of the Confederate reports, the commander of the Army of the Potomac had to admit that the official returns of the V Corps tended to confirm rebel claims of 2,700 prisoners.[12]

At about the same time, Gregg sent Spear's tired brigade of cavalry to Miles.[13] Miles dispatched Spear on a reconnaissance to the west of Reams Station.[14] At around 11 a.m., Barlow returned to the command of the First Division of the II Coirps and Miles returned to the command of the First Division's First Brigade. Barlow ordered Miles to occupy Reams Station.[15] Miles sent on this mission the 81st and 183rd Pennsylvania under the command of Colonel James C. Lynch, who had commanded the First Brigade while Miles had commanded the First Division. Lynch occupied Reams Station without meeting any opposition, and by 1 p.m. the rest of Miles' brigade had arrived. Miles' men began wrecking the railroad.[16]

Back at City Point, shortly after noon, Grant directed Butler to use the X Corps to relieve the XVIII Corps. By 2:15 p.m., the general-in-chief had travelled to Fort Powhatan, downriver from City Point. There he conceived the plan of sending the XVIII Corps and the cavalry to wreck the Weldon Railroad all the way down to Hicksford (part of modern Emporia) as soon as the roads dried. This would have doubled the distance to Petersburg from the railhead and increased the inconvenience to the Confederates.[17]

By about 2 p.m., two regiment-sized companies from the 4th New York Heavy Artillery had reinforced Spear's cavalrymen.[18] Near Monk's Neck Bridge on Rowanty Creek, about two miles west of Reams Station, this force drove in the pickets of Barringer's Brigade of Rooney Lee's cavalry division just as Butler's Division, which had crossed the Appomattox that morning, began relieving those pickets.[19] A meeting engagement began that went on so long that in later years some Federals called the action the "fight by moonlight."[20]

Matthew Butler encountered Spear just east of Monk's Neck Bridge. The Virginians of Rosser's Brigade, still under Dulany's command, formed the rebel left and deployed in some woods on the Stage Road.[21] The 11th Virginia Cavalry dismounted on the left of the Stage Road, the 7th Virginia Cavalry on the right.[22] A portion of the 12th Virginia Cavalry dismounted and went forward as skirmishers.[23] The remainder of the 12th Virginia Cavalry and the 35th Battalion Virginia Cavalry, the Comanches, remained mounted. A squadron of the Comanches joined Matthew Butler, who had gone to the right with Dunovant's Brigade.[24] The South Caro-

linians formed the rebel right, dismounting on the Depot Road in an open field.[25]

Along the Stage Road, Rosser's Brigade drove some mounted Federals through the woods to an open field.[26] Unpreceded by a skirmish line, Dunovant's Brigade went forward through the open field on the Depot Road and into some woods. There the South Carolinians encountered a heavy fire from a concealed position. The brigade received orders to lie down, but a prone position did not make the fire any less galling.[27]

Suddenly, Spear seized the initiative and sent forward several mounted squadrons to charge Matthew Butler's line.[28] "Their cavalry came rushing on us as if just risen from the earth," a private of the 6th South Carolina Cavalry later wrote.[29] The Virginians and South Carolinians fled in panic before the horsemen of the aggressive Spear, who had served as a sergeant in the pre-war army.[30] The Federals smote the routed rebels with pistol and sabre.[31]

Some Confederate field officers began counselling retreat. The hard-fighting Spear might have driven the Virginians and South Carolinians back across Rowanty Creek but for the steadiness of the one-legged Matthew Butler, who rallied the rebels after they had retreated about 100 yards. The Southern commander then committed his reserves and led a countercharge.[32] Spear had sought reinforcements from Gregg and Barlow. Receiving none, Spear reluctantly retreated.[33] Matthew Butler reestablished the rebel picket line and quickly removed the dead and wounded from the battlefield.[34]

While Spear struggled with Matthew Butler, Gregg arrived at Reams Station. About an hour after Matthew Butler's men had driven off Spear and reestablished the rebel picket line, Gregg sent the 2nd and 16th Pennsylvania Cavalry out on the Depot Road to investigate the reports of an engagement about a mile and a half to the west. The two Keystone regiments soon encountered the Confederate pickets and drove them in on Matthew Butler's main body.[35] Matthew Butler in turn drove the Federals over a hill and back toward Reams Station.[36] Gregg reinforced his advance force until he had committed eight of his nine available regiments. He kept in reserve his ninth regiment in order to guard his flanks and plug any gap that developed.[37] Two relatively fresh companies of the 4th New York Heavy Artillery relieved their comrades and came to Gregg's assistance.[38] The Federals brought the rebels to a halt about a mile west of the railroad.[39] By this time, the rest of Barlow's division had joined Miles' brigade at Reams Station. Barlow's men had wrecked the railroad all the way there despite the rain, which had repeatedly put out the fires of destruction.[40] Though the Confederates pressed Gregg's line vigorously and long after dark, the Union cavalrymen and heavy artillerymen held. At about 9 p.m., Matthew Butler withdrew his tired men.[41]

The Federals had lost around 125 men.[42] The Confederates had lost 136.[43]

In reaction to the fight by moonlight, the commander of the Army of the Potomac ordered the Federals at Reams Station reinforced with the Second Division of the II Corps and four batteries of artillery. Meade also sent Hancock to take command at Reams Station.[44] Named after Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, Hancock now headed down into Dinwiddie County, Scott's birthplace.[45]

Under Major General John Gibbon, a West Pointer and former commander of the Iron Brigade who had returned from a personal leave of absence, the Second Division and the four batteries proceeded southward along the Jerusalem Plank Road.[46] The column turned off toward Reams Station at Shay's Tavern. Trees felled by the Confederates slowed progress, as did a battery stuck in dry quicksand. Gibbon's division and the four batteries did not begin occupying the works at Reams Station until 3 a.m.[47] By 10 a.m., they had all arrived.[48] Hancock's command at Reams Station consisted of 6,000 to 6,500 infantry and about 2,000 cavalry. This force had with it sixteen guns.[49]

The VI Corps had begun the earthworks at Reams Station in late June, just after the First Battle of Reams Station, a rout of Federal cavalry retreating from a raid on the South Side Railroad and the Richmond and Danville Railroad, which connected Richmond with the Deep South.[50] Rain had washed down the sides of the works.[51] Stagnant water stood in the ditch that ran along the inside of the works, which began at the edge of Jones Hole Swamp, about half a mile northeast of Oak Grove Church and the burnt railroad station. Along this stretch, the works had embrasures for guns and stood high enough to protect the gunners. Behind this return ran the road to Shay's Tavern. South of and parallel to this road, a small branch ran from near the church to Jones Hole Swamp.[52]

The works ran southwestwardly to the Weldon Railroad and resumed west of the tracks.[53] At a blunt angle scarcely five yards west of the railroad, the works turned southwest by south for a distance of about 700 yards.[54] The works gradually diverged from the railroad, which ran south by southwest from its northern passage through the works to the Depot Road. There the railroad began turning gently to a south by southeasterly direction, and the southern end of the western face of the works rested about forty-five yards west of the railroad.[55]

In approximately the center of the works, an opening about ten yards wide existed for the Depot Road.[56] North of the Depot Road, the tracks ran through a cut as deep as thirteen feet. South of the road, the railroad ran on an embankment up to six feet high.[57] The cut and the embankment made it difficult to reinforce the troops in the works or supply them with ammunition and also rendered withdrawal difficult.[58] A gunner of the 10th

Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery later described the works immediately to the south of the Depot Road as "a mere rifle-pit not more than three feet in height, and of frail structure, being built of fence-rails within, and these were slightly banked with sods and loose earth."[59] The works here could not protect artillerymen as they loaded and fired.[60] About halfway between the Depot Road and the acute angle where the works bent back to and terminated at the railroad, a traverse ran at approximately right angles to the works. South of the traverse, the works afforded gunners more protection than did the works immediately to the north, though not as much as did the works northeast of the railroad.[61]

Morning illuminated a pleasant change of scenery for the men of the Second Division and the four batteries. The historian of the 10th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery later wrote:

> By daylight we found ourselves in the midst of a country which had not been much desolated by the march of war. Through this we passed cheerily along amid apple-trees laden with fruit, and cornfields whose ears were just ready for roasting.[62]

The landscape did not bear this visage long. The funeral pyres of the railroad soon began consuming the countryside. A soldier of the 4th New York Heavy Artillery later told that unit's historian:

> While the fire was heating the rails we went into the cornfields on each side of us, and pulled armfuls of green corn, which was in its prime, and roasted it in the fire. We had plenty of salt and pepper and used it freely. This refreshment gave a zest to our work, which was new. We continued doing this all day — tearing up, firing, and roasting.[63]

The Federals did not confine themselves to roasting corn. Union foragers also returned with chickens, pigs and sheep. By the end of the day, while Gibbon's men rested in the works, Miles' division had killed the livestock and wasted the crops all the way down to Malone's Crossing, about two miles south of Reams Station and around five miles from where the railroad crossed Rowanty Creek.[64]

Spear's brigade preceded Miles' men to Malone's Crossing, covering the approach of the working party. During the day, skirmishing took place between Spear's pickets and Confederate cavalrymen. Miles sent to Spear's aid two regiments from the First Division's Fourth Brigade, the 145th and 148th Pennsylvania. Spear picketed the southern approaches to Reams Station while Gregg picketed from the Jerusalem Plank Road to Warren's left. Late in the afternoon, all of Miles' infantry withdrew to Reams Station,,leaving Spear's brigade alone at Malone's Crossing. Miles put Lieutenant Colonel Levin Crandell in charge of the division's picket line, and command of the Consolidated Brigade devolved upon Major

John W. Byron.[65]

Back in the trenches east of Petersburg, the Confederates continued to menace the XVIII Corps. In the forenoon, an estimated 5,000 Confederate infantry massed opposite Ord's left division, near the Crater.[66] The Union signal officers actually saw a much smaller number of men from Scales' Brigade pulling out of the trenches for the march down the railroad.[67] In the late afternoon, by which time the threat had proven illusory, Terry departed from Bermuda Hundred with two brigades totalling 1,800 infantry to go to the relief of the XVIII Corps. Straggling during what turned into a night march cut this force of exhausted X Corps soldiers down to 700 men by the time they reached Ord.[68]

More ominous developments took place on the Union left. Before sundown, Federal signal officers reported 8,000 to 10,000 rebel infantry moving southwest on the Vaughan Road. Meade cautioned Hancock to prepare for an attack by this force.[69] Despite the warning, Hancock allowed the night to pass as he and Gibbon had allowed the day to pass — without effecting a single improvement in the breastworks at Reams Station.[70]

The fight by moonlight led directly to the Second Battle of Reams Station. On the night of August 23rd and on the morning of the following day, Hampton evaluated the reports of his subordinates. The South Carolinian perceived the weakness of the Federal force at Reams Station — according to his information, a single division each of cavalry and infantry without any artillery. In the finest tradition of the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee's best yet least senior current corps commander proposed to Lee that infantry join the cavalry in an attack on the Federals at Reams Station.[71] Meanwhile, Hampton withdrew his men from the immediate environs of Reams Station but held the junction of the Stage Road and the Depot Road in order to protect the Monk's Neck Bridge crossing of Rowanty Creek.[72]

Always willing to consider the ideas and initiatives of subordinates, Lee initially thought it inadvisable to send any portion of his infantry that far from the Petersburg lines.[73] The commander of the Army of Northern Virginia upon mature consideration accepted Hampton's suggestion.[74] The Federal force at Reams Station simultaneously threatened Hicksford and Dinwiddie Court House.[75] The Confederates could and eventually did retain Petersburg and Richmond despite the destruction of the Weldon Railroad as far south as Hicksford.[76] Federal occupation of Dinwiddie Court House, however, would compel the abandonment of the Petersburg-Richmond position. A Union force at Dinwiddie Court House would cut off the wagon trains from the Stony Creek terminus of the Weldon Railroad and threaten the South Side Railroad, the Richmond and Danville Railroad and Lee's line of retreat.[77] Rather than extend his out-

numbered forces to guard against a Federal occupation of Dinwiddie Court House or a Union cavalry raid on the South Side Railroad and the Richmond and Danville Railroad, now just recovering from the June raid that had ended with the First Battle of Reams Station, the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia chose to drive off Hancock's force.[78] Lee also perceived the political benefits that would accrue to the Confederate cause from a victory. Every defeat inflicted on Federal forces would tend to discredit the Northern war party.[79]

The commander of the Army of Northern Virginia at first sent only Wilcox's Division to Hampton's assistance. In response to a communication from Hampton during the mid-afternoon, Lee also sent part of Heth's Division, and put A. P. Hill in charge of the expedition. Still later, Lee sent part of Mahone's Division.[80] This stripped Lee's lines to the point where only a single rank occupied them.[81]

Lee did not want to attack in the piecemeal fashion that he felt had contributed to the loss of the battle for the railroad at Globe Tavern. The presence at Petersburg of Anderson's, Bratton's and Law's Brigades of Field's Division made possible the dispatch of a force commeasurate with the task at hand.[82] Two of these brigades had come to Petersburg on August 21st, and Lee ordered the third to follow on the morning of August 24th.[83] The commander of the Army of Northern Virginia sent to attack Hancock eight brigades of infantry under A. P. Hill. These troops went lightly armed and equipped because they had to return to the nearly empty Petersburg trenches as soon as possible.[84] Under Wilcox went Anderson's Brigade from Field's Division and McGowan's, Scales' and Lane's Brigades of Wilcox's Division. Under Heth went Mahone's and Sanders's Brigades from Mahone's Division and Cooke's and MacRae's Brigades from Heth's Division.[85] Under Lieutenant Colonel William J. Pegram, the Letcher Artillery and the Purcell Artillery of his own battalion, Battery A of the Sumpter Artillery of Cutts' Battalion and sections of Clutter's Battery and the Hardaway Artillery of McIntosh's Battalion accompanied Hill's infantry.[86]

Like Grant, Lee in planning his offensive decided to feint with one wing in order to make the strike with the other wing more effective. The commander of the Army of Northern Virginia planned an elaborate ruse for August 25th on his left while Hill struck on the far right. Major General George E. Pickett, in command of the Confederates on the Howlett Line, would demonstrate against the Federal works across the base of Bermuda Hundred. Pickett and Beauregard would exchange false signals to deceive the Federals into thinking an attack imminent along the Bermuda Hundred and Petersburg lines. Lee hoped that this would draw or immobilize the Federal reserves.[87]

Late on August 24th, in order to avoid the Federals at Globe Tavern,

Hill sent his men on a circuitous march by various routes. Wilcox's men swung wide, taking the Boydton Plank Road and then the Duncan Road. They crossed Hatcher's Run, a tributary of Rowandy Creek, at Armstrong's Mill. The Duncan Road led Wilcox's men into the Vaughan Road, and they camped three or four miles beyond Armstrong's Mill, near Holly Church and the intersection of the Vaughan Road with the Monk's Neck Road.[88] Heth's men went south on the Squirrel Level Road. A safe distance beyond Globe Tavern, they switched over to the more easterly Vaughan Road, still heading south.[89] Heth's men spent the night a short distance downstream from Armstrong's Mill.[90] An officer of the 12th Virginia in Mahone's Brigade wrote of this march in his diary:

> Remained quiet until about 1 o'clock when the everlasting order came "prepare to march & leave your baggage." Generally speaking, every one can form some idea or at least imagines he can = of where we are going when such orders come but this time they fooled all the knowing ones. We did not start until 3 or 4 o'clock in the evening, and took the line of breastworks, coming out near Battery No. 41, I believe on the plank road. We did not keep this long but travelled by all sorts of blind roads and camped near Armstrong's Mill.[91]

Around sunset, Hill and Hampton conferred near Monk's Neck Bridge.[92] Though Hill had command of the operation, he did not know the ground around Reams Station. The Virginian acquiesced in the battle plan that the South Carolinian proposed. Hampton's plan called for part of the rebel cavalry to cover Hill's approach on the Depot Road while the main force of Confederate horsemen took up a position on the Weldon Railroad that would threaten the left flank of the Federals at Reams Station. The rebel infantry and cavalry would attack early and simultaneously.[93]

CHAPTER 11

The Second Battle Of Reams Station, August 25, 1864

The First Confederate Assault

At about 3 a.m., leaving Dunovant's Brigade and the 7th Virginia Cavalry to screen Hill's approach, Hampton set out with Barringer's Brigade of W. H. F. Lee's Division and the remainder of Butler's Division to join Chambliss' Brigade at Malone's Bridge. The commander of the Army of Northern Virginia's Cavalry Corps ordered Barringer, in command of W. H. F. Lee's Division, to send Chambliss' Brigade up Malone's Road, across Malone's Bridge, toward Malone's Crossing from the southwest. Rosser's Brigade, now back under the command of Brigadier General Thomas L. Rosser, and Young's Brigade, under the command of Colonel Gilbert J. Wright, would support Chambliss' Brigade. Hampton accompanied this column. The South Carolinian also ordered Barringer to take Barringer's Brigade, under the command of Colonel William H. Cheek, up the Halifax Road toward Malone's Crossing from the southeast.[1]

While Hampton and his cavalry plodded toward the left of Hancock's force at Reams Station, Pickett staged the demonstration that Lee had suggested. Near Ware Bottom Church a strong rebel skirmish line from Hunton's Brigade charged the Union pickets of the Second Division of the X Corps. The Confederates pressed back the Federals and took a portion of the entrenched picket line. Before long, however, the Union pickets counterattacked and retook the ground lost. This affair cost each side approximately fifty casualties.[2]

At daylight, Miles' division of the II Corps relieved Gibbon's division in the works and on the picket line around Reams Station.[3] Miles' First Brigade occupied the stretch of works on the right from Jones Hole Swamp to the railroad. The 140th Pennsylvania held the extreme right of the works. To the 140th's left, Lynch respectively positioned the 61st New York, the 2nd New York Heavy Artillery, the 12th Battery, New York Light Artillery, the 3rd Battery, New Jersey Light Artillery, the 183rd Pennsylvania, the 5th New Hampshire, the 26th Michigan, the 28th Massachusetts and the 81st Pennsylvania. This last regiment had its left resting on the railroad.[4] The two batteries stood about a third of a mile east of the railroad.[5] To the left of Lynch's brigade, the consolidated Second and Third Brigades occupied the works from the railroad to the traverse. The 4th New York Heavy Artillery held the works from the traverse back to the railroad.[6] East of the railroad, on the left of the 4th New York Heavy Artillery, Colonel K. Oscar Broady's Fourth Brigade began constructing a

light line of rifle pits that ran northeast for about 150 yards at the same angle as did the works held by Lynch's brigade. The refused left of the line of rifle pits ran parallel to the western face of the works.[7] As soon as Miles occupied the works, he employed his division's entire pioneer corps and an additional detail of fifty ax men in slashing the timber in front of the First Brigade, the Consolidated Brigade and the Fourth Brigade. This detail also cut roads for the movement of troops and artillery in the rear of the line.[8]

Shortly after 6:00 a.m., Hancock ordered his cavalry to undertake a reconnaissance of his front and right. The commander of the II Corps promised to send Gregg a brigade of infantry for support. Hancock had decided not to send out the Second Division to wreck the Weldon Railroad down to Rowanty Creek as planned until he had assured himself of the absence of the Confederates reported headed in his direction on the previous evening. Before the brigade of infantry arrived, Gregg drove in the Confederate cavalry pickets at two points on the Vaughan Road and found no evidence of the rebels reported headed Hancock's way.[9]

Exhausted from the previous day's march of at least ten miles in the hot sun, Hill's infantry did not rise until about 7 a.m. Wilcox's men, the vanguard, crossed Monk's Neck Bridge about an hour later. Gregg's cavalry probes made Hill cautious. The prospect of a meeting engagement such as that of August 23rd forced the commander of the Third Corps to deploy Wilcox's men in line of battle. Turning off to the right, Wilcox's men formed at right angles to the Depot Road. This threw off the timing of the Confederate plan, which called for the rebel infantry to arrive in front of Reams Station at around 9 a.m. Instead, after marching for about a mile cross country, Wilcox's men halted at that time. Two miles still separated them from Reams Station.[10]

The delayed progress of Hill's infantry gave Hancock a false sense of security. Reports from Gregg's squadrons assured the commander of the II Corps that no large body of Confederates had arrived in his vicinity. At about the same time as Wilcox's battle line halted, Hancock decided to send Gibbon's division out to work on the destruction of the railroad. The Second Division had hardly gotten out of the earthworks before Spear, as usual on outpost duty, reported the Confederate cavalry advancing on him in force at Malone's Crossing.[11]

After crossing Malone's Bridge over Rowanty Creek, the 9th Virginia Cavalry of Chambliss' Brigade dismounted and proceeded to a small stream about half a mile southwest of Malone's Crossing — the Brick Kiln Branch of Warren Swamp, a tributary of Rowanty Creek. The Virginians drove in the Federal pickets and found Spear's men occupying a cut of the railroad on the right and on the left of the old brick kiln that gave the branch its name. The Union line outflanked the Confederate right. The line

of the rebels outflanked the Federal right.

The 10th Virginia Cavalry received orders to move forward and extend the 9th's line to the right. Observing the arrival of the 10th, the 9th's men raised a yell and charged, carrying the Union line before the 10th could form. As the Federals fled, they received an enfilading fire on the left and threw away their repeating rifles in their haste to retreat.[12] A section of the 2nd Battery Jeb Stuart Light Artillery soon came up and contributed to the confusion of the Federals by a rapid and well-directed fire.[13] A few stray shots from this battery fell with unnerving effect among the Union troops along the western face of the works at Reams Station.[14]

Chambliss' Brigade and its supports followed Spear's Federals up the Halifax Road toward Reams Station for about a half a mile. There the rebels saw a large body of Union cavalry and led-horses occupying a field. The Federal horsemen retreated before the Confederates could take advantage of the opportunity for a charge. Spear's men joined Gregg back at Reams Station.[15]

While Chambliss' Brigade drove Spear's men from Malone's Crossing, the 6th South Carolina Cavalry of Dunovant's Brigade drove in the Union cavalry pickets of the 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry on the Depot Road. The South Carolinians dismounted and pursued the Federal cavalrymen to the swamp and ice pond about 400 yards northwest of the main Union works. Here the rebels ran into Crandell's infantry pickets who along with the 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry forced the South Carolinians to withdraw several hundred yards and restored the Federal cavalry picket line.[16]

Meanwhile, Barringer's Brigade took a course that put it between the Federals at Reams Station and the Jerusalem Plank Road. Near the Haddon house, where the railroad and the Halifax Road swung west, the Tarheels kept going along a by-road that went northeast between the Shands and J. Parham farms and then turned northwest until, near the Tucker farm, the by-road reached the road that ran from Reams Station to the Temple house on the Jerusalem Plank Road. While the 3rd North Carolina Cavalry protected Barringer's rear, the 1st North Carolina Cavalry dismounted and attacked at Tucker's farm at about 9:30 a.m. Supported by the 2nd and 5th North Carolina Cavalry, the 1st broke through the 16th Pennsylvania Cavalry, which formed Gregg's picket line from Reams Station east to the Jerusalem Plank Road. The North Carolinians drove the Pennsylvanians across a creek, through a wide swamp and up to within a short distance of the Federal infantry.[17] Barringer's attack at Tucker's farm seriously affected Meade's use of the Army of the Potomac's reserves, which led to a critical misunderstanding between Meade and Hancock.[18]

Massed in the corn and sorghum fields behind Oak Grove Church,

where some of the men had feasted on green corn and sweet potatoes, the Second Division of the II Corps received orders to move out to meet the Confederates moving up the railroad from the south. Colonel Thomas A. Smyth's brigade, followed by Lieutenant Colonel Horace P. Rugg's brigade and then Colonel Matthew Murphy's brigade, marched down the Halifax Road at the double quick.[19]

About three quarters of a mile down the road, near the Lanier farm, Gibbon ordered Smyth to halt and deploy skirmishers to the right of the railroad in order to recover the entrenching tools left by the First Division on the previous day. Gibbon also wanted Smyth to try to capture the rebel force confronting the Federals. While Smyth's vanguard halted to the left of the railroad about 400 yards from the rebels and opened a harmless fire from behind a barricade of fence rails, Smyth deployed the 1st Delaware as skirmishers to the right of the railroad with the 12th New Jersey in support. Advancing this line, Smyth made a left wheel in his approach and engaged the Confederates. The commander of the Third Brigade found both of his flanks exposed and deployed two companies of the 12th New Jersey to protect his left. On the right he deployed the 108th New York at nearly right angles to the skirmish line. This formation advanced about half a mile against stiff resistance, including clubbed muskets.[20]

Smyth ordered the right wing of the 12th New Jersey to deploy in single rank of the 1st Delaware and to charge the rebel skirmishers. He also brought the rest of the brigade to a position a short distance in the rear of his skirmish line. Advancing, Smyth's skirmishers drove the rebels through a corn field into an open field and then into a wood. As the Confederate skirmishers disappeared into the wood, a rebel battle line emerged and forced Smyth's skirmish line back to the position that it had occupied before its charge.[21] A soldier of the 12th New Jersey later wrote:

> We were close enough to the enemy to hear their guns snap and hear the officers giving their commands. Captain F. M. Acton and the writer lay low among the corn, as close to the ground as we could lie, the cornstalks near and around us being cut off by the bullets of the enemy, as though knives were cutting them, the balls striking in the sand threw it in our faces.[22]

After driving back Smyth's skirmish line, the Confederate battle line withdrew into the woods.[23]

Threatened on both flanks by Gibbon's maneuvers and perplexed by Hill's inaction, Hampton had notified the commander of the Third Corps of the rebel cavalry's situation. The South Carolinian tactfully suggested that the Lieutenant General attack. Hill responded with a modification of the plan agreed upon at the previous evening's conference. The Virginian promised an attack and urged Hampton to try to draw the Federals down

the railroad in order that the Confederate infantry might strike Hancock's force in the rear. Still in line of battle where they had halted two hours earlier, Wilcox's infantry returned to the Depot Road and then headed along that road toward Reams Station.[24]

Upon receipt of Hill's response, Hampton prepared to execute the prescribed maneuver. The South Carolinian ordered Barringer to strongly picket the road from Reams Station to the Temple house and with the rest of his command to join the main body of the Confederate cavalry at Malone's Crossing. Barringer left Company H of the 5th North Carolina Cavalry to picket the road. The Tarheels arrived at Malone's Crossing just as Hampton's battle line withdrew about 400 yards down the railroad. The South Carolinian ordered the 2nd North Carolina Cavalry to dismount, take position on the right of the line and to attempt to turn the flank of the Federals if an opportunity arose.[25]

When Smyth reported the withdrawal of the Confederate line of battle to Gibbon, the Major General ordered Smyth to press the rebels and ascertain their force and position. Smyth deployed in double line the 7th West Virginia Battalion, the 4th Ohio Battalion and the 14th Connecticut. The right wing of the 12th New Jersey took position in echelon on the left flank of this line. The right wing of the 14th Connecticut bore well to the right and rear in protection of the line's right. Smyth supported the line with the 69th and 106th Pennsylvania. Advancing, Smyth drove the rebels until his right flank reached a swamp. He discovered the Confederates in position on the opposite side. Subjected to a severe fire, Smyth could not advance.[26]

As Smyth's brigade deployed to the right of the railroad, Rugg's brigade took the place of Smyth's men on the railroad's left and Murphy's brigade crossed the railroad into Smyth's rear. Rugg's men deployed on the left of and at right angles to the railroad. The 59th New York and the 7th Michigan went forward as skirmishers to feel the enemy on the left and kept up with Smyth's advance. In their rear, the rest of Rugg's brigade formed in line of battle. A section of the 10th Battery Massachusetts Light Artillery took up a position on the left front of Rugg's brigade and silenced an opposing Confederate battery. Rugg's skirmishers advanced about a mile and found rebel cavalry, part mounted, part dismounted.[27]

While Gibbon followed Hampton's force back toward Malone's Crossing, at about 11 a.m., the 16th Pennsylvania Cavalry and two small regiments from Broady's brigade of Miles' division, the 116th and 145th Pennsylvania, reestablished the Federal picket line between the Halifax Road and the Jerusalem Plank Road. To prevent the rebels from getting possession of the roads leading from Reams Station to the Jerusalem Plank Road, Gregg gave the roads the additional protection of the 4th and 8th Pennsylvania Cavzalry.[28] In order to repel any further attacks from the

left and rear, the 3rd Battery, New Jersey Light Artillery moved from its position on the northern return to the corn field behind the church. One section took position on the knoll near the end of what would become the southern return and faced south. The other section took position between the knoll and the road to Shay's Tavern and faced east.[29] Hancock moved his field hospitals from the Emmons house, about a mile east of the railroad on the road to Shay's Tavern, to Oak Grove Church.[30] The 140th Pennsylvania of Lynch's brigade moved east about three quarters of a mile on the road to Shay's Tavern, linked its right to the left of the division's picket line and established a road block.[31]

Back at II Corps headquarters, Hancock learned from prisoners that Confederate infantry would soon join in the attack against his force. The Pennsylvanian prepared for battle.[32] Hancock began by ordering the section of the 10th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery and the better part of Gibbon's division to return to Reams Station. The guns returned to their parent unit, stationed between the traverse and the Depot Road.[33] Murphy's brigade relieved that portion of Broady's brigade still in the newly constructed rifle pits of the southern return.[34] Miles ordered the return of the two regiments of Broady's brigade from the vicinity of the Tucker farm.[35]

Broady's brigade relieved that portion of the Consolidated Brigade occupying the works between the 10th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery and the Depot Road.[36] From left to right, the 7th New York Heavy Artillery, the 145th Pennsylvania and the 66th New York occupied this stretch of the works.[37] The 64th New York and the 116th Pennsylvania went out to the west of the works as skirmishers.[38] The 53rd and 148th Pennsylvania went into reserve except for Company E of the 148th, which took position as sharpshooters in the Heath house, near the picket line.[39]

The Consolidated Brigade contracted its line to extend from the left of the First Brigade to the Depot Road.[40] The former Third Brigade, consisting of the 7th, 39th, 52nd, 57th, 111th, 125th and 126th New York, formed the left of the Consolidated Brigade. The former Second Brigade, the 63rd, 69th and 88th New York, formed the Consolidated Brigade's right.[41] With Crandell in charge of the First Division's picket line and the former Second Brigade's Byron in command of the entire Consolidated Brigade, Captain Nelson Penfield took command of the former Third Brigade.[42]

Rugg's brigade of Gibbon's division withdrew to Reams Station and took up a position on the left of Murphy's brigade, except for the 7th Michigan and the 59th New York. After exchanging shots with the Confederates, these two regiments also received orders to withdraw. They halted in the woods north of the Lanier farm and functioned as a picket line in that position.[43]

Smyth's brigade remained in place on the right of the railroad. Discovering rebels moving to his right in considerable force, Smyth deployed the 10th New York Battalion to meet the threat to his right. This proved insufficient to guard the rear of the brigade, and Smyth subsequently moved the 108th New York and the 1st Delaware to his right rear, connecting with the 10th New York Battalion on their left and covering a road to the railroad on their right.[44]

The Federals recalled to Reams Station arrived around noon, just as the Confederate infantry drove in the Union cavalry pickets on the Depot Road. In the midst of preparing lunch, the gunners of the 10th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery heard the crash of small arms and looked up to see the Federal horsemen dash through the opening in their works, "raising a great dust, and riding as recklessly as if the whole Rebel army was at their heels."[45]

Riding toward Reams Station to reconnoiter in person, Wilcox found between the head of his column and the Federal infantry's rifle pits an uncultivated field broken by clumps of pines. This field extended between thick pine woods for about 100 yards on each side of the Depot Road. Behind the Federal rifle pits on the left of the road, a similar open field stretched for several hundred yards to another pine forest, which hid the main Federal works. On the right of the road, the Union rifle pits extended to a field of corn which stretched back beyond the wall of pines on the road's left side. In this corn field stood the buildings of the Heath farm. Wilcox could see the smoke of the Federal artillery rising from near these houses as the Union guns swept the Depot Road with shot and shell.[46]

Several hundred yards farther back and out of sight of the Federals, Wilcox deployed his brigades as they arrived. Scales' Brigade went into the thick pines on the left side of the road. McGowan's Brigade, now under Brigadier General Samuel McGowan, went into the dense woods on the right of the road. Lane's Brigade, now under Brigadier General James Conner, followed Scales' Brigade into the pine forest on the road's left side.[47]

At the same time, Wilcox deployed the sharpshooter battalions of these three brigades across the road and ordered them to advance. The lead battalion, of Scales' Brigade, had engaged the Federal pickets before McGowan's Brigade had gotten into position. McGowan's sharpshooters covered and supported Scales' sharpshooters, following at a distance of from seventy-five to 100 yards. The sharpshooters of Lane's Brigade covered and supported McGowan's sharpshooters, following at a similar distance.[48]

While the sharpshooters deployed, Wilcox ordered Scales' and Lane's Brigades to keep under cover of the woods and pass into the

pines in rear of the Federal rifle pits. The Major General accompanied McGowan's Brigade forward through the woods on the right of the road as the Federal gunners shelled these woods.[49]

As the sharpshooters of Scales' Brigade advanced, they found themselves in the presence of a large force of Federals which overlapped them on both flanks. McGowan's sharpshooters therefore uncovered Scales' sharpshooter battalion and moved up on its right. The sharpshooters of Lane's Brigade uncovered and moved up on the left of Scales' sharpshooter battalion. The three sharpshooter battalions advanced slowly through the woods, drove in the Union skirmishers and at the edge of the corn field beyond struck the entrenched Federal picket line. With a yell, the rebel sharpshooters charged. The Union pickets held their position until the Confederates threatened to overwhelm them. Then the Federals broke and fled across the corn field to the cover of their main line on the railroad. The Confederate sharpshooters pressed on toward the main Federal line.[50]

Wilcox's sharpshooters found the earthworks along the railroad occupied not by a small force of cavalry as expected but by the better part of Hancock's corps of infantry.[51] The commander of McGowan's sharpshooters later wrote: "They received us with a blizzard as we cleared the field of their skirmishers."[52] The rebel sharpshooters engaged the Federal main line for a few minutes at short range. Developing the full strength of the line, obviously too great for them, the sharpshooters dropped back about four hundred yards. This put about half of the rebel sharpshooters in the pine forest north of the Depot Road and the other half just behind the crest that ran north and south through the corn field on the south side of the road.[53]

As the skirmishers driven in by the Confederates reformed in the rear of the breastworks, a hasty barricade of logs and brush went up across the gap where the Depot Road passed through the works.[54] North of the road, twenty-five men of Penfield's force went forward into the pine forest with orders to give notice of the approach of the rebels.[55]

Hancock reacted to the advance of the Confederate sharpshooters by shifting more of his forces to the western face of the works. The commander of the II Corps ordered Rugg's brigade from the left of Murphy's brigade to the support of the Consolidated Brigade. Rugg's men took position in the railroad cut. Hancock also ordered Smyth's brigade to return to the works and fill the void that Rugg's departure had created on Murphy's left.[56] Gregg called in the pickets of the 16th Pennsylvania Cavalry from their line to the Jerusalem Plank Road and put this regiment on the left of the Federal line and in the rear of Reams Station.[57]

The commander of the II Corps now ordered the restoration of his


MAP 10
Reams Station
August 25
The First Confederate Assault
Stage Road
Weldon R.R.
7th Va. Cav.
Spiers
Stedman
J. P. Emmons (Emmerson)
Woods
Woods
Woods
WILCOX
Phillips (Camley)
Conner
Halifax Road
Lynch
12 N.Y.
GREGG
140 Pa.
MILES
Woods
HANCOCK
To Shay's Tavern
Oak Grove Church
Smith & Spear
Sorghum
3 N.J.
Capt. Goodwyn
Dunovant
Anderson Scales
Byron
Rugg
Corn
Smyth
Branch (McDowell)
GIBBON
Woods
McGowan
Corn
Broady
Murphy
A. Heath (Webb)
10 MA.
1 R.I.
To Tucker Farm
Woods
4 N.Y. H.A.
7 MI & 59 N.Y.
Woods
Lanier

picket line. Broady in turn directed the 116th and 148th Pennsylvania of his brigade into the corn field south of the Depot Road. At the same time, Broady took command of the Third Brigade and sent Penfield forward into the woods with the 111th, 125th and 126th New York. Broady ordered Penfield to link up with the two Pennsylvania regiments on the left and the pickets of the First Brigade on the right. The 116th and 148th Pennsylvania pursued the Confederate sharpshooters back to the crest in the corn field, taking a few prisoners along the way. There the Keystoners encountered a rebel line of battle and fell back to their own works. Finding his left exposed and unable to link his right to the skirmishers of the First Brigade, Penfield also retreated to the works.[58]

Broady's Pennsylvanians had fallen back from the battle line of McGowan's Brigade, which Wilcox had deployed on the right of two other brigades that he had selected to assault the main Federal works. Observing the relatively unimpeded advance of his sharpshooters through the woods west of the entrenched Federal picket line and hearing no fire from any line of battle, Wilcox had thought the Federals in the process of retiring. As a result, he sent Anderson's Brigade into the woods north of the Depot Road. Meanwhile, McGowan's Brigade reached the corn field south of the Depot Road and halted in rear of the crest. Ordering this brigade to advance no farther, Wilcox went into the woods north of the Depot Road and positioned Anderson's and Scales' Brigades for an attack on the Federals.

Anderson's Brigade formed in the woods about 400 yards across an open field from the Federals. Scales' Brigade formed in the woods on the left of Anderson's Brigade. The right regiment of Scales' Brigade faced the same open field as did Anderson's Brigade. Thick woods intervened between the other three regiments of Scales' Brigade and the Federal works. The advance of Penfield's force caused Brigadier General Alfred M. Scales to report that the Union line extended beyond his left. Wilcox sent two regiments of Lane's Brigade to protect the left flank of Scales' Brigade.[59]

Wilcox now decided to attack. He made the decision on his own initiative. Ill, Hill found the heat of the day aggravating his condition. During this stage of the battle, the corps commander dismounted and lay down on the ground, leaving the direction of the battle to Wilcox.[60]

The North Carolina-born Major General ordered McGowan to create a diversion to prevent the Federals from reinforcing the point which Wilcox intended to strike. At the sound of McGowan's gunfire, shortly after Penfield's and Broady's skirmishers had fallen back to the woods, Scales' and Anderson's Brigades moved forward. Scales' Brigade charged with an impetus that carried it through the underbrush to within a few yards of the Federal works. Present with Anderson's Brigade, Wilcox

observed what he later termed "an evident indisposition to advance." This brigade, used up in the fighting north of the James and fatigued by the long march from Petersburg, at length entered the open field, cheered and dashed toward the main Federal works.

The Georgians had advanced unscathed to within 200 yards of the works when the Federals delivered a volley of musketry that inflicted a relative handful of casualties. That handful included the brigade's only field officer, however, and Anderson's Brigade retreated. The men in the right regiment of Scales' Brigade saw Anderson's Brigade retire and themselves fell back. One by one, from right to left, Scales' other regiments also withdrew.

Displeased with the feebleness of this attack, Wilcox determined to renew the assault at once with his two unused brigades, Lane's and McGowan's Brigades. The Major General withdrew the two regiments of Lane's Brigade from the left of Scales' Brigade and began to send for McGowan's Brigade, which would have to come by an awkward route that would expose the South Carolinians to artillery fire and leave unengaged the Federals in the portion of the works south of the Depot Road. At 3 p.m., however, Heth's command began arriving. Wilcox suspended his planned attack and reported in person to Hill.[61]

As the assaulting rebel brigades retired through Wilcox's sharpshooters, three hours of hell began for the Federal soldiers and horses in the works west of the railroad. The commander of McGowan's sharpshooter battalion later wrote:

> Here, deliberately, but without malice, planning the destruction of their enemies, the sharpshooters carefully estimated the distance between the lines, the depression of the ground where the enemy lay, the course the ball would take in its trajectory flight, and the exact point where it would cut the line of fire; then adjusting their sights accordingly, they entered upon the work in hand.[62]

The Confederate sharpshooters delivered their fire from just behind the crest in the corn field, which protected them from Federal muskets and artillery.[63] The commander of McGowan's sharpshooters later wrote: "The sharpshooters mounted the crest and with unerring aim proceeded to split the scalp of every mother's son that dared to lift his head above the breastworks.[64] The entire battalion would deliver a volley and then drop back to reload.[65]

At first the Federal infantry and guns responded vigorously. As time passed, however, the fire of the rebel sharpshooters had its effect.[66] The Union infantrymen crouched lower and lower behind the works and fired higher and higher until the gunners sarcastically asked if the foot soldiers

thought that the rebels had wings.[67] Each time that the Confederate skirmish line pushed toward the Federal works, the Union artillerymen not only exposed themselves to Wilcox's sharpshooters by firing the guns but expended extra ammunition in compensating for the slackening fire of the infantry. Before long, the gunners had emptied their limbers, parked just behind the works. In order to resupply themselves with ammunition from the caissons, parked on the embankment's eastern side, the artillerymen had to scramble back and forth over the railroad embankment with a few rounds at a time. This further exposed the gunners to the rebel sharpshooters. Confederate bullets took such a significant toll of the Federal cannoneers that in order to man its guns the 10th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery began to draw upon volunteers from its supporting infantry, the 7th New York Heavy Artillery. The 4th New York Heavy Artillery supported Batteries A and B, 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery, and supplied volunteers to help man the guns of that unit.[68]

The rebel sharpshooters put more lead into the artillery horses than into the gunners, though. A member of the 10th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery later described the terrible ordeal of these animals:

> Standing out in bold relief above the slight earthwork, in teams of six, they were naturally a prominent target for Rebel bullets, and the peculiar dull thud of these, at short intervals, told either that another animal had fallen a victim to the enemy's fire, or, what was frequently the case, that one already hit was further wounded. Some of the horses would fall when struck by the first bullet, lie quiet awhile, then struggle to their feet again to receive additional injuries. Frequently a ball would enter a horse's neck, with the effect only of causing him to shake his head a few times as if pestered by a fly, and then he would stand as quietly as if nothing had happened. I remember seeing one pole-horse shot in the leg — the bone evidently fractured — go down in a heap, then, all encumbered as he was with harness and limber, scramble up and stand on three legs. It was a sad sight to see a single horse left standing, with his five associates lying dead or dying around him, himself the centre of a concentrated fire, until he, too, was laid low. I saw one such stuck by seven bullets ere he fell for the last time. Several received as many as five, and it was thought by some that they would average that number apiece. They were certainly very thoroughly riddled, and long before the serious fighting of the day occurred, but two, out of the thirty plainly visible to the enemy, were left standing. These two had been struck, but not vitally, and survived some time longer. This statement does not include the horses on the caissons, most of which also fell.[69]

The slaughter of the horses clearly signified that the Confederates meant business and intended to capture the guns.[70] "We knew it was fight or Andersonville," a soldier of the 152nd New York in Rugg's brigade later wrote.[71]

The gunners of Batteries A and B, 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery shelled the Confederate sharpshooters for a short time, but then received orders to cease fire from a staff officer who accused the gunners of firing on their own men.[72] The 10th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery shelled the woods, the corn field and the buildings of the Heath farm. Shells riddled the house, and one of the dependencies took fire. The shelling drove the sharpshooters from the buildings, but could not drive them from their work.[73]

While Wilcox's command locked horns with Miles' division, events elsewhere effected the outcome of the battle. These events all involved the creation and deployment of reserves.

Instead of relieving the XVIII Corps with part of the substantially larger X Corps, as Grant had desired, Butler merely ordered the two corps to exchange places.[74] In the midst of this exchange, Butler began preparing to depart for New York. The politician-general turned over command of the Army of the James to Ord, its senior corps commander. Ostensibly, Butler departed in order to probate his brother's will.[75] Actually, this presidential hopeful left in order to keep a closer watch on the Democratic convention.[76] On top of all this, Pickett's demonstration at dawn, erroneous intelligence that Mahone's Division had reinforced Pickett and the concocted signals of the mine ruse sufficed to keep the 3,000 man reserve of the Army of the James occupied until early evening, far too late for its availability to assist Meade in meeting the contingencies that he faced.[77]

Just before noon, Meade left the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac in order to go to Hancock's headquarters. The commander of the Army of the Potomac arrived at Mott's headquarters, near the Jones house, at around 12:20 p.m. There Meade received a report that Lee had stripped the Confederate lines at Petersburg in order to drive the Federals from the Weldon Railroad. Only one rank, weaker than a picket line, occupied the rebel trenches in front of Mott's division. The cautious commander of the Army of the Potomac told Mott to ready his reserves to send to Hancock or Warren if necessary. The more aggressive Grant, who ordinarily would have directed Mott to attack the thinly occupied rebel works, felt too unwell to go to the front that day and contemplated a boat trip from City Point to Fortress Monroe at 4 p.m.[78]

By 1 p.m., Meade had made his way to Warren's headquarters at Globe Tavern. The commander of the Army of the Potomac proceeded no farther. At Globe Tavern, Meade found an 11:40 a.m. dispatch from Han-

cock reporting Barringer's breakthrough. Hancock's telegraph line to Army of the Potomac headquarters had not yet opened at 11:40 a.m., and the commander of the II Corps had sent the message to Warren's headquarters for transmission.[79]

Meade interpreted this report in accordance with his own preconceptions. These rested only in part on the Confederate movements reported by the signal officers on the previous evening and the statements of the rebels who had deserted to Mott that morning. Earlier that morning, City Point had received a report of the imminent return of Fitzhugh Lee's Division of cavalry from the Shenandoah Valley.[80] On August 23rd, two Northern born boys had fled Petersburg and told the Federals of the rumor circulating in the city about Early returning from the Shenandoah Valley, presumably with his entire corps and Kershaw's Division.[81] Back in June of 1862, such a shift of Confederate forces from the Shenandoah Valley had preceded the Seven Days Battles on the Peninsula, just east of Richmond between the York and James Rivers. The leader of a brigade at that time, Meade had suffered a wound at the Battle of Glendale, one of the Seven Days Battles.[82]

By 2 p.m. on August 25th, Meade had concluded that Lee would try to maneuver the Army of the Potomac off the Weldon Railroad by thrusting around the Federal left and threatening the army's rear on the Jerusalem Plank Road. In Barringer's attack on Gregg's picket line, Meade discerned the beginning of just such a maneuver. A single brigade of cavalry screened the Federal left from the Jerusalem Plank Road to the James River. The weakness of this force rendered the Federal rear vulnerable all the way back to the army's cattle pens at Coggins Point, twenty-five miles northeast of Reams Station on the James River.[83] Just over three weeks later, Hampton's raid on those cattle pens would demonstrate this vulnerabilty beyond question.[84]

Grant had begun the Fourth Offensive — Hancock's attacks north of the James River, the advance of V Corps across the Weldon Railroad, Hancock's move to Reams Station and the contemplated advance to Hicksford — in order to force the Confederates to withdraw troops from the Shenandoah Valley. The prospect of those troops joining Lee for a descent upon the Army of the Potomac's unprotected rear alarmed Meade. In his mind's eye, Meade must have seen Lee again driving the Army of the Potomac all the way back to the James and the protection of the Federal gunboats.

In order to prevent such a disaster, Meade sent to the junction of the Jerusalem Plank Road and the road to Reams Station two forces. At about 2 p.m., the Third Brigade and part of the Second Brigade of Mott's division pulled out of the Federal works near the Jones house. This force, under the command of Colonel Robert McAllister, comprised about 2,000

men.[85] Meade's chief of staff replaced McAllister's men with about 1,000 engineer troops and the army's headquarters infantry.[86] After a detachment of around forty cavalrymen from the Army of the Potomac's provost guard joined McAllister's force, the column headed south on the Jerusalem Plank Road to its intersection with the Reams Station road at Shay's Tavern.[87]

At about 3 p.m., Willcox's division of the IX Corps pulled out of the works near Globe Tavern and proceed southeast five miles mostly cross-country to Shay's Tavern. Three batteries accompanied this division. Meade ordered Willcox and McAllister to report to Hancock upon arrival at the Shay's Tavern intersection, which Meade considered crucial to the defense of the army's rear.[88] In case the Confederates interposed between the V Corps and Hancock, which Hancock also feared, Meade held in reserve at Globe Tavern Crawford's division of the V Corps and White's division of the IX Corps.[89]

The commitment of engineers, headquarters infantry and the provost guard bespoke the overextension of the Army of the Potomac. Had Butler followed Grant's orders and put the XVIII Corps into reserve, Meade's staff would not have had to scrape the bottom of the barrel in order to meet the threats posed by Lee's movements.

Again with the intent of guarding the army's left and rear, Meade at 1 p.m. authorized Hancock to withdraw from Reams Station but left the matter to Hancock's discretion. This authorization came down the railroad by courier from Warren's headquarters and did not reach Hancock until almost 2:45 p.m., after Wilcox's assault. Considering himself too closely engaged to withdraw before dark, Hancock declined to retreat. Just after 4 p.m. Hancock received another message from Meade by means of a courier from the headquarters of the V Corps. This message informed Hancock that Meade had also sent to the Federal left Willcox's division of the IX Corps and authorized Hancock to call up the division.[90]

The misunderstanding between Meade and Hancock arose over the line of march of this division. Hancock saw this unit solely as a reinforcement for him. At 4:15 p.m., he complained to Meade that had Meade directed it straight down the Weldon Railroad from Globe Tavern to Reams Station, a distance of five miles, it would have arrived in time to help. The division's actual line of march, from Globe Tavern to Reams Station via Shay's Tavern on the Jerusalem Plank Road, involved a distance of about twelve miles.[91]

Hancock failed to grasp that Meade intended to use this unit primarily to guard the army's left rear and only secondarily as a reinforcement for Hancock. After complaining to Meade, the commander of the II Corps sent a staff officer to conduct Willcox's division to Reams Station.[92]

The Confederates roaming around the Union left posed as many threats to the Army of the Potomac as the Federal force at Reams Station posed to Petersburg and Richmond. Unlike Lee, Meade chose to guard against the threats posed instead of attempting to eliminate the source of the threats or creating further threats of his own. By extending the Army of the Potomac to the utmost, Meade thought that he had managed to meet all of the contingencies that he faced. As events would show, however, a possibility existed which he had overlooked.[93]

Meade's cautiousness gradually infected Grant. At noon, the general-in-chief had still wanted Hancock's force to move a day's march toward Weldon, rip up a few miles of track and return by a road farther east than the one on which it had gone forth — the plan employed to complete the destruction of the railroad down to Hicksford in December's "Apple Jack Raid." By a little after 2 p.m., however, Grant had decided that he must consolidate and leave such a raid to the future.[94]

Heth arrived on the battlefield with Cooke's and MacRae's Brigades at about 3 p.m.[95] When Wilcox reported the feebleness of his first assault to Hill, the commander of the Third Corps evinced an inclination to withdraw even though Wilcox recommended a renewal of the attack. Hill feared a repetition of the costly repulse suffered in the Confederate attack on Warren's fortifications at Glove Tavern only four days earlier. After conferring with Brigadier Generals John R. Cooke and William MacRae, two of Lee's finest brigadiers, Heth sent word that his men could take the works if supported by Wilcox's men. This convinced the commander of the Third Corps to reconsider. Hill ordered a renewal of the attack.[96]

Hill and Wilcox realized that Heth's men could deploy for the attack much more quickly and less awkwardly than McGowan's men could reposition themselves. The commander of the Third Corps directed Wilcox to tell Heth to attack with Cooke's and MacRae's Brigades. Though Wilcox conveyed the order to Heth, Hill's subordinates modified the order. Wilcox proposed to make the attack with one of his own brigades and with one of Heth's brigades. After the two Major Generals examined the Federal position together, they decided to attack with Lane's Brigade on the left and Cooke's Brigade on the right. Ordered to support these units, Scales' Brigade took position behind and to the left of Lane's Brigade, and MacRae's Brigade took position behind and to the right of Cooke's Brigade.[97]

While the infantry deployed for the assault, Heth left to position Pegram's guns.[98] The rebel artillerymen manhandled their pieces into position behind the crest of the corn field south of the Depot Road.[99] During Heth's absence, Wilcox shifted the attack force farther to the left, so that only the right half of Cooke's Brigade had an open field to cross. The

other half, like Lane's Brigade, had to negotiate dense woods and then an abatis.[100] Anderson's Brigade reformed in rear of MacRae's right, but the Georgians did not form part of the attack force.[101] MacRae's sharpshooters took position with those of McGowan and Scales, adding to the discomfiture of man and beast in the Union works.[102]

The preparations for the attack took until almost 5 p.m. When Wilcox had deployed the infantry to his satisfaction, he reported to Heth. The Virginian Major General had stationed himself with Pegram and the guns about 400 yards south of the Depot Road. The plan that Hill and Hampton had devised on the previous evening had failed, primarily due to the slowness with which the tired Confederate infantry reached the field. Now Hill staked everything on what had become a frontal assault. The new Confederate plan of attack simply called for the infantry to advance on the works after an artillery barrage. No time remained for further maneuvering or for another attack if this one failed.[103]

While the Confederates prepared to attack again, the Federals also redeployed their forces. Smyth's brigade did not arrive until after the repulse of the first rebel assault. The brigade occupied a line east of the railroad embankment. The line followed a crest through the corn field across the road that led past the Tucker farm. The brigade immediately began building breastworks along this line. Smyth deployed the 4th Ohio Battalion as skirmishers beyond the road.[104] Detached from the rest of the brigade, the 12th New Jersey went to the support of the 3rd Battery, New Jersey Light Artillery.[105]

Gregg positioned the 1st District of Columbia Cavalry on a hastily constructed work atop a hillock slightly advanced and to the left of Smyth's men. A squadron of the 11th Pennsylvania Cavalry advanced as vedettes in front of this work with orders to alert Gregg if rebels debouched from the woods southeast of Reams Station. The 16th Pennsylvania Cavalry remained mounted on the left of this work. Gregg dismounted the 1st Maine Cavalry in the swamp on the left of the 11th Pennsylvania Cavalry. The ravine that ran south of and roughly parallel to the road to Shay's Tavern debouched into this swamp.[106]

The 19th Maine and 19th Massachusetts of Rugg's brigade received orders to position themselves at the junction of Murphy's and Smyth's brigades. This left in the railroad cut, behind the Consolidated Brigade, the 36th Wisconsin, the 20th Massachusetts, the 1st Minnesota, the 184th Pennsylvania and the 152nd New York, with the 36th Wisconsin and the 20th Massachusetts on the left and the other three regiments on the right.[107]

Miles made use of the time afforded him to prepare to meet the attack that he sensed coming at his right. Penfield had no sooner withdrawn to the works than he received orders to picket the front of the Third

Brigade again. He found a strong rebel line in front and captured pickets of the 13th North Carolina while swinging to the left. Penfield's picket line covered the right of the Consolidated Brigade, but not the left. No connection existed between Penfield and the skirmishers of Lynch's brigade. The nearest picket force of Lynch's brigade occupied the Camley (Phillips) house, just west of the railroad.[108]

The withdrawal of Penfield's force from the works left them occupied by only a single line of men, in some places a pace apart. To repair this situation and cover the gaps on the right and left of the brigade, Broady detached the 53rd and 148th Pennsylvania from his own brigade and stationed them in front of the railroad cut and behind the Consolidated Brigade. These two regiments took position behind the Irish Brigade, the Consolidated Brigade's right. The 53rd Pennsylvania took station behind the 69th New York, and the 148th Pennsylvania took position on the 53rd's right.[109]

Miles prepared a warm reception for any rebels assaulting the northwest angle of the works. He detached the 152nd New York from Rugg's command and sent it up the railroad to near the Camley house, where the tracks ran along an embankment again, with orders to strike the flank and rear of a Confederate force attacking this angle. In case of an attempt to turn the Union right, the 152nd had orders to deploy behind the embankment and fight a delaying action. Miles also placed a Napoleon of the 12th Battery, New York Light Artillery east of the railroad cut and north of the church. This gun raked the opening where the railroad and the Halifax Road entered the northern face of the works.[110]

Like Meade, Hancock feared that the Confederates would interpose between Reams Station and the V Corps at Globe Tavern.[111] By 4:30 p.m., however, it had become apparent to Hancock that insufficient time remained for the Confederates to turn his right, anchored on Jones Hole Swamp. The commander of the II Corps thought it would require "vigorous use" of the hours of daylight remaining for the rebels to turn his left. Fifteen minutes later, pickets reported the Confederates moving artillery into position. This indicated another attack, which would almost certainly have to come against the western face of the works again.[112] Penfield receiving warning of the approach of the large force of rebels. The captain did not credit the warning, and he gave no order for the pickets to fall back.[113]

McAllister arrived at Shay's Tavern at about this time. Massing his soldiers to the right and left of the plank road, he sent a staff officer to report to Hancock. Before the staff officer's return, Meade in person arrived and ordered McAllister to deploy his men in a good position across the Jerusalem Plank Road. After reconnoitering, McAllister found a position to his satisfaction about a mile south of the intersection. He

threw his cavalry out in a screen still farther south. Battery D, Pennsylvania Light Artillery soon arrived. McAllister posted two of its cannon on the left of the road and four on the right. The guns afforded a complete sweep of both roads. McAllister's men began fortifying this position.[114]

Shortly before 5 p.m., the staff officer sent by McAllister reported to Hancock the arrival of McAllister's force at Shay's Tavern. Because Willcox's division would turn off the Jerusalem Plank Road there for Reams Station before the staffer could return with similar orders for McAllister, Hancock sent orders to McAllister to hold well down the plank road in anticipation of any attempt of the rebels to turn the left of the II Corps and reach the Federal rear. Hancock also sent a separate order directing McAllister to arrest all stragglers and form them into regiments.[115]

As of 5 p.m., the battle seemed a Union victory. The reporter who travelled with Hancock described it as a victory in the dispatch that he hurried to send off in time to make the deadline for the following day's paper.[116]



James Connor

Dudley M. Dubois



Wade Hampton

Robert E. Lee

Benjamin Franklin Butler

Orlando B. Willcox

N. A. Miles



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

Henry Heth

John R. Cooke

Cadmus M. Wilcox



William McRae

Mahone, "The hero of the Crater"

Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard

Ambrose Powell Hill

Roger Atkinson Pryor

Alfred H. Terry

William Birney

A cavalry leader at Gettysburg — General David McM. Gregg and staff

George Gordon Meade

Gouverneur Kemble Warren



Crawford and staff



Horses killed in battle — a serious loss

A sad sight for the cavalryman



Hancock "The Superb"

Soldiers by the Upper Pontoon Bridge at Deep Bottom — James River, 1864

Signal Station

The Globe Tavern, Weldon Railroad

General Ulysses S. Grant at City Point in 1864, with his wife and son Jesse

Aiken House

Union works on the Weldon Road

CHAPTER 12

The Second Battle of Reams Station, August 25, 1864
The Second Confederate Assault

As soon as Wilcox reported to Heth the readiness of the infantry, the two Major Generals and Pegram synchronized their watches. Heth ordered Pegram's batteries to fire as rapidly as possible for thirty minutes. Then Pegram would cease fire and the infantry would go forward.[1]

Toward five o'clock, Pegram's batteries opened up on the Union works. Seventeen guns fired about three rounds per minute. A shell burst in and around the Federal works almost every second.[2] The guns inflicted few casualties on the Federals in the works west of the railroad but disabled the leftmost gun of the 10th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery, blew up one of this battery's caissons and shattered the wheels of another.[3] The barriage demoralized many green Federals — particularly among Gibbon's men, whom the guns enfiladed.[4] The peculiar sound of the solitary Whitworth in the section of the Hardaway Artillery proved unusually unnerving.[5] A reporter for the New York Sun wrote:

> the man who hears the scream of a Whitworth shell will never forget the sound to the day of his death. It is a concentration of the war whoop of an Indian, the snarl of a tiger, and the scream of a woman in mortal terror. It begins afar off with a muttered threat of vengeance; it grows upon the ear with a howl as of wolves in pursuit of the lone traveler; it comes nearer with shrieks of baffled rage; it is at hand with a scream which can be likened to nothing but the cries of a mob mad for death and destruction.[6]

The guns of the 3rd Battery, New Jersey Light Artillery, positioned in a sorghum field about 300 yards behind the railroad, occupied high ground in full view of the Confederate guns. The rebel fire became so severe that the gunners of this battery could not stand to their guns but had to lay on their faces.[7]

While the Confederates shelled the Federal works, the 12th Battery, New York Light Artillery pounded the woods in front of the Consolidated Brigade but overshot the rebel infantry. Gregg's First Brigade threatened the Confederate left flank. The 7th Virginia Cavalry, partially armed with Henry repeaters captured from the Federal cavalry at the First Battle of Reams Station, fired so noisily that Hill thought Federal infantry were involved. The commander of the Third Corps sent to the assistance of the

Virginians a pair of howitzers and three regiments of McGowan's Brigade before the threat to his rear disspitated.[8]

After approximately fifteen minutes, Conner led Lane's Brigade forward through the undergrowth toward the abatis. Cooke sent forward the left half of his line, the 27th and 48th North Carolina, along with Lane's Brigade, but held back the right, the 46th and 15th North Carolina, which had to cross only the open field. Cooke did not want the right to outstrip the left and suffer a repulse for lack of support. Pegram's guns continued to hammer the Federal works upon and south of the Depot Road.[9]

The Confederate infantrymen advanced with a thunderstorm bearing down on them from behind to face a man-made storm of canister and minie bullets.[10] The brigades of Cooke, Lane and MacRae totalled about 1,750 men.[11] A captain of the 47th North Carolina Infantry in MacRae's Brigade imagined that "the heretofore triumphant Federals must have smiled as they beheld the small force advancing against them, and intended to withhold their fire until we should reach a point from which we might be unable to escape."[12]

The Federals now paid the price for Penfield's failure to heed the warning that he had received and give appropriate orders. According to the Consolidated Brigade's official report, Lane's Brigade and Cooke's left advanced "with the utmost silence."[13] The rebels refused to answer the fire of the skirmishers till the Confederate battle line struck the Federal skirmish line with full force. Union skirmishers became mingled with the pursuing rebels. The 12th Battery, New York Light Artillery could not open fire on the rebels until the Union skirmishers had cleared. The gunners then opened a rapid fire of canister on the Tarheels. The Consolidated Brigade also reserved its fire for a time in order to allow the Federal skirmishers to retire, but then poured heavy volleys on the Confederates. Luckily for the rebels, the 53rd and 148th Pennsylvania now caused confusion in the Irish Brigade as they rushed forward to join in the firing.[14]

The men of Lane's Brigade and Cooke's left picked their way in squads and individually through the thirty yards of abatis, under heavy fire.[15] The abatis consisted of trees felled with their tops outward from the works, and the branches trimmed sharp.[16] Some units literally had to crawl through the abatis.[17] The slashing impeded the Confederates so effectively that five to ten minutes elapsed from the time the first men reached the works until a sufficient number had formed to enable the rebels to scale the works successfully.[18] Many men fell back, and the first Confederates to reach the works had difficulty surviving during this interval.[19] The historian of the 27th North Carolina Infantry, on the extreme left of Cooke's Brigade, later wrote:

> Upon striking the enemy's works we found they would not give way, and a hand-to-hand fight across the breastworks ensued for a minute or two. Three times Captain Shade Wooten, Company C, finding one of the enemy poking his gun up to shoot him, grabbed a handful of dirt from the embankment and dashed it in the eyes of his opponent and thus saved his life.[20]

MacRae could tell from the firing that Lane's Brigade had advanced, but he could not see the advancing portion of Cooke's line.[21] As his own brigade waited, MacRae issued his orders. He wanted his men to advance in silence through some woods in front of them. When they reached the open field, they must give the rebel yell and charge, not firing until they reached the Yankee works.[22]

The sound of firing in the direction of Lane's Brigade increased, but still the visible portion of Cooke's line failed to advance. Sensing that the decisive moment had arrived, MacRae ordered his men forward.[23] The advance of MacRae's Brigade jostled the right of Cooke's Brigade into motion. The 46th and 15th North Carolina went forward across the same field that Anderson's Brigade and Scales' right regiment had crossed over three hours earlier.[24] Pegram's guns stopped their bombardment.[25] A soldier of the 116th Pennsylvania wrote in his notebook that night: "Suddenly the firing ceased, and with low yells and without firing a gun they sprang forward, hats pulled down over their eyes and guns on a trail."[26]

Cooke's right struck the left of the Consolidated Brigade and the right of the Fourth Brigade. Fire from these brigades and from the 4th New York Heavy Artillery and the 10th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery, which both fired to the right oblique, nearly annihilated Cooke's right.[27] The 46th North Carolina lost 73 men.[28] The 15th North Carolina, on the far right, closer to the remaining guns of the 10th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery and the bearing guns of the Batteries A and B, 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery, lost 114.[29] Confederate casualties covered the field. "When they would drop wounded they would haul out an old dirty handkerchief and wave it while they lay on their backs," a soldier of the 116th Pennsylvania wrote in his notebook that night.[30] Had not the rebel sharpshooters and Pegram's barrage cowed the Federal infantry into firing high, the soldiers of Cooke's right would have suffered even more. A few men of the 15th and 46th North Carolina reached the works. The regiments of the Consolidated and Fourth Brigade opposite Cooke's right remained steady. Farther to the Federal left, some men of the 7th New York Heavy Artillery stampeded but quickly rallied. With the aid of canister from the 10th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery, the Consolidated and Fourth Brigades drove back the opposing rebels. Cooke's right recoiled in confusion.[31]

As the men of Cooke's right retreated, MacRae's Brigade ran into

them and carried them back again toward the Federal works.[32] Now the efforts of the Confederate sharpshooters paid their richest dividends. The 10th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery had used up almost the last of its canister west of the embankment in blasting Cooke's right.[33] The artillerymen of this battery found themselves with only one or two rounds of canister per gun as MacRae's Brigade advanced, and the gunners reserved these rounds for short range work. The 12th Battery, New York Light Artillery and 3rd Battery, New Jersey Light Artillery could not fire without fear of hitting their own troops. The leftmost gun of Batteries A and B, 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery, on low ground on the Halifax Road, could not fire over the railroad embankment. The other three guns of this consolidated battery could bear on the charging Confederates only while the rebels crossed the open field. Once the Tarheels reached the breastworks, these guns could not fire for fear of hitting Broady's infantry and the 10th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery.[34]

MacRae's men advanced at the double-quick "in a line almost as straight and unbroken as they presented when on parade," according to the historian of the 44th North Carolina.[35] They did not fire a shot until they reached the works.[36] Mounting the works, MacRae's men and the survivors of Cooke's right precipitated themselves among the Federal infantry on the other side.[37]

The Tarheels of MacRae's impetuous brigade assailed the Federal works near the opening for the Depot Road. MacRae's right overlapped the left of the 66th New York, the rightmost regiment of Broady's brigade, just south of the road.[38] The main impact of MacRae's brigade fell on the left of the Consolidated Brigade, the 7th, 52nd and 39th New York.[39] In his official report of the battle, Hancock wrote of these regiments:

> The Seventh, Fifty-second, and Thirty-ninth New York are largely made up of recruits and substitutes. The first-named regiment in particular is entirely new, companies being formed in New York and sent down here, some officers being unable to speak English. The material compares very unfavorably with the veterans absent.[40]

Demoralized by the hours of sharpshooter fire, as well as Pegram's barrage, these green troops "sent their shots into the tops of the trees," in the words of MacRae's adjutant general.[41] According to a major in the 44th North Carolina Infantry, the central regiment of MacRae's Brigade, the Federal infantry "did not show the determination which had generally marked the conduct of Hancock's Corps."[42] The major thought that the Union foot soldiers "seemed to be dazed by the vehemence of the attack, and made a very feeble resistance after their ranks were reached."[43] MacRae's right encountered stiffer resistance. The 66th New York, on the right of Broady's brigade, initially repulsed MacRae's onslaught. The 47th

North Carolina lost heavily, including a disproportionate number of its best men.[44] A major in that regiment, which suffered a permanent weakening, later wrote: "Men who seemed to have possessed charmed lives; who struck so quick, and were so cool and daring to pass the danger line, were struck down in a body."[45] All in all, however, MacRae's Brigade suffered few losses in its approach to the works.[46]

The Union conscripts on the Depot Road broke as MacRae's Brigade and the survivors of Cooke's right scaled the works. Some of these Federals fled and others surrendered. As the New Yorkers broke and fell back in confusion, Rugg's left regiments, the 36th Wisconsin and 20th Massachusetts, moved forward and received the Confederates with a sharp fire and momentarily checked their progress.[47]

The rebels opposing the Union troops adjacent to the green New Yorkers took heart. Seeing the Federals on their left give way, the North Carolinians in front of the 66th New York renewed their attack and drove the 66th back to the railroad embankment.[48] While the left of MacRae's Brigade engaged the left of Rugg's brigade and the 66th New York, MacRae's right drove down the works into Broady's brigade in three columns, one outside, one inside and one along the breastwork's crest.[49] Flanked, the regiments of Broady's brigade fell back one by one.[50] A column of the 7th New York Heavy Artillery, on Broady's left, filed off like sheep into captivity. The gunners of the 10th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery, on the other hand, fought to the last. One by one, the three remaining guns fired their last rounds of canister as the gunners retired from piece to piece. Some of the gunners who did not fall back refused to surrender and the rebels had to take them by sheer physical force.[51] Trained to use artillery, the sharpshooters of the 44th North Carolina Infantry in MacRae's Brigade turned the cannon that they had captured upon the line of retreat of the Consolidated Brigade and Rugg's men.[52]

The advance of MacRae's right came to a halt at the traverse as a battalion of the brigade-sized 4th New York Heavy Artillery changed front to face the oncoming rebels.[53] Though urged by the commander of the western section of Batteries A and B, 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery to counterattack and cut off the rebels by closing the opening for the Depot Road, the commander of the 4th New York Heavy Artillery refused to budge.[54] The Confederate artillery opened fire again, this time on the Federals south of MacRae's Brigade.[55]

In front of the Irish Brigade, on the other side of MacRae's initial breakthrough, some rebels had begun throwing down their arms as a preliminary to surrendering.[56] Stimulated by the shouts of MacRae's Brigade and Cooke's right, the men of Conner's right and Cooke's left redoubled their efforts and advanced with great rapidity through the fallen timber to join their comrades close under the works.[57]

A few minutes after the lodgment of MacRae's Brigade, the 37th North Carolina in the center of the Lane's Brigade became the next Confederate unit to enter the Federal works.[58] The 37th drove through the gap in the works between the First and Consolidated Brigades, where Penfield's force had regrouped. Penfield's men broke. His panic-stricken soldiers fled through the ranks of Rugg's two right regiments, the 1st Minnesota and 184th Pennsylvania. The New Yorkers created confusion among Rugg's men and made it impossible for them to fire on the rebels. The panic of Penfield's soldiers quickly spread to Rugg's men. When the colorbearer of the 37th North Carolina leapt into the railroad cut and landed at Miles' feet, Miles ordered Rugg's men to counterattack and plug the gap. Instead of following Miles' order, the men on Rugg's right either lay on their faces or got up and ran to the rear.[59] The Napoleon sited to rake the opening fired canister until the Confederates came over the works. The gunners then attempted to limber up and escape, but the rebels shot a wheel horse.[60] Conner's men captured the gun and began infiltrating into the rear of the Consolidated Brigade.[61] Like MacRae's men, they turned the captured gun on the Consolidated Brigade's line of retreat.[62]

Because of the angle at which the left of Lane's Brigade approached the works, it lagged behind the rest of the unit.[63] The angle of approach exposed Conner's left to an enfilade fire from Miles' First Brigade and the 152nd New York. The trap that Miles had prepared for such a Confederate assault failed to spring, however. The 152nd changed front and moved to within 200 yards of Conner's flank and rear, but then bolted for the Federal rear without having fired more than a few shots at Conner's men.[64]

The left of Lane's Brigade quickly caught up with the center after the center had penetrated the Federal works at the railroad cut. A captain of the 28th North Carolina, on the left of Lane's Brigade, outdistanced his company and became one of the first of his regiment to mount the works. Finding the works still well-manned and himself unsupported, he bluffed the Federals and yelled out, "Yanks, if you know what is best for you, you will make a blue streak toward sunset." In front of the captain and elsewhere, the Northerners made the streak.[65] The commander of the 37th North Carolina, the central regiment of Lane's Brigade and just to the right of the 28th, wrote in his official report: "The prisoners, were with a few exceptions, only directed which way to go."[66]

The penetration of the rebels into the railroad cut precipitated the first of several pockets that developed during the battle. Engaged with the rebels in their immediate front, the men of the Consolidated Brigade and Rugg's left failed to notice the Confederates infiltrating into their rear. Tarheels from Lane's Brigade worked their way down behind the railroad cut behind these Federals while MacRae's left drove the 66th New York from behind the railroad embankment on the left of Rugg's detachment.


SCALES
Phillips (Camley)
152 N.Y.
Conner
LYNCH
Cooke & Conner
WILCOX
Conner
HILL
Cooke
1 gun, 12 N.Y.
MILES
HETH
PENFIELD
Brigade
Oak Grove Church
Cooke & Conner
PEGRAM
2nd
Rugg
HANCOCK
MAP 11
Reams Station
August 25
The Second Confederate Assault
3rd Brigade
53 & 148 Pa.
MacRae
Dunovant
Branch (McDowell)
MacRae

Within five minutes, the rebels had surrounded those soldiers of the Consolidated Brigade and Rugg's detachment who had not fled.[67]

During that time, the Irish Brigade and the 57th New York — the center of the Consolidated Brigade since Penfield's men had returned to the works — finally crumbled.[68] By now, enough of Conner's right and Cooke's left had reached the works to scale them successfully. According to a soldier of the 152nd New York, the rebels "arose like demons from the bowels of the earth, and with one prolonged yell they vaulted over the works and with the bayonet drove the men, capturing many and cutting the line in two parts."[69] With the captured cannon playing on their line of retreat, many soldiers from the center of the Consolidated Brigade surrendered.[70]

Engaged by rebels in front, with other Confederates advancing on both flanks, Rugg's men attempted to withdraw.[71] Now, for the first time, too late to resist, Rugg's men saw the Tarheels and the captured guns cutting off their line of retreat. Like Hartshorne's men at the Battle of Globe Tavern, only a handful ran the gauntlet.[72]

Disorganized groups of Cooke's and Lane's Brigades began working their way out toward the 12th Battery, New York Light Artillery along the outside of the northern return and through the woods in that return's rear.[73] The commander of the battery pulled out his left gun and sited it to fire west on the road from Shay's Tavern to Reams Station. This gun kept the rebels off the road, but the Confederates broke the line that Miles attempted to form in the woods to the battery's left. The gunners fired double-shoted canister until the Tarheels had almost reached the guns under cover of the woods. Then the battery commander ordered a retreat, but the rebels shot the teams of the two westernmost guns before they could limber. The Federals succeeded in limbering up the third gun, but it did not get far before the Confederates brought down its horses.[74] A handful of disorganized rebels representing each of the brigades in the assault briefly took possession of the three guns.[75]

During the half hour in which all this happened, the assault had appeared a failure to Wilcox and Heth. From their vantage point, they saw only what seemed large numbers of their men retiring.[76] In fact, the smoke had obscured their vision. The two Major Generals unknowingly witnessed not only some of their own men retiring, but large numbers of Federals marching unescorted into captivity.[77] Finally, Wilcox dispatched an aide who quickly discerned that the assault had succeeded in capturing the Federal works and many prisoners. Wilcox went forward to see for himself.[78]

As Wilcox departed, Heth ordered forward the available portion of McGowan's Brigade.[79] The gunners of Batteries A and B, 1st Rhode Island

Light Artillery ran out of ammunition and abandoned their horseless pieces.[80] While MacRae's men engaged the infantry support of the consolidated battery, the two uncommitted regiments of McGowan's brigade and McGowan's sharpshooters swept into the rear of the Federals and pocketed a second Union group. McGowan's meager force took the guns of the consolidated Rhode Island battery and around 500 prisoners, mostly from a battalion of the 4th New York Heavy Artillery that did not receive orders to fall back in time.[81] An officer of the 4th New York Heavy Artillery who escaped later said: "The men wisely deemed discretion the better part of valor, and, in company with their newly found escorts, started for that goal of their ambition — Petersburg."[82] Like MacRae's and Conner's soldiers, McGowan's men turned the captured field pieces on the retreating Federals.[83]

An attempt to reform the 4th New York Heavy Artillery just east of the railroad failed.[84] Fugitives from the First Division retreated to Gibbon's line in the southern return, where they sowed confusion.[85] The fire of the captured cannon and the rebel musketry enfiladed Gibbon's division from the right and forced it to relocate itself to the reverse side of the southern return.[86] When McGowan's men took the guns, Murphy's right retreated to a traverse, abandoning the stretch of the southern return adjacent to the railroad.[87] Confederate fire commanded the inside of the returns for some distance, and the Federal line now ran parallel to and from 200 to 300 yards back from the railroad, halfway between the railroad and the woods to the east, with the 3rd Battery, New Jersey Light Artillery in its center.[88]

McGowan's South Carolinians soon had to fend off a feeble counterattack ordered by Murphy. This officer, on his own initiative, sent two small regiments of the Corcoran Legion amounting to less than 150 men to reoccupy the stretch of the southern return adjacent to the railroad. Murphy personally led these men of the 155th and 170th New York, who accomplished the task tardily under a heavy fire. Murphy then headed back toward the left of his brigade.[89] The two New York regiments and McGowan's men remained stationary. Unable to attack and unwilling to retreat, these exhausted forces fired intermittently at one another.[90]

The impetus of the assaulting North Carolina brigades had now spent itself. On the far left, a handful of disorganized Confederates milled about around the three easternmost guns of the 12th Battery, New York Light Artillery.[91] Some of Conner's soldiers had turned on the Federal line in the corn field the captured gun at the northwest angle of the works.[92] Except for part of the First Brigade, which had stopped the rebel advance along the northern return near where the return reached Jones Hole Swamp, the First Division and the attached portion of Rugg's brigade had disintegrated. Groups of rebels attempted to pursue the fleeing Federals of the First Division and Rugg's brigade across the corn field behind the

church and into the woods beyond, but the 3rd Battery, New Jersey Light Artillery turned to face the Southerners and, with the aid of the 12th New Jersey, succeeded in holding them off.[93] Between the Depot Road and the traverse, MacRae's men had turned the guns of the 10th Battery, Massachusetts Light Artillery on the Federals.[94] Between the traverse and the acute southern angle, McGowan's men had turned on the Federals the guns of Batteries A and B, 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery.[95]

The rebels had previously found Hancock a worthy adversary.[96] The commander of the II Corps did not disappoint them on this occasion, either. Hancock called upon Gibbon to counterattack immediately and retake the lost Federal works.[97] The North Carolina-born Gibbon hastened to obey.[98] Gibbon counterattacked so promptly, however, that the attack had no chance whatsoever of retaking all of the lost entrenchments for the simple reason that he attacked in the wrong direction. The Second Division occupied the reverse side of the southern return. Gibbon did not realign his division before attacking, but simply ordered his men forward. In consequence, they went in a northwesterly direction, toward the northern return, not toward the western face of the works. The course of the Second Division exposed its left to a devastating enfilade fire from the Confederates and captured batteries behind the railroad cut.[99]

The 8th New York Heavy Artillery and the 164th New York of Murphy's brigade formed the left of the division's attack column. The 19th Maine and 19th Massachusetts, a detachment from Rugg's brigade, formed the center. Smyth's brigade constituted the right.[100] Demoralized by the enfilade fire from the railroad embankment, disordered by the refugees from the First Division and the attached portion of Rugg's brigade, exhausted by the morning's marching, countermarching, digging and fighting, Gibbon's men responded sluggishly to the order to advance.[101]

Gibbon's left faltered first. The enfilade fire from the railroad embankment proved unendurable to that portion of Murphy's brigade led by Gibbon's acting assistant adjutant general, a captain. The 8th New York Heavy Artillery and the 164th New York, closest to the enfilade fire, quickly disintegrated and fell back to the works in confusion.[102]

The detachment from Rugg's brigade advanced at the double-quick despite the galling crossfire. These Federals proceeded farther than did the detachment from Murphy's brigade, nearly to the church and the nearby McDowell (or Branch or Dr. Duvall) house north of the junction of the Depot and Halifax Roads. The 19th Maine and 19th Massachusetts still failed to accomplish anything significant, however. Perceiving the troops on both their flanks falling back, they reformed behind the church and the house and then withdrew to the works.[103]

Smyth's left consisted of the 1st Delaware and the 2nd Delaware Bat-

talion, the 69th and 106th Pennsylvania, the 108th New York, the 7th West Virginia Battalion and three companies of the 10th New York Battalion. This force crossed open ground and disintegrated under the enfilade fire of the Confederates and the captured guns along the railroad embankment before Rugg's men reached the Church.[104]

The right of Smyth's brigade, consisting of the 12th New Jersey, the 14th Connecticut and the other three companies of the 10th New York Battalion, had the good fortune to advance through timber rather than over open ground.[105] Still, the heavy rebel enfilade fire forced back the left, formerly the right, of the 14th Connecticut.[106] The rest of this force succeeded in recapturing a portion of the northern return that Lynch's brigade had lost.[107]

The successful portion of Smyth's brigade remained in the works that it had recaptured.[108] The detachment from Rugg's brigade retreated to the reverse side of the earthworks from which it had charged in relatively good order.[109] The other survivors of Gibbon's counterattack withdrew to the reverse side of the earthworks from which they had charged in a state of profound disorganization.[110] Smyth had difficulty restoring order to the repulsed portion of his command.[111] Murphy had just returned from the left of his command when the right came streaming back slightly to the east of where it had begun. He only partially restored order to the 8th New York Heavy Artillery and the 164th New York.[112] Gibbon rode along his line with his horse at a walk, the picture of despair, casting frequent and anxious glances towards the lost position in anticipation of a movement against the completely demoralized men of his division.[113]

Hancock himself had urged Gibbon's men forward.[114] Bareheaded and with loosened sleeves, his bridle rein cut by a bullet, the commander of the II Corps administered a prolixity of the horrible oaths that his admirers considered his most serious fault.[115] According to a soldier of the 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Hancock "looked more like a wild man or a soldier possessed with a restless and demoniac spirit, than a general commanding in a good cause."[116] Followed by two or three of his personal staff, the commander of the II Corps rode up to the main breastwork, waved his cap and shouted, "Come on! we can beat them yet. Don't leave me for God's sake!" Not half a dozen men responded to his appeal, though. At this point, Hancock's horse received a bullet in the neck, from which the animal fell forward, temporarily dismounting the commander of the II Corps. The wounded horse recovered in a few minutes.[117] Hancock remounted the animal and rode up to one of his staff at the 3rd Battery, New Jersey Light Artillery. Begrimed with powder and smoke and covered with dust, the commander of the II Corps put his hand upon the staff officer's shoulder and said: "Colonel, I do not care to die, but I pray God I may never leave this field!"[118]

As the unsuccessful portions of Gibbon's command retreated, a motley force which included representatives from Lynch's and Smyth's brigades drove off the handful of rebels milling around the guns of the 12th Battery, New York Light Artillery. Repossessing the guns, this force almost completely reoccupied the northern return.[119] Miles directed Lynch to move across the railroad and attack the rebel left flank in order to recapture the works lost by the Consolidated Brigade. The cavalrymen of Gregg's First Brigade joined Lynch in this counterattack.[120] With a force of about 200 officers and men from nearly every regiment in the First and Second Divisions, Lynch had difficulty advancing. Friendly fire from the Federals occupying the northern return hindered this counterattack, as did the force's lack of any organization. Lynch's force eventually reached the Camley house, across the railroad and about 200 yards from the left flank of the rebels.[121] From there the Federals infantrymen enfiladed the Confederate position along the railroad. The fire proved merely annoying to the rebels.[122]

At about 6:15 p.m., while Miles counterattacked down the northern return, Hancock directed Gibbon to renew his counterattack across the corn field toward the church, in order to meet Miles.[123] Still in the process of reforming his routed men, Gibbon could do no more than push forward a skirmish line.[124]

Meanwhile, the supporting Confederate infantry commenced its advance. Sanders' Brigade, led by Colonel Horace J. King, and Mahone's Brigade had arrived on the field during the charge of the three North Carolina infantry brigades. Wilcox ordered Mahone's and Sanders' Brigades forward, along with Scales' Brigade, in support of Cooke's, MacRae's and Lane's Brigades. Scales' Brigade occupied the left, Sanders' Brigade the center and Mahone's brigade the right of this supporting line.[125] Just before dark, Scales' and Sanders' Brigades drove back Lynch and his 200 men from their position at the Camley house. Lynch's Federals retreated to the works east of the railroad.[126]

Mahone's Brigade at first moved forward on the immediate right of Sanders' Brigade. The Virginians then veered farther to the right and went to the assistance of the men of McGowan's Brigade who had captured the consolidated Rhode Island battery. Mahone's Brigade advanced over the same ground as had McGowan's sharpshooters. Some men of the 61st Virginia joined McGowan's soldiers in manning the captured cannon.[127] Mahone's Virginians arrived to find McGowan's South Carolinians and Murphy's New Yorkers still stalemated, "but pretty soon Mahone's men out-Yankeed the Yankees," according to an officer in Rosser's Brigade. Teams of soldiers from Mahone's Brigade threw cross-ties and rails over the embankment and on to the heads of Murphy's Federals, driving them from their position on the east side of the embankment.[128]

The Second Division of the II Corps had still not completely reformed on the reverse side of the works when, at around 6:45 p.m., it again found itself subjected to a fire from its rear.[129] In response to this fire, which Gibbon characterized as "very feeble," the men of the Second Division shifted back again to the inside of the works, some changing from side to side for as much as the fourth time. Gibbon's soldiers suffered a heavy enfilading fire from the Confederates and the captured guns on the other side of the railway embankment.[130]

Late in the afternoon, a courier had arrived at Malone's Crossing with the news that Hill had commenced his long-awaited advance. A few moments later, Hampton heard Pegram's artillery open fire.[131] The South Carolinian immediately ordered an advance of his whole line, which extended across the railroad at Malone's Crossing. Mounted, the 2nd North Carolina Cavalry and a squadron from the 9th Virginia Cavalry led the advance. Immediately behind them came the remainder of the 9th, on foot. At the Lanier farm, about a mile north of Malone's Crossing, the rebel vanguard encountered a line of rifle pits occupied by the 7th Michigan and 59th New York of Rugg's brigade. The mounted Virginians and North Carolinians charged, leapt the works with their horses, and took over sixty prisoners from the detachmernt of Rugg's brigade. The Virginians and North Carolinians waited at the Lanier farm until the rebel cavalry behind them reached this line.

By the time Hampton reached the Lanier farm, Hill's infantry had driven the Federals from the works west of the railroad. Seeing this, the South Carolinian double-quicked Butler's Division from the west side of the railroad to the right and formed a new line. Chambliss' Brigade, with its left on the railroad, formed the new line's left. Barringer's Brigade formed the center. Young's Brigade formed the right. Behind this line, Rosser's Brigade formed a second supporting line.[132] The two batteries of horse artillery took the place of Butler's Division west of the railroad.[133] Hampton had most of his men dismount, but kept some men mounted in case a situation arose requiring real cavalry rather than mounted infantry. Once he had effected his formation, Hampton issued orders that it should advance slowly with its left on the railroad while the right swung around to strike the rear of the Federals at the refused left of the southern return.[134]

The rebel formation advanced into the belt of woods north of the Lanier farm. The Confederate cavalrymen advanced steadily over this difficult terrain, encountering only picket fire. A short distance into the woods, the rebels reached a line of rifle pits. There, without offering much resistance, about fifty Federal pickets of the 4th New York Heavy Artillery's Company F surrendered.[135]

Hampton's men continued to advance through the woods. The Southerners came to the slashing south of the main Federal works, and

the going became even more difficult.[136] Due to the configuration of the Federal works, the right of the Confederate line had to advance more rapidly than the center or the left. Rosser's Brigade veered more and more to the right until the 12th Virginia Cavalry moved up from the supporting line and formed the extreme right of the assaulting column. The 11th Virginia Cavalry and a portion of the Comanches found themselves behind Young's Brigade.[137] As the rebel cavalrymen emerged from these woods, they saw before them a gentle slope which led up from the edge of the woods to the southern return, which extended along the crest of the slope. On the left, the slashing intervened between the woods and the works. On the right, the woods naturally receded from the works.[138] Gibbon's division, which occupied these works, shifted back to the inside of the works and opened a heavy fire on the rebel cavalrymen emerging from the woods. At the same time, the Confederate infantry and the captured guns west of the railroad opened a severe enfilading fire on Gibbon's men.[139]

Hampton ordered Chambliss' Brigade to lie down until support came up on the right.[140] Due to the exertions of Mahone's Brigade, the Federals of Murphy's brigade had abandoned for good the short stretch of the southern return adjacent to the western side of the railroad embankment.[141] The right of the Union troops in the southern return now rested behind a traverse. As the Federal bullets pattered against the foliage, Hampton ordered a squadron of the 9th Virginia Cavalry to scale the vacant section of the southern return. The attention of Gibbon's men rested upon the rebels in front of them, allowing the squadron of the 9th Virginia Cavalry to advance undetected.[142] Young's Brigade appeared about 200 yards in the left rear of the Federals and discharged a volley followed by a rush.[143] When the squadron of Virginians reached the traverse and gave the Federals a galling volley in flank and rear, fire from all directions pinned down the Federals. All along the southern return, Northerners began surrendering. A handful of Confederates began leading hundreds of Federals into captivity.[144]

The historian of the 140th Pennsylvania, which Miles had earlier sent to clear the road to Shay's Tavern, later wrote of the effect of Hampton's attack on the Federal position:

> With the line breaking up in our front and a force of the enemy of unknown strength directly in our rear, it seemed for a few moments as if we were all in a fair way to be escorted directly to Richmond. It was a position in which, for the time, there was no rear and no place which was not swept by artillery fire or musketry or both.[145]

In the process of surrendering, some Federals discovered the weakness of the rebel force. Running into the sorghum field behind the


J. P. Emmons
(Emmerson)
MILES
Scales
Phillips
(Camley)
King
Lynch
Conner
HANCOCK
Cooke
Smith & Spear
To Shay's Tavern
Weisiger
3 N.J.
GREGG
Oak Grove
Church
Dunovant
Pegram
Branch
(McDowell)
Smyth
MacRae
Anderson
GIBBON
To Tucker Farm
A. Heath
(Webb)
Murphy
McGowan
McGowan
7 MI. & 59 N.Y.
Lanier
MAP 12
Reams Station
August 25
The Federal
Counterattacks

works, these escaped prisoners recommenced firing. The Confederate cavalrymen pursued these Federals.[146] From behind a hasty breastwork of fence rails on the wooded knoll opposite the right of Hampton's men, the Union cavalry opened fire on the advancing rebels.[147] The Confederate cavalrymen also found themselves subjected to an enfilading fire from the captured batteries west of the railroad embankment.[148] Caught in this crossfire and faced by fire from the 3rd Battery, New Jersey Light Artillery, the rebels recoiled. "A rusher in any sort of a fight," according to one of his men, the impetuous Wright incurred the wrath of the soldiers of Young's Brigade when he castigated them for falling back.[149]

While the attack of Hampton's men momentarily stalled, Mahone's Brigade came to their support.[150] As darkness fell, the 12th Virginia of Mahone's Brigade and the 12th Virginia Cavalry of Rosser's Brigade drove the dismounted Federal horsemen back from the wooded knoll into the woods that harbored the fugitives from Gibbon's division.[151] After dark, the rebels fired blindly along the inside of the recaptured northern return. The Federals returned the fire at clinking and rattling canteens, gunflashes and voices.[152]

Gibbon had already begun reorganizing his routed men. Smyth sent the 69th and 106th Pennsylvania to link up with his soldiers in the northern return. The cavalry reformed on Gibbon's left. Lynch's brigade, Smyth's brigade, the 3rd Battery, New Jersey Light Artillery and the Federal cavalry kept open the route of retreat — the road to Shay's Tavern.[153]

The Union prisoners passed Mahone's ordnance officer as they went to the Confederate rear. This soldier had never before seen so many prisoners taken in a battle and thought that his comrades had captured the entire Federal army.[154] He later wrote:

> Among them was a full regiment of Pennsylvania "Bucktails," so-called from each man wearing a buck's tail in his hat. Our men were very much pleased with the buck tails and asked the prisoners for them. Some of our men took the buck tails without saying "by your leave."[155]

After the Confederates had driven Lynch's force back across the railroad, Miles established a picket line along the Halifax Road. While inspecting this line, Miles heard Confederate officers and color bearers calling out their regiments. This led Miles to believe that the rebels had suffered heavier losses than his own men and an equal degree of disorganization. Though his routed and totally disorganized command had no prospect of retaking anything, the commander of the First Division unrealistically concluded that he could retake his entire line. Miles sent this information to Hancock.

Hancock consulted his other divisional commanders. Gregg, whose command may actually have had the capacity for a successful counter-

attack, also offered to retake entire the position from which the Confederates had driven his men. Gibbon bluntly admitted the obvious and unwittingly furnished Hancock and his apologists with a scapegoat for the battle's loss. The Iron Brigade's first commander told the commander of the II Corps that the routed and disorganized Second Division could not retake any part of its previous position. Unreinforced and unable to keep open the only line of retreat without reoccupying the lost works, Hancock ordered a withdrawal. Miles' men covered the retreat, with the provost guard and the 61st New York acting as the rear guard.[156]

At about 7 p.m., Hancock's force met Willcox's division, still a mile and a half from the battlefield. Hancock's order to McAllister to arrest stragglers had instead reached Willcox shortly after 6 p.m. Willcox, who had performed capably at Globe Tavern on August 19th but unsatisfactorily at the Crater on July 30th, failed to observe that Hancock had addressed the order to McAllister. The erratic Brigadier General deployed Humphrey's brigade across the road to arrest the stragglers already coming back in large numbers. That the stragglers included officers disturbed Willcox. Not only stragglers, but wagons and ambulances filled the road and impeded the progress of Willcox's division. While engaged in stopping and reorganizing the fugitives, Willcox received from Hancock an urgent call for reinforcements. Throwing off their knapsacks, Willcox's men started for the battlefield at a double-quick only to receive from the chief-of-staff of the II Corps an order to cover the withdrawal of Hancock's troops.[157] As Hancock's force abandoned the battlefield, night came on and a violent rain poured down.[158]

At 9:00 p.m. that night, Meade ordered the divisions of Crawford and White from Globe Tavern to join Hancock.[159] In a telegram to Hancock sent at 11 p.m., Meade explained the concerns that had governed his use of the Army of the Potomac's reserves, but Hancock remained convinced that Meade ought to have sent reinforcements down the railroad.[160]

Willcox's men took over the duties of a rear guard at around 11 p.m., after Miles' division had finished passing. At about midnight, Hancock's men encamped by the Williams house, near where the Jerusalem Plank Road crossed Second Swamp. While Hancock's force encamped, Willcox's division began its return to the Jerusalem Plank Road. On the way, Willcox's command aroused and collected hundreds of stragglers asleep and exhausted along the road and in the woods. McAllister's force remained in position until after 1 a.m., when Willcox's command passed the junction at Shay's Tavern and turned toward the Gurley house. McAllister's men then marched to their old position near the Jones house, arriving at 5 a.m. This left Gregg's cavalry holding the Jerusalem Plank Road and the country between that road and Warren's position at Globe Tavern.[161]

The Confederates did not pursue Hancock that night, but removed the wounded, buried the dead and secured the captured muskets and artillery. Around midnight, when the rain stopped, the rebel infantry withdrew from the captured works.[162] Seven regiments of Hampton's cavalry remained on the battlefield.[163] Marching until nearly day, the infantry bivouacked for a few hours about five miles west of Rowanty Creek.[164]

In the morning, while other Confederate cavalrymen continued burying the dead and removing the wounded, Company B of the 12th Virginia Cavalry followed Hancock's path of retreat toward Shay's Tavern and took prisoner a great many stragglers. Encountering Gregg's First Brigade about two miles from the battlefield at around 10 a.m., the rebel cavalrymen skirmished briefly and then withdrew.[165] The rebel infantrymen arrived at the nearly empty Petersburg trenches that evening.[166]

Union killed and wounded at the Second Battle of Reams Station totalled over 600. The Confederates took over 2,000 prisoners.[167] For some time after the battle, the men of the 28th North Carolina, in Lane's Brigade, joked among themselves that Grant would have to send Hancock back North to recruit a new command.[168]

The rebels took twelve colors, nine guns, and 3,100 stands of arms.[169] The color bearer of the 33rd North Carolina, in Lane's Brigade, claimed to have captured Hancock's coat tail.[170]

Secessionist losses totalled 720, most of them in the infantry.[171] The Southern cavalry lost only 94 men.[172] A Confederate officer considered the loss of 720 men "surprisingly small in proportion to the fire sustained, the shooting of the Federals being unusually wild, the bullets ranging very high, a sure sign of want of skill or nerve."[173]

From Hancock's point of view, according to his assistant adjutant general, "Reams Station was but a nightmare and a hideous dream."[174] The battle eliminated whatever prospects the budding politician had of getting the Democratic Party's presidential or vice presidential nomination in 1864. As a general, Hancock had never before suffered such a devastating defeat:

> He had seen his troops fail in their attempts to carry the intrenched positions of the enemy, but he had never before had the mortification of seeing them driven and his lines and guns taken, as on this occasion; and never before had he seen his men fail to respond to the utmost when he called upon them personally for a supreme effort; nor had he ever before ridden toward the enemy followed by a beggarly army of a few hundred stragglers who had been gathered together and pushed toward the enemy. He could no longer conceal from himself that his once mighty corps retained but the shadow of its


Scales
Phillips (Camley)
Lynch
WILCOX
HILL
Conner
Cooke
Dunovant
Anderson
HETH
A. Heath (Webb)
McGowan
MacRae
Weisiger
McGowan
Oak Grove Church
Branch (McDowell)
MILES
12 N.Y.
HANCOCK
J. P. Emmons (Emmerson)
To Shay's Tavern
Smyth
3 N.J.
GREGG
Smith & Spear
GIBBON
Smyth
Rosser
Wright
MATTHEW BUTLER
To Tucker Farm
Murphy
Cheek
BARRINGER
Davis
7 MI. & 59 N.Y.
Lanier
Confederate Horse Artillery
HAMPTON
MAP 13
Reams Station
August 25
The Final
Confederate Attacks

former strength and vigor.[175]

To make matters worse, the Northern newspapers picked up the dispatch written by Hancock's reporter before the final Confederate assault and proclaimed on the following day, "Another great victory by Gen. Hancock!" The Secretary of War went along with the newspapers and began issuing press releases about the victory. Because Hancock could not publicly contradict Stanton, the commander of the II Corps had to endure this embarassingly false propaganda for a number of days.[176]

Hancock suffered still another humiliation stemming from the battle. On August 30th, Gibbon sought authority to deprive the 8th New York Heavy Artillery, the 164th New York and the 36th Wisconsin of the right to carry colors because these regiments had lost their colors at Reams Station. Referring the matter to Meade on September 3rd, Hancock recommended that Meade deprive all regiments which had lost their colors of the right to carry others. On September 23rd, the commander of the Army of the Potomac adopted Hancock's recommendation prospectively but otherwise sustained Gibbon. This made Hancock's men the only ones deprived of the right to carry colors. Meade published in all the daily newspapers received in the Army of the Potomac the order depriving the three regiments of this right.[177]

As a result of this controversy, Hancock's already strained relationship with Gibbon became positively unpleasant. When Gibbon suggested a reorganization of the II Corps, Hancock responded by suggesting that Gibbon resign.[178] Hancock's friendship with Meade also suffered, and Hancock took his leave of the II Corps and the Army of the Potomac on November 26th.[179] Not for nothing did Hancock's chief-of-staff later write in regard to Reams Station:

> The agony of that day never passed away from that proud soldier. . . .So one who was gifted to discern the real forces which in us make for life or for death, looking down on the cold and pallid form of Hancock as he lay at rest beneath the drooping flag of his country on Governor's Island, in February, 1886, would have seen Reams's Station written on brow and brain and heart as palpable as, to the common eye, were the scars of Gettysburg.[180]

After the battle, the officers and men of the II Corps sought to exonerate themselves of responsibility for the loss of the Second Battle of Reams Station. They propagated the myth that the Confederates outnumbered Hancock's force at Reams Station by a factor of two or three to one.[181] Actually, the Federals outnumbered their opponents by at least 1,000 and perhaps as many as 2,000 fighting men. Hill left Petersburg with no more than 6,500 muskets.[182] Of this number, between 4,500 and 5,000 arrived at Reams Station before the battle ended.[183] As for the Con-

federate cavalry, Hampton had about 2,000 sabres.[184] The Confederates outnumbered Hancock's force in guns alone, twenty-five to sixteen.[185]

Hancock and his men blamed their defeat at the Second Battle of Reams Station on the poor location of the earthworks, on Meade's failure to withdraw Hancock from Reams Station on the morning of August 25th, on Meade's failure to send reinforcements straight down the railroad from Globe Tavern and on the unwillingness of the Federal soldiers to fight.[186] The earthworks, the late hour at which Hancock received authorization to withdraw and the route of Willcox's and McAllister's forces certainly all contributed to the disaster, as did the failure to do anything to improve the works at Reams Station until the morning of August 25th. Ultimately, however, responsibility for the loss of the battle rested with the troops and with those who had used them up — Grant and Meade. Hancock's assistant adjutant general, captured by the rebels at Second Reams Station, recognized this:

> Worn out by excessive exertions, cut up in a score of charges against intrenched positions, their better officers and braver sergeants and men nearly all killed or in hospital, regiments reduced to a captain's command, companies often to a corporal's guard — this was the state to which four months of continuous campaigning upon the avowed policy of "hammering" had brought the old divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick. Already twenty-seven officers had fallen in command of brigades, one hundred and twenty-five in command of regiments. Could the killed and wounded of but half an hour's fighting at Cold Harbor have been called back to the Second Corps on the 25th of August, Heth and Wilcox might have charged till the sun went down, and all to no purpose. Had Tyler, Brooke, McKeen, Haskell, McMahon, Byrnes, Morris, and Porter stood over the skeleton regiments at Ream's, the northwest angle would not have been carried, and Hill would have gone back in his intrenchments that night with none but his own colors and guns.[187]

Despite Meade's failure to withdraw Hancock's force on the morning of the 25th, despite Meade's failure to send reinforcements straight down the railroad from Globe Tavern, despite the unsatisfactory location of the earthworks, despite Hancock's failure to take prompt action to improve them, Hancock would have won the Second Battle of Reams Station if his men had possessed the will to fight. The Federal conscripts had none of the coolness and determination that evoked Heth's admiration when, in December, he wrote of his soldiers who participated in the charge that determined the outcome of the battle: "This charge and its results has proved to me that nothing is impossible to men determined to win."[188]

By August of 1864, natural selection in the Army of the Potomac had produced a soldier who would not fight.[189]

News of the victory at Reams Station caused rejoicing throughout the Confederacy during the few days that remained before the fall of Atlanta.[190] An officer in Lane's Brigade considered Reams Station "the greatest victory of the war."[191] Though the officer may have overstated the matter, frontal assaults against fully-manned breastworks rarely succeeded.

On August 29th, 1864, Lee said in a letter to Governor Zebulon B. Vance of North Carolina:

> I have frequently been called upon to mention the services of the North Carolina soldiers in this army, but their gallantry and conduct were never more deserving of admiration than in the engagement at Reams' Station, on the 25th instant. The brigades of Generals Cooke, MacRae and Lane, the last under the command of General Conner, advanced through a thick abatis of felled trees, under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and carried the enemy's works with a steady courage that elicited the warm commendation of their corps and division commanders, and the admiration of the army.
>
> On the same occasion the brigade of General Barringer bore a conspicuous part in the operations of the cavalry which were no less distinguished for boldness and efficiency than those of the infantry. If the men who remain in North Carolina share the spirit of those they have sent to the field, as I doubt not they do, her defense may be securely entrusted in their hands."[192]

To Brigadier General James H. Lane, who had missed the August battles due to a Cold Harbor wound, Lee said that:

> the three North Carolina brigades, Lane's, Cooke's and MacRae's, which made the second assault, after the failure of the first by other troops, had by their gallantry not only placed North Carolina, but the whole Confederacy, under a debt of gratitude, which could never be repaid.[193]

Had Hill failed to drive Hancock's men from Reams Station and had the Federals pressed on to occupy Dinwiddie Court House, the rebels would have had to evacuate Richmond.[194] The commander of the Army of Northern Virginia probably had this possiblity in mind when he spoke to Lane.[195] Lee could not know that occupying Dinwiddie Court House had not even occurred to Grant.

The commander of the Army of Northern Virginia certainly had in mind the possiblity of a cavalry raid on the South Side Railroad and the

Richmond and Danville Railroad when he spoke to Lane, and such a raid did occur to at least some in the Federal high command.[196] The countryside around Richmond and Petersburg afforded sufficient subsistence that mere disruption of the capital's supply lines could not force its evacuation, but the effects of privation had already made clear to Lee that each interruption of the flow of provisions and forage would hasten the day when lack of men and mounts would reduce his force to where it could no longer successfully resist the opposing Federals.

CHAPTER 13

Had Not Success Come Elsewhere

The Second Battle of Reams Station brought to an end the major fighting of the Siege of Petersburg for the month of August, 1864. Casualties continued to mount due to sniping, shelling and skirmishes. This attritional warfare resulted in about a thousand casualties during August for the Federals.[1] The Confederates lost a similar number.[2] Federal casualties for the month totalled 10,999.[3] The rebels lost almost 5,500 men.[4] Of all the months during the Petersburg Campaign, only June surpassed August in bloodiness.[5]

During the August battles around Petersburg, a number of military leaders distinguished themselves — some for better, some for worse.

Grant performed masterfully on the strategic plane. The general-in-chief believed that his plan of pressuring the Confederacy on all fronts would produce victory, and he had the character to adhere to that plan despite pressure from friend and foe. Grant's unification of the Federal commands in the Shenandoah Valley laid the foundation for Sheridan's future victories.

Operationally, the general-in-chief's plan to capture the Weldon Railroad, employed for the second time in three weeks, finally succeeded. In executing the plan, however, Grant displayed a tendency to issue orders in ignorance of readily ascertainable facts. He failed to apprise himself of the difficulties of landing troops at Deep Bottom. Failing to perceive the power of the combination of the strategical offensive with the tactical defensive, he meddled in Warren's handling of the Battle of Globe Tavern without knowing the ground. Not content with capturing the railroad, Grant prodded his subordinate into terrain that negated the numerical advantage of the V Corps. The general-in-chief thus bore some of the responsibility for the disaster of August 19th. Grant also failed to appreciate the importance of occupying Dinwiddie Court House. Illness may have excused his failure to strike the nearly empty Confederate trenches at Petersburg on August 25th. Oblivious to the exhausted condition of his soldiers, he bore part of the responsibility for the disaster at Reams Station.

President Davis, Grant's opponent on the strategic level, showed the danger inherent in the combination of a strong will and a bad plan. That Davis failed to consider the possiblity of shifting forces from Virginia to Georgia demonstrated the wisdom and effectiveness of Grant's design

rather than the defects of Davis's judgment. Unlike Meade during the autumn of Chickamauga, Grant kept the Confederates in Virginia so occupied that their high command did not even think of such a shift. Davis's folly displayed itself in the rigid adherence to his departmental system of defense that caused him to refrain from transferring to Georgia forces from less important departments, such as Mississippi.

Lee, Grant's opponent within the Virginia theater, wisely attempted to shift the scene of hostilities to the vicinity of Washington, D.C. The commander of the Army of Northern Virginia's will did not equal that of the Federal general-in-chief, though. Just as in July, Lee overreacted to Hancock's movement north of the James. During the Battle of Globe Tavern, when only enough men for piecemeal attacks remained in Petersburg and mustering enough force for a potentially decisive attack gave the Federals time to construct impregnable fortifications, the Confederates suffered for Lee's failure to learn from the maneuver that resulted in the First Battle of Deep Bottom. Sensitive to the political consequences of casualties in the North, he also had the good sense to approve the initiatives and adopt the plans of Mahone and Hampton. The Second Battle of Reams Station showed that Lee remained as bold as at the beginning of the Seven Days Battles. After Second Reams Station, however, he failed to realize the extent of the advantage that he held in the war of attrition which he had begun in the Wilderness. Lee's failure to leave adequate forces north of the James led to the loss of Fort Harrison in September.

Meade showed himself at heart an executive officer rather than a commander. The irascible Pennsylvanian capably shifted his forces to reinforce Warren, but failed to perceive the weakness of the V Corps' position on August 19th. Meade reacted too passively during the Second Battle of Reams Station, when he ought to have assaulted the nearly empty Confederate trenches at Petersburg. Meade bore some of the responsibility for the disaster at Reams Station in that he saw but disregarded the terrible condition of the First and Second Divisions of the II Corps.

Responsibility for the retention of the likes of the commander of the Army of the James rested with President Lincoln. Butler more than negated in the field the political advantages that his retention brought to the administration in smoke filled rooms. His misunderstanding of Grant's orders led to insufficient reserves on August 25th and his departure during this crisis merited a sterner measure than mere sacking.

Despite the carping of President Davis, Beauregard made the most of his situation on August 18th and 19th. Responsiblity for the respite given Warren on August 20th lay with Hill, for his rejection of the scratch force from Johnson's Division, and with Lee, for his insistence on a concentration that gave Warren time to prepare impregnable fortifications.

Hancock performed competently at Deep Bottom and had the good fortune to capture prisoners, flags and guns there for the second time in three weeks. But for Birney's failure to reconnoiter the Confederate line above Fussell's mill pond on August 15th, the following day's attack might have succeeded. The commander of the II Corps neglected to prepare adequately the defensive position at Reams Station. Slashing a few yards wider might have prevented disaster on August 25th.

Birney performed capably on August 14th. The terrible condition of his men on August 15th after their march in the previous night's rain excused his failure to attack on that day. His failure to reconnoiter to the west resulted in Terry's failure to attack at dawn on August 16th, which doomed any prospects the Federals had of permanently breaching Field's line.

An engineer like Meade, Warren defended as passively as did the commander of the Army of the Potomac. Left to his own devices on August 21st, the commander of the V Corps showed that his eye for ground remained as good as when he saved the Union left at Gettysburg. His failure to get his subordinates to position their pickets as he intended led to disaster on August 19th.

The commander of the Army of Northern Virginia's Third Corps performed adequately on August 18th and August 19th. His rejection of the ad hoc brigade from Johnson's Division on August 20th contributed to the failure of the Confederates to attack on that day. Hill's failure to reconnoiter properly for the attack on August 21st, as well as his failure to halt the attack once he had seen that the Federals had retired to a new position, led to unacceptable casualties. Straggling prevented his force from arriving at Reams Station in accordance with Hampton's plan. Illness compelled Hill to relinquish field command to Wilcox, who failed to mount a stronger assault at 5 p.m. than the two-brigade attack proposed by the commander of the Third Corps. Hill's situation presented the sad spectacle of the commander of a fine division promoted beyond his level of competence.

One corps commander stood head and shoulders above all others in regard to his performance during August, 1864. Hampton more than justified his appointment to command the Army of Northern Virginia's Cavalry Corps. Modestly successful in his attack of August 18th due to his unfortunate failure to get into position on time, the South Carolinian a week later showed himself the war's best commander of a cavalry corps attached to an army and the best corps commander in Virginia on either side. Hampton's initiative led to the Confederate victory at the Second Battle of Reams Station, where he had to stand by and watch victory nearly elude a committee of less capable infantry commanders senior to him in rank.

Turning next to the divisional commanders, Terry captured guns, prisoners and flags on August 14th and August 16th. That he placed a different brigade of his division in the lead each time he deployed to attack on August 16th showed that at least one eastern general did not invariably deploy his western soldiers as shock troops.[6]

William Birney demonstrated his incompetence on August 15th, when his men fired on one another, and on August 16th, when he winded his Second and Third Brigades in bringing them to the battlefield and then, disregarding the Confederates gathering on its flank, launched the Third Brigade into a crossfire.

In ill health and beset with personal tragedy, Barlow disappointed those grooming him for corps command when he attacked piecemeal on August 14th. He failed to properly position Macy's brigade for the final attack of the day. Macy's right struck Fussell's mill pond.

Gregg, the commander of the Federal Second Cavalry Division showed himself generally capable, but failed to coordinate well with Spear on August 23rd. Under Gregg's command, Spear drew more than his fair share of hazardous assignments.

Crawford bore much of the responsibility for the disaster that befell the V Corps on August 19th.

Willcox's bungling on August 25th ensured that his division would not arrive at the Second Battle of Reams Station in time to save the day.

Miles, a future general-in-chief of the Army, proved unable to command the entire First Division of the II Corps at Second Reams Station. Retaining command of Lynch's brigade, part of Rugg's brigade, and the three New York regiments of the former Irish Brigade, Miles split off the 152nd New York from the rest of the detachment from Rugg's brigade. This left Miles with four brigades or demi-brigades under his command. He allowed Broady to exercise command over the rest of the First Division. Broady divided his own brigade and the Third Brigade portion of the Consolidated Brigade. This left him with an ad hoc division of five brigades or demi-brigades: the 4th New York Heavy Artillery; the 53rd and 148th Pennsylvania; the rest of Broady's brigade; the three regiments of Penfield's force; and the rest of the former Third Brigade. The fragmentation effected by Miles and Broady contributed to the collapse of the First Division. Miles exaggerated the effect of his counterattack and unrealistically proposed another.

Gibbon counterattacked too promptly to properly align his forces on August 25th. His bluntness in regard to the ability of his men to counterattack again provided Hancock's partinsans with yet another excuse for the loss of the battle. Gibbon failed to investigate fully before depriving three of his regiments of the right to carry colors — a majority of the men

in those regiments had not abandoned their colors, but had followed them into captivity.

Conner performed admirably in command of the detachment from Wilcox's Division on August 16th, counterattacking the right of the Federal infantry's breakthrough on his own initiative.

The former president of the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad, Mahone brilliantly initiated and executed the spectacularly successful Confederate attack of August 19th. His inadequate reconnaissance and failure to call off the attack of August 21st when it became clear that the Federals had withdrawn to a new position contributed to the costly Confederate repulse on August 21st.

The actual commander of the Confederate infantry at Second Reams Station, Wilcox followed one piecemeal assault with another. But for MacRae's initiative, the Federals would have repulsed the final rebel assault. Wilcox also positioned himself poorly to ascertain the results of the assault. A prompter commitment of the supporting brigades could only have increased the magnitude of the Confederate victory.

As for the brigade commanders, Osborn and Shaw shared with William Birney some of the blame for the fiasco on August 15th in which their brigades fired on one another. At the Battle of Globe Tavern, Bragg shared with Crawford and Warren responsibility for the disaster on August 19th. William Humphrey deserved credit for his part in the Federal counterattack on August 19th, when he led his brigade in a rush that recaptured a section of Crawford's works and took about 100 prisoners and the flag of the 47th Virginia. In the cavalry skirmishes preceding the Second Battle of Reams Station, Spear led his brigade with unusual aggressiveness for a Federal. Inexplicably absent at the critical moment at Reams Station, Rugg earned a discharge from the service with another poor performance on October 27th at the Battle of the Boydton Plank Road.

On August 16th on the Darbytown Road, DuBose performed outstandingly well. The effective commander of the Confederate right in the counterattack, DuBose drove the Federals from the captured works with a scratch force. Barbour executed the difficult task of withdrawing Lane's Brigade when Wright's Brigade broke on its right, rallying his men, and then leading them in the successful counterattack from the left. In the second rebel assault on August 25th, Cooke committed his brigade with admirable skill. MacRae saved the day for the rebels on August 25th by advancing in support of Cooke's Brigade on his own initiative.

Heth distinguished himself more as an artillerist than as a divisional commander. The senior Major General of the Third Corps placed the rebel guns on August 18th and 19th at the Battle of Globe Tavern and on August

25th at Second Reams Station. Pegram's death at the Battle of Five Forks insured that Heth, an old-fashioned Virginia gentleman, would never claim the credit actually due him.

The performances of the troops around Petersburg during August, 1864, varied as widely as the performances of their commanders.

The men of Terry's division demonstrated that they had more fight in them than did any other troops in Grant's army group. They had more fight in them because they had not fought since the Battle of Ware Bottom Church in June.[7] Foster's brigade had an exceptional day on August 14th, capturing prisoners and cannon. The brigade's New Yorkers and Marylanders did not perform as well as its stalwart New Englanders on August 16th and 18th, but the brigade still lost only one prisoner for every seven men killed and wounded.[8] The division as a whole lost but a single prisoner for every eight men killed or wounded, a showing unmatched by any other Federal division seriously engaged during August, 1864.[9]

Used up in fighting at the Crater, the Second and Third Brigades of William Birney's division did not perform as well as did Terry's men. Coan's brigade lost four prisoners for every five men killed or wounded.[10] The Third Brigade did much better, losing almost two men killed or wounded for every prisoner.[11]

Extraordinary motivation not to surrender resulted in the Colored Brigade of William Birney's division losing only one prisoner for every fifteen men killed or wounded.[12]

The ratio of killed and wounded to prisoners in the X Corps as a whole, approximately four and a half to one, far surpassed that of any other corps, Union or Confederate.[13] That the X Corps yielded these prisoners during the course of an attack reflected still more favorably upon this formation. Attackers who surrendered when pinned down or counterattacked did not equate with defenders who failed to fight.

The statistical performance of Macy's brigade certainly contradicts Barlow's complaints about the vigor with which the sleepless, heatsick II Corps attacked on August 14th. Poorly positioned, with its right blocked by a mill pond, this brigade gamely charged toward breastworks across a steep-sided, vine-choked ravine. Macy's men had a good ratio of killed and wounded to prisoners, over three to one, and that on the offensive.[14] Craig's and Miles' brigades did not perform as well on August 16th, losing almost as many prisoners as killed and wounded — but once again, these prisoners had attacked and fallen prey to powerful rebel counterattacks.[15] Overall, the II Corps achieved a ratio of killed and wounded to prisoners of approximately two to one — more than honorable in light of the fact that the corps yielded the prisoners on the attack.[16]

Exhausted at the beginning of Second Deep Bottom, beyond exhaustion after the muddy night marches that followed the battle, the once elite II Corps performed abysmally at Second Reams Station. More than three of its men surrendered for every one who suffered death or a wound. Prisoners accounted for seventy percent of the corps' casualties.[17] Contrary to the impression left by the official reports of Hancock and Miles, the First Division performed practically as poorly as did Gibbon's men, losing 967 prisoners as opposed to 1,005, seventy-seven percent of its casualties as opposed to eighty percent — and but for the collapse of Miles' division, Gibbon's division would not have suffered these casualties.[18] Smyth's brigade, with 140 prisoners, fifty-nine percent of its casualties, did not get the credit that it deserves for its participation in the counterattack that retook the northern face of the works and three guns of the 12th Battery, New York Light Artillery.[19] Lynch's brigade, with 156 prisoners, sixty-four percent of its casualties, has received more credit than it deserved.[20]

The Second Cavalry Division performed admirably at Second Deep Bottom, losing nearly two killed or wounded per prisoner yielded.[21] At Second Reams Station, Gregg's division lost only nine missing out of sixty-nine total casualties.[22] To Stedman's brigade alone belongs the distinction of having participated in all three of August's major battles plus the "fight by moonlight" near Monk's Neck Bridge.

Statistically, the V Corps performed almost as badly at Globe Tavern as the II Corps did at Second Reams Station.[23] The figures by themselves deceive, however. Warren lost only two prisoners for every three killed or wounded on August 18th, but this occurred as a result of a frontal attack by two Confederate brigades upon an initially equal number of Federals.[24] Reinforcements increased the odds to three to one in favor of the Federals before they brought the rebels to a halt. The circumstances of this attack reflected far worse on Warren's men than did the ratio of prisoners to killed or wounded among the casualties.

The figures for August 19th, on the other hand, showed the V Corps performing even worse than did the II Corps. Prisoners outnumbered killed or wounded by approximately eight to one.[25] The unusual circumstances of this attack, however, mitigated in favor of the V Corps. The men of the II Corps experienced the unpleasantness of concentric fire at Second Reams Station, but not a force of rebels appearing in their immediate rear without any warning whatsoever.

The V Corps lost one prisoner for every two killed and wounded on August 21st.[26] Pickets accounted for most of the captives, though, and no disgrace accrued to a captured picket — such duty by its very nature carried with it a strong risk of capture. On the other hand, the men of the V Corps occupied an impregnable position on August 21st and had such

overwhelming artillery support that the Confederate infantry could not even come to grips with them.

Engaged on August 19th and 21st, the IX Corps lost almost two killed and wounded for every prisoner.[27] Because pickets captured on August 21st accounted for many of the captives, however, the IX Corps performed better than the statistics indicate.

At Second Reams Station, Spear's brigade achieved an enviable ratio of killed and wounded to prisoners of approximately three to one.[28]

Despite the frequency of mitigating circumstances, the overall Union ratio for August of six prisoners for every five soldiers killed or wounded reflected very poorly on the will to fight of Federal troops.[29] In no other month of the Petersburg campaign did such an unfavorable ration of prisoners to killed and wounded occur.

Confederate units generally performed favorably in comparison with their opponents.

At Second Deep Bottom, Field's Division suffered about 500 killed or wounded as opposed to about 100 captured, and most of the prisoners represented captured pickets.[30] Connor's detachment of Wilcox's Division also had a fine ratio of killed and wounded to prisoners, losing thirty-five missing out of 215 casualties, also about five to one.[31] Sanders' detachment of Mahone's Division behaved badly, however, losing approximately five prisoners for every three killed and wounded.[32] Killed and wounded probably outnumbered prisoners by about five to one among the approximately 300 casualties in the Confederate cavalry.[33]

Davis' and Walker's Brigades of Heth's Division performed a remarkable feat of arms on August 18th when they attacked and inflicted over 900 casualties on a Federal force at least three times their size at a cost of about 300 men.[34] Assuming that each of the two Confederate and six Federal brigades involved had about 1,000 men engaged, the Confederates inflicted 450 casualties per 1,000 engaged while the Federals inflicted fifty per 1,000. This represented a nine to one advantage in efficiency without even factoring in the advantage of the defensive posture of the Federals.

On August 19th, this less disciplined half of Heth's Division assisted Mahone's three-brigade force of about 2,000 men in capturing around 2,700 Federals. On August 18th and 19th together, Davis' Brigade had an astounding ten to one ratio of killed and wounded to prisoners.[35] Walker's Brigade could not equal that ratio, losing about sixty prisoners among less than 200 casualties, but most of the captures occurred during a picket affair on August 20th.[36]

Cooke's and MacRae's Brigades of Heth's Division lost a total of about 200 men on August 21st, including almost no prisoners.[37] The terri-

ble prisoner losses of Harris's Brigade of Mahone's Division and Hagood's Brigade of Hoke's Division occurred as a result of attackers running into overwhelming fire followed by counterattacks.[38] These circumstances bespoke a willingness to fight.

The victorious Confederates at Second Reams Station lost practically no prisoners, in part because they recaptured some lost earlier in the day.[39] The men of Cooke's, MacRae's and Lane's Brigades conducted themselves heroically. The sharpshooters had a spectacular day, their best of the war. Only Anderson's Brigade, used up in the fighting on the Darbytown Road on August 16th, behaved poorly.

Prisoners accounted for no more than a quarter of the approximately 5,500 casualties suffered by the Confederates around Petersburg in August of 1864, and three quarters of the Confederate missing occurred among attackers or pickets.[40] Such circumstances attended the capture of no more than one quarter of the almost 6,000 Federals captured during the month. A far greater willingness to fight prevailed among the rebels than among the Federals, who needed overwhelming artillery support and extensive fortifications to withstand attack.

The campaign of attrition that Lee had launched in May had succeeded to a greater degree than the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia realized.[41] Casualties and expiring enlistments had resulted in the inability of Grant's army group to hold even breastworks. The general-in-chief received such poor replacements that an officer on Meade's staff wrote:

> By the Lord! I wish these gentlemen who would overwhelm us with Germans, negroes, and the offscourings of great cities, could only see — only see — a Rebel regiment, in all their rags and squalor. If they had eyes they would know that thse men are like wolf-hounds, and not to be beaten by turnspits.[42]

At the end of August, Lee held the greatest advantage that he had ever before held or would ever again hold in the battle of attrition. As the first historian of the Army of the Potomac later wrote:

> Had not success come elsewhere to brighten the horizon, it would have been difficult to have raised new forces to recruit the Army of the Potomac, which, shaken in its structure, its valor quenched in blood, and thousands of its ablest officers killed and wounded, was the army of the Potomac no more.[43]

Terms such as victory or defeat do not adquately describe the results of Grant's Fourth Offensive, which included the battles and skirmishes of August, 1864. Certain advantages or disadvantages accrued to both sides, though.

Like a complex painting, the outcome of Grant's Fourth Offensive

appears different when viewed from different perspectives.

Viewed in the narrowest context, that of the Petersburg campaign, the Fourth Offensive began in stalemate and ended in stalemate.

On the one hand, the Federals had inflicted about 4,500 casualties upon the Confederates and had captured four guns and thirteen colors. Grant had made progress toward completing the investment of Petersburg. The Union armies had taken one more step toward severing all of the Confederates supply lines south of the Appomattox River.

The interruption of the Weldon Railroad seriously aggravated the already dire Confederate meat and forage shortages in Virginia. Resumption of service by the poorly run Richmond and Danville Railroad took place just as the fall of Atlanta cut off Lee's forces from their sources of supply in southwest Georgia and central Alabama. Though the rebels ran corn and Nassau bacon through the blockade into Wilmington, North Carolina, wagons on a thirty mile haul from Stony Creek to Petersburg could not adequately replace railroad trains even in the delapidated state which the Southern rolling stock had reached by this time. The increasingly short supply of meat constrained Lee to limit his offensive action in September to rustling beef.

The consequences of the absence of forage reached further. The horseflesh of the Army of Northern Virginia never recovered from the corn shortage that began in August of 1864. The number of dismounted cavalrymen grew until the Southern high command detached Hampton and two brigades of horseless horsemen to South Carolina in early 1865, partially in order to procure new mounts. The disgrace at Five Forks would never have occurred with Hampton present.[44]

The artillery horses and transport animals fared as poorly as did the cavalry mounts. Lee delayed his contemplated departure from Petersburg in early 1865 in the hope that the strength of his command's horses and mules might improve.[45] The abandoned guns, caissons, limbers, ambulances and forage wagons that littered the road to Appomattox testified to the effects of the lack of forage that began with the loss of the Weldon Railroad in August, 1864.

On the other hand, Grant paid a high price for the progress that he made — about 9,900 men, more than two casualties for every casualty that his soldiers inflicted. The Federals had also lost nine guns and twenty flags.

Besides decreasing the strength of Grant's army group, the casualties had serious political repercussions in the North. To make matters worse, the general-in-chief's progress remained too slow. Grant did not have forever to produce results. He had only until November 8, 1864. For Grant's Petersburg campaign alone to have provided the results

necessary to justify the year's terrible casualties, the general-in-chief needed to capture Richmond before the November election. This Grant failed to accomplish. The battles of August, 1864 left his army group in such poor condition that the general-in-chief could not undertake another offensive for nearly five weeks.[46] Even Petersburg remained in Confederate hands for the decisive November election.

The results of Grant's Fourth Offensive look better when viewed in the context of the war's eastern theater. The Federal general-in-chief prevented Lee from shifting the scene of conflict to the vicinity of the Union capital. Regardless of Lee's specific intent, the presence near Washington, D.C. of three of the Army of Northern Virginia's four corps commanders — Anderson, Early and Hampton — would soon have necessitated Lee's own presence there. Grant forced Lee to divert forces en route to the Shenandoah Valley and to retain forces under orders to march to the Valley.

Just as in the case of the Petersburg campaign by itself, however, for operations within the Eastern theater alone to have had a decisive outcome, they would have had to result in the capture of Richmond before the election. This did not happen. If preservation of the Union had depended on the capture of Richmond before the election, the Union would not have survived the war.

Only on the next level, the strategic level, did Grant's Fourth Offensive pay dividends that justified its cost. If Lee could not reinforce Early, Lee's government certainly could not take troops from Virginia in order to reinforce Hood at Atlanta. Grant's Fourth Offensive foreclosed the possibility of a last ditch Confederate concentration against Sherman. The Fourth Offensive thus contributed to the decisive military event of the war — the capture of Atlanta.

As the Fourth offensive ground to a halt, another offensive got underway in distant Georgia that redeemed the sacrifices made by Grant's army group. Within a week of the Second Battle of Reams Station, Sherman's army group had outflanked Hood's vastly outnumbered forces and cut the last railroad into Atlanta. Though gold briefly rose during Hood's desperate struggle to recover the railroad, Sherman emerged the victor in the Battle of Jonesboro and compelled Atlanta's evacuation.[47]

The capture of Atlanta provided the success necessary to justify the administration's hard war policy and 1864's heavy casualties. As Grant later wrote:

> The news of Sherman's success reached the North instantenously, and set the country all aglow. This was the first great political campaign for the Republicans in their canvass of 1864. It was followed later by Sheridan's campaign in the

> Shenandoah Valley; and these two campaigns probably had more effect in settling the election of the following November than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the parading with banners and bands of music in the North.[48]

The capture of Atlanta effected a dramatic reversal of fortunes.

The Democratic Party fell prey to dissention. On August 29th, their Chicago convention had nominated McClellan for president on a platform that called for an unconditional armistice that would necessarily result in Confederate independence. McClellan concurred in the platform in his first three drafts of his letter accepting the Democratic nomination. By the time he released his final draft on September 8th, though, War Democrats and the fall of Atlanta had persuaded him to repudiate his party's peace plank and to insist upon preservation of Union as the precondition of peace. This stance alienated many Peace Democrats, who felt that McClellan had betrayed them.

The Republicans closed ranks. Calls for a new convention to replace Lincoln with another candidate quickly ceased. The uninspiring victory at Mobile Bay took on new significance in conjunction with the capture of Atlanta. Secretary of State William H. Seward proclaimed, "Sherman and Farragut have knocked the bottom out of the Chicago platform." Two weeks after McClellan's divisive letter of acceptance, Fremont withdrew his splinter candidacy and left the Republican Party united behind its incumbent president.[49]

Some Southerners did not consider the fall of Atlanta a fatal blow.[50] Others, like a diarist in Columbia, South Carolina, despaired:

> Atlanta gone. Well — that agony is over. Like David when the child was dead, I will get up from my knees, will wash my face and comb my hair. No hope. We will try to have no fear.[51]

Northern morale soared. Sherman's victory transformed defeatism into determination to fight to the last.[52] Volunteers appeared instead of draft rioters.[53]

The opinion prevailed prior to the November election that for Lincoln to win, Northern forces had to capture Richmond or Atlanta. With Sherman's capture of Atlanta, the burden of persuading the Northern electorate shifted to the Confederates. The rebels failed to meet this burden. By October 17th, Hood had abandoned his attempt to maneuver Sherman out of Atlanta. On October 19th, at the Battle of Cedar Creek, Early failed to drive Sheridan from the Shenandoah Valley and mount yet another threat to Washington, D.C.

Less than three weeks later, Lincoln's percentage of the vote confirmed the accuracy of the opinion prevailing prior to the election. The

President obtained fifty-five percent of the vote, such a percentage signifying an election that in other circumstances, could well have gone the other way.

In the spring of 1864 Lincoln had said of Grant's grand design to pin down the Confederacy's armies so that they could not reinforce one another, "Those not skinning can hold a leg."[54] During August of 1864, Grant held a leg while Sherman skinned.

APPENDIX A

Orders Of Battle, Second Deep Bottom

FEDERAL

SECOND ARMY CORPS
Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock
(also in charge of all the troops engaged)

ESCORT
1st Vermont Cav., Co. M

FIRST DIVISION
Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow
(sick from August 17)
Brig. Gen. Nelson A. Miles

FIRST BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. Nelson A. Miles
Col. James C. Lynch

28th Massachusetts
26th Michigan
5th New Hampshire
2nd New York Heavy Artillery
4th New York Heavy Artillery
61st New York
81st Pennsylvania
140th Pennsylvania
183rd Pennsylvania

CONSOLIDATED BRIGADE
Col. Levin Crandell

7th New York (five cos.)
39th New York (six cos.)
52nd New York (six cos.)
57th New York
63rd New York (six cos.)
69th New York (six cos.)
88th New York (five cos.)
111th New York
125th New York
126th New York

FOURTH BRIGADE
Lt. Col. K. Oscar Broady

7th New York Heavy Artillery
64th New York
66th New York
53rd Pennsylvania
116th Pennsylvania
145th Pennsylvania
148th Pennsylvania

ARTILLERY

New York Light, 11th Battery
4th United States, Battery K

SECOND DIVISION
Col. Thomas A. Smyth

PROVOST GUARD
2nd Co. Minnesota Sharpshooters

FIRST BRIGADE
Col. George N. Macy
(disabled August 14)
Lt. Col. Horace P. Rugg

19th Maine
19th Massachusetts
20th Massachusetts
1st Co. Massachusetts
Sharpshooters
7th Michigan
1st Minnesota (two cos.)
59th New York
152nd New York
184th Pennsylvania
36th Wisconsin

SECOND BRIGADE
Col. Mathew Murphy

8th New York Heavy Artillery
155th New York
164th New York
170th New York
182nd New York (69th New York
National Guard Artillery

THIRD BRIGADE
Lt. Col. Francis E. Pierce

14th Connecticut
1st Delaware
2nd Delaware (two cos.)
12th New Jersey
10th New York (six cos.)
108th New York
4th Ohio (four cos.)
69th Pennsylvania
106th Pennsylvania (three cos.)
7th West Virginia (four cos.)

ARTILLERY

Maine Light, Sixth Battery (F)
1st New York Light, Battery G

THIRD DIVISION
Brig. Gen. Gershom Mott

FIRST BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. P. Regis de Trobriand

20th Indiana
1st Maine Heavy Artillery
17th Maine
40th New York
73rd New York
86th New York

SECOND BRIGADE
Col. Calvin A. Craig
(killed August 16)
Col. John Pulford

1st Massachusetts Heavy Artillery
5th Michigan
93rd New York
57th Pennsylvania
84th Pennsylvania
105th Pennsylvania

124th New York
63rd Pennsylvania (three cos.)
99th Pennsylvania
110th Pennsylvania
2nd U.S. Sharpshooters
141st Pennsylvania
1st U.S. Sharpshooters

THIRD BRIGADE
Col. Robert McAllister

ARTILLERY

11th Massachusetts (seven cos.)
5th New Jersey (three cos.)
6th New Jersey (three cos.)
7th New Jersey
8th New Jersey
11th New Jersey
72nd New York (one co.)
120th New York
1st New Jersey Light, Battery B
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery F

TENTH ARMY CORPS
Maj. Gen. David B. Birney

FIRST DIVISION
Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry

FIRST BRIGADE
Col. Francis B. Pond
(prostrated by heat August 16)
Col. Alvin C. Voris
(outranked August 18)
Col. Joshua B. Howell
(assumed command August 18)

SECOND BRIGADE
Col. Joseph R. Hawley

39th Illinois
62nd Ohio
67th Ohio (only four cos. engaged)
85th Pennsylvania
6th Connecticut
7th Connecticut
3rd New Hampshire
7th New Hampshire

THIRD BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. Robert S. Foster

10th Connecticut
11th Maine
1st Maryland Cav. (dismounted)
24th Massachusetts
100th New York

PROVISIONAL DIVISION
Brig. Gen. William Birney

SECOND BRIGADE
Lt. Col. William B. Coan

47th New York
48th New York
76th Pennsylvania
97th Pennsylvania

THIRD BRIGADE
Col. Francis A. Osborn
(wounded August 16)
Maj. Ezra L. Walrath
(wounded August 16)
Capt. Frank W. Parker
(wounded August 16)
Capt. Robert J. Gray

13th Indiana (three cos.)
9th Maine
4th New Hampsire
115th New York

COLORED BRIGADE
Col. James Shaw

29th Connecticut
7th U.S. Colored Troops
8th U.S. Colored Troops
9th U.S. Colored Troops

ARTILLERY BRIGADE
Lt. Col. Freeman McGilvery

Connecticut Light, 1st Battery
3rd Rhode Island Light, Battery C
New Jersey Light, 4th Battery
1st U.S., Batteries C and D

UNASSIGNED
4th Massachusetts Cav., 1st and 3rd Bns.

CAVALRY
SECOND DIVISION
Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg

FIRST BRIGADE
Col. William Stedman

1st Massachusetts
1st New Jersey
10th New York
6th Ohio
1st Pennsylvania

SECOND BRIGADE
Col. J. Irvin Gregg
(wounded August 16)
Col. Michael Kerwin
(outranked August 20)
Col. Charles H. Smith
(assumed command August 20)

1st Maine
2nd Pennsylvania
4th Pennsylvania
8th Pennsylvania
13th Pennsylvania
16th Pennsylvania

HORSE ARTILLERY
2nd U.S., Battery A

CONFEDERATE

ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA
Gen. Robert E. Lee

FIELD'S PROVISIONAL ARMY CORPS
Maj. Gen. Charles W. Field

FIELD'S DIVISION
Brig. Gen. John Gregg

ANDERSON'S BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. George T. Anderson

7th Georgia
8th Georgia
9th Georgia
11th Georgia
59th Georgia

LAW'S BRIGADE
Col. William F. Perry

4th Alabama
15th Alabama
44th Alabama
47th Alabama
48th Alabama

BENNING'S BRIGADE
Col. Dudley M. DuBose

2nd Georgia
15th Georgia
17th Georgia
20th Georgia

BRATTON'S PROVISIONAL DIVISION
Brig. Gen. John Bratton

BRATTON'S BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. John Bratton

1st South Carolina Volunteers
2nd South Carolina Rifles
5th South Carolina
6th South Carolina
Palmetto Sharpshooters

JOHNSON'S BRIGADE
Col. John M. Hughs

17th/23rd Tennessee
25th/44th Tennessee
63rd Tennessee

DETACHMENT,
PICKETT'S DIVISION
Lt. Col. Frank H. Langley

1st Virginia
11th Virginia
19th Virginia

DETACHMENT, SCALES' BRIGADE

DETACHMENT,
THOMAS' BRIGADE

25th Virginia Bn.

DETACHMENT, WILCOX'S DIVISION
Brig. Gen. James Conner

MCGOWAN'S BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. James Conner

1st South Carolina Rifles
12th South Carolina
13th South Carolina
14th South Carolina
Orr's Rifles

LANE'S BRIGADE
Col. William M. Barbour
(wounded August 16)
Col. William H. A. Speer

7th North Carolina
18th North Carolina
28th North Carolina
33rd North Carolina
37th North Carolina

DETACHMENT, MAHONE'S DIVISION
Brig. Gen. John C. C. Sanders
(outranked August 17)
Brig. Gen. Nathaniel H. Harris
(assumed command August 17)

HARRIS' BRIGADE
Col. Joseph M. Jayne

12th Mississippi
16th Mississippi
19th Mississippi
48th Mississippi

SANDERS' BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. John C. C. Sanders
Col. J. Horace King

8th Alabama
9th Alabama
10th Alabama
11th Alabama
14th Alabama

WRIGHT'S BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. Victor J. B. Girardey
(killed August 16)
Col. William Gibson

2nd Georgia Bn.
10th Georgia Bn.
3rd Georgia
22nd Georgia
48th Georgia
64th Georgia

ARTILLERY
BROWN'S BATTALION
Lt. Col. Robert A. Hardaway

Powhatan Artillery
Rockbridge Artillery
3rd Co. Richmond Howitzers
Salem Flying Artillery

CAVALRY CORPS
Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton

BUTLER'S DIVISION
Maj. Gen. Matthew C. Butler

BUTLER'S BRIGADE
Col. Hugh K. Aiken

3rd South Carolina
4th South Carolina
5th South Carolina
6th South Carolina

YOUNG'S BRIGADE
Col. Gilbert J. Wright

Cobb's Georgia Legion
Phillips Georgia Legion
Jeff Davis Legion
Millen's Georgia Bn.
Love's Alabama Bn.

ROSSER'S BRIGADE
Col. Richard H. Dulany

7th Virginia
11th Virginia
12th Virginia
35th Bn. Virginia

LEE'S DIVISION
Maj. Gen. William H. F. "Rooney" Lee

BARRINGER'S BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. Rufus Barringer

1st North Carolina
2nd North Carolina
3rd North Carolina
5th North Carolina

CHAMBLISS' BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. John R. Chambliss
(killed August 16)
Colonel J. Lucius Davis

9th Virginia
10th Virginia
10th Virginia
13th Virginia

GARY'S PROVISIONAL DIVISION
Brig. Gen. Martin W. Gary

GARY'S BRIGADE
Col. Alexander C. Haskell

7th Georgia
(detached from Young's Brigade)
Hampton Legion
7th South Carolina
24th Virginia

GREGG'S BRIGADE (infantry)
Col. Frederick S. Bass

3rd Arkansas
1st Texas
4th Texas
5th Texas

HORSE ARTILLERY
Maj. R. Preston Chew

Washington (S.C.) Artillery
2nd Jeb Stuart Horse Artillery

APPENDIX B

Orders Of Battle, Weldon Railroad

FEDERAL

FIFTH ARMY CORPS
Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren
(also in charge of all the troops engaged)

PROVIST GUARD
5th New York (bn.)

FIRST DIVISION
Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin

FIRST BRIGADE
Col. William S. Tilton

121st Pennsylvania
142nd Pennsylvania
143rd Pennsylvania
149th Pennsylvania
150th Pennsylvania
187th Pennsylvania

SECOND BRIGADE
Col. Edgar M. Gregory

32nd Massachusetts
21st Pennsylvania Cav.
(dismounted)
91st Pennsylvania
155th Pennsylvania

THIRD BRIGADE
Col. James Gwyn

20th Maine
18th Massachusetts
1st Michigan
16th Michigan
44th New York
83rd Pennsylvania
118th Pennsylvania

SECOND DIVISION
Brig. Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres

FIRST BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. Joseph Hayes
(captured August 19)
Col. Frederick Winthrop

5th New York
140th New York

SECOND BRIGADE
Col. Nathan T. Dushane
(killed August 21)
Col. Samuel A. Graham

1st Maryland
4th Maryland

146th New York
10th United States (three cos.)
11th United States
12th United States
14th United States
17th United States

THIRD BRIGADE
Lt. Col. Michael Wiedrich

15th New York Heavy Artillery

7th Maryland
8th Maryland
Purnell (Maryland) Legion

THIRD DIVISION
Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford

FIRST BRIGADE
Col. Peter Lyle

16th Maine
39th Massachusetts
104th New York
90th Pennsylvania
107th Pennsylvania

THIRD BRIGADE
Col. William R. Hartshorne
(captured August 19)

190th Pennsylvania
191st Pennsylvania

SECOND BRIGADE
Col. Richard Coulter
(sick from August 18)
Col. Charles Wheelock

94th New York
97th New York
11th Pennsylvania
88th Pennsylvania

FOURTH DIVISION
Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler
(wounded August 21)

PROVOST GUARD
Independent (Wisconsin) Bn.

FIRST BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. Edward S. Bragg

7th Indiana
19th Indiana
24th Michigan
1st Bn. New York Sharpshooters
6th Wisconsin
7th Wisconsin

SECOND BRIGADE
Col. J. William Hofmann

3rd Delaware
4th Delaware
76th New York
95th New York
147th New York
56th Pennsylvania
157th Pennsylvania (bn.)

ARTILLERY BRIGADE
Col. Charles S. Wainwright

Massachusetts, Light, 3rd Bat. (C)
Massachusetts Light, 5th Bat. (E)
Massachusetts Light, 9th Battery
1st New York Light, Battery B
1st New York Light, Battery C
1st New York Light, Battery D
1st New York Light, Battery H
1st New York Light, Battery L
New York Light, 15th Battery
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B
5th United States, Battery D

NINTH ARMY CORPS

FIRST DIVISION
Brig. Gen. Julius White

FIRST BRIGADE
Lt. Col. Joseph R. Barnes

21st Massachusetts (three cos.)
29th Massachusetts
35th Massachusetts
56th Massachusetts
57th Massachusetts
59th Massachusetts
100th Pennsylvania

SECOND BRIGADE
Lt. Col. Gilbert P. Robinson

3rd Maryland (bn.)
14th New York Heavy Artillery
179th New York
2nd Pennsylvania Provisional Heavy Artillery

ARTILLERY

Massachusetts Light, 14th Battery

SECOND DIVISION
Brig. Gen. Robert B. Potter

FIRST BRIGADE
Col. Zenas R. Bliss
(outranked August 21)
Col. John I. Curtin
(assumed command August 21)

36th Massachusetts
58th Massachusetts
2nd New York Mounted Rifles (dismounted)
51st New York
45th Pennsylvania
48th Pennsylvania
4th Rhode Island

SECOND BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. Simon G. Griffin

31st Maine
32nd Maine
2nd Maryland
6th New Hampshire
9th New Hampshire
11th New Hampshire
17th Vermont

ACTING ENGINEERS
Lt. Col. Percy Daniels

ARTILLERY

7th Rhode Island

Massachusetts Light, 11th Battery
New York Light, 19th Battery

THIRD DIVISION
Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Willcox

FIRST BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. John F. Hartranft

8th Michigan
27th Michigan
109th New York
13th Ohio Cav. (dismounted)
51st Pennsylvania
37th Wisconsin
38th Wisconsin

ACTING ENGINEERS
Capt. Joseph A. Sudsborough

17th Michigan

SECOND BRIGADE
Col. William Humphrey

1st Michigan Sharpshooters
2nd Michigan
20th Michigan
24th New York Cav. (dismounted)
46th New York
60th Ohio

CAVALRY

FIRST BRIGADE (Gregg's division)
Col. William Stedman

1st Massachusetts
1st New Jersey
10th New York
6th Ohio
1st Pennsylvania

SECOND BRIGADE (Kautz's division)
Col. Samuel P. Spear

1st District of Columbia
11th Pennsylvania

CONFEDERATE

AUGUST 18-19

DEPARTMENT OF NORTH CAROLINA AND SOUTHERN VIRGINIA
Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard

THIRD ARMY CORPS
Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill

DETACHMENT, HETH'S DIVISION
Maj. Gen. Henry Heth

DAVIS' BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Davis

1st Confederate Bn.

WALKER'S BRIGADE
Col. Robert M. Mayo
(ill August 19)
Col. William S. Christian

13th Alabama

2nd Mississippi
11th Mississippi
26th Mississippi
42nd Mississippi
55th North Carolina

2nd Maryland Bn.
1st Tennessee
7th Tennessee
14th Tennessee
22nd Virginia Bn.
40th Virginia
47th Virginia
55th Virginia

MAHONE'S PROVISIONAL DIVISION
Maj. Gen. William Mahone

COLQUITT'S BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Colquitt

6th Georgia
19th Georgia
23rd Georgia
27th Georgia
28th Georgia

MAHONE'S BRIGADE
Col. David A. Weisiger

6th Virginia
12th Virginia
16th Virginia
41st Virginia
61st Virginia

CLINGMAN'S BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Clingman
(wounded August 19)
Col. Hector McKethan

8th North Carolina
31st North Carolina
51st North Carolina
61st North Carolina

ARTILLERY

PEGRAM'S BATTERY
Lt. Col. William J. Pegram

Pee Dee Artillery
Letcher Artillery
Crenshaw's Battery
Fredericksburg Artillery
Purcell Artillery

CAVALRY

DEARING'S BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. James Dearing

7th Confederate
4th North Carolina
Petersburg Artillery
62nd Georgia
6th North Carolina

AUGUST 21

ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA
Gen. Robert E. Lee

THIRD ARMY CORPS
Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill

HETH'S PROVISIONAL DIVISION
Maj. Gen. Henry Heth

COOKE'S BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. John R. Cooke

15th North Carolina
27th North Carolina
46th North Carolina
48th North Carolina

MACRAE'S BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. William MacRae

11th North Carolina
26th North Carolina
44th North Carolina
47th North Carolina
52nd North Carolina

RANSOM'S BRIGADE
Lt. Col. John L. Harris

24th North Carolina
25th North Carolina
35th North Carolina
49th North Carolina
56th North Carolina

MAHONE'S PROVISIONAL DIVISION
Maj. Gen. William Mahone

HARRIS' BRIGADE
Col. Joseph M. Jayne

12th Mississippi
16th Mississippi
19th Mississippi
48th Mississippi

WRIGHT'S BRIGADE
Col. William Gibson

2nd Georgia Bn.
3rd Georgia
109th Georgia Bn.
22nd Georgia
48th Georgia
64th Georgia

SANDERS' BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. John C. C. Sanders (killed)
Col. J. Horace King

8th Alabama
9th Alabama
10th AlabaC a
11th Alabama
14th Alabama

FINEGAN'S BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. Joseph Finegan

2nd Florida
5th Florida
8th Florida
9th Florida
10th Florida

11th Florida

HAGOOD'S BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. Johnson Hagood

7th South Carolina Bn.
11th South Carolina
21st South Carolina
25th South Carolina
27th South Carolina

SCALES' BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. Alfred M. Scales

13th North Carolina
16th North Carolina
22nd North Carolina
34th North Carolina
38th North Carolina

DETACHMENT, THOMAS' BRIGADE

ARTILLERY

PEGRAM'S BATTALION
Lt. Col. William J. Pegram

Pee Dee Artillery
Letcher Artillery
Crenshaw's Battery
Fredericksburg Artillery
Purcell Artillery

CAVALRY

BARRINGER'S BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. Rufus Barringer

1st North Carolina
3rd North Carolina
2nd North Carolina
5th North Carolina

APPENDIX C

ORDERS OF BATTLE, SECOND REAMS STATION

FEDERAL

SECOND ARMY CORPS
Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock

FIRST DIVISION
Brig. Gen. Nelson A. Miles

FIRST BRIGADE
Col. James C. Lynch

28th Massachusetts
26th Michigan
5th New Hampshire

CONSOLIDATED BRIGADE
Col. Levin Crandell
(in charge of picket line)
Maj. John W. Byron
(missing)
Capt. Nelson Penfield

7th New York (five cos.)
39th New York (six cos.)
52nd New York (six cos.)

2nd New York Heavy Artillery
61st New York
81st Pennsylvania
140th Pennsylvania
183rd Pennsylvania

FOURTH BRIGADE
Lt. Col. K. Oscar Broady (wounded)
Lt. Col. William Glenny

7th New York Heavy Artillery
64th New York
66th New York
53rd Pennsylvania
116th Pennsylvania
145th Pennsylvania
148th Pennsylvania

57th New York
63rd New York (six cos.)
69th New York (six cos.)
88th New York (five cos.)
111th New York
125th New York
126th New York

UNATTACHED
Lt. Col. Thomas Allcock (wounded)
Capt. John B. Vande Weile

4th New York Heavy Artillery

SECOND DIVISION
Maj. Gen. John Gibbon

PROVOST GUARD
2nd Co. Minnesota Sharpshooters

FIRST BRIGADE
Lt. Col. Horace P. Rugg

19th Maine
19th Massachusetts
20th Massachusetts
1st Co. Massachusetts Sharpshooters
7th Michigan
1st Minnesota (two cos.)
59th New York
152nd New York
184th Pennsylvania
36th Wisconsin

THIRD BRIGADE
Col. Thomas A. Smyth

14th Connecticut
1st Delaware
2nd Delaware (two cos.)
12th New Jersey
10th New York (six cos.)

SECOND BRIGADE
Col. Mathew Murphy

8th New York Heavy Artillery
155th New York
164th New York
170th New York
182nd New York (69th New York National Guard Artillery)

108th New York
4th Ohio (four cos.)
69th Pennsylvania
106th Pennsylvania (three cos.)
7th West Virginia (four cos.)

ARTILLERY BRIGADE
Capt. A. Judson Clark

Massachusetts Light, 10th Battery
New York Light, 12th Battery
New Jersey Light, 3rd Battery
1st Rhode Island Light, Batteries A and B

CONFEDERATE

THIRD ARMY CORPS
Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill
(also in command of all the troops engaged)

WILCOX'S PROVISIONAL DIVISION
Maj. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox

ANDERSON'S BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. George T. Anderson

7th Georgia
8th Georgia
9th Georgia
11th Georgia
59th Georgia

MCGOWAN'S BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. Samuel McGowan

1st South Carolina
12th South Carolina
13th South Carolina
14th South Carolina
Orr's Rifles

SCALES' BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. Alfred M. Scales

13th North Carolina
16th North Carolina
22nd North Carolina
34th North Carolina
38th North Carolina

LANE'S BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. James Conner

7th North Carolina
18th North Carolina
28th North Carolina
33rd North Carolina
37th North Carolina

HETH'S PROVISIONAL DIVISION
Maj. Gen. Henry Heth

COOKE'S BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. John R. Cooke

15th North Carolina
27th North Carolina
46th North Carolina
48th North Carolina

SANDERS' BRIGADE

Col. J. Horace King

8th Alabama

MACRAE'S BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. William MacRae

11th North Carolina
26th North Carolina
44th North Carolina
47th North Carolina
52nd North Carolina

DETACHMENT, MAHONE'S BRIGADE
Col. David A. Weisiger

6th Virginia

9th Alabama
10th Alabama
11th Alabama
14th Alabama

12th Virginia
16th Virginia
61st Virginia

ARTILLERY

PEGRAM'S PROVISIONAL BATTALION
Lt. Col. William J. Pegram

Clutter Battery (section)
Letcher Artillery
Battery A, Sumter Artillery

Hardaway Artillery (section)
Purcell Artillery

CAVALRY CORPS
Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton

BUTLER'S DIVISION
Maj. Gen. Matthew C. Butler

DUNOVANT'S BRIGADE
Brig. Gen. John Dunovant

3rd South Carolina
4th South Carolina
5th South Carolina
6th South Carolina

YOUNG'S BRIGADE
Col. Gilbert J. Wright

Cobb's Georgia Legion
Phillips Georgia Legion
Jeff Davis Legion
Millen's Georgia Bn.
Love's Alabama Bn.
7th Georgia

ROSSER'S BRIGADE'
Brig. Gen. Thomas Rosser

7th Virginia
11th Virginia
12th Virginia
35th Virginia Bn.

LEE'S DIVISION
Brig. Gen. Rufus Barringer

BARRINGER'S BRIGADE
Col. William H. Cheek

1st North Carolina
2nd North Carolina
4th North Carolina
5th North Carolina

CHAMBLISS' BRIGADE
Col. J. Lucius Davis

9th Virginia
10th Virginia
13th Virginia

HORSE ARTILLERY BATTALION
Maj. R. Preston Chew

Washington (S.C.) Artillery

2nd Jeb Stuart Horse Artillery

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9. Ibid., 140.
10. "Ninth Virginia Cavalry, 141; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 242; Pt. 2, 216; Daniel T. Balfour, "13th Virginia Cavalry" (Lynchburg, Va., 1986), 36; William Child, "A History of the Fifth Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteers in the American Civil War, 1861-1865" (Bristol, N.H., 1893), 278 (cited hereinafter as "Fifth New Hampshire").
11. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 215-216; "13th Virginia Cavalry," 36.
12. "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 137; Edward F. Tobie, "History of the First Maine Cavalry, 1861-1865" (Boston, 1887), 310 (cited hereinafter as "First Maine Cavalry").
13. "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 137-138.
14. "OR," Pt. 1, 265-266, 639-640; Ibid., Pt. 2, 224.
15. Ibid., 217.
16. Ibid., 223-224, 229.
17. Ibid., Pt. 1, 640.
18. Ibid., Pt. 2, 223-224.
19. Ibid., 215.
20. Ibid., 223-224.
21. Ibid., 224, 228.
22. Ibid., 229.
23. Ibid., 228.
24. Ibid., Pt. 1, 275; "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 138.
25. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 275.
26. "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 138-139.
27. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 229.
28. Edward L. Wells, "Hampton and his Cavalry in '64" (Richmond, Va., 1899), 272-273.
29. "N.C. Regiments," III, 540.
30. "First Maine Cavalry," 309-311.

31. Ibid., 311.
32. Ibid., 309-310.
33. "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 138.
34. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 640; "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 138-139; "First Maine Cavalry," 310-311.
35. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 242, 266, 272.
36. Ibid., Pt. 2, 220.
37. Ibid., Pt. 1; 266, 272; "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 139.
38. Ibid., 140.
39. Ibid., 139.
40. "N.C. Regiments," III, 540.
41. "Charming Nellie," 254; "OR," XLII, Pt. 229.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., Pt. 2, 242.
44. Ibid., Pt. 2, 229; "Alexander Cheves Haskell: The Portrait of a Man," 140.
45. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 248, 724, 728, 746; Letter, Adrian H. Terry to "My own darling Isa," September 3, 1864, Terry Family Papers, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.
46. Ibid.; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 688, 728; Ibid., Pt. 2, 235.
47. Ibid. Pt. 1, 746, 752, 758.
48. Ibid., Pt., 1, 688, 728; Ibid., Pt. 2, 235; Ezra J. Warner, "Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders" (Baton Rouge, 1964), 497 (cited hereinafter as "Generals in Blue").
49. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 362.
50. Ibid., 755; Ibid., Pt. 2, 235.
51. Ibid., Pt. 1, 363.
52. Ibid., 739; "SHSP," XIV, 552.
53. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 746-747.
54. Ibid., 694, 739.
55. "Eleventh Maine," 244.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 747.
58. Ibid., 747; Stephen Walkley, "History of the Seventh Connecticut Volunteer Infantry" (Stonington, Conn., 1905), 161 (cited hereinafter as "Seventh Connecticut"); Letter, Adrian H. Terry to "My own darling Isa," September 3, 1864, Terry Family Papers, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.
59. Ibid.; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 688-689, 699-700.
60. Ibid., 711; Daniel Eldredge, "The Third New Hampshire and All About It" (Boston, 1893), 521 (cited hereinafter as "Third New Hampshire"); Letter, Adrian H. Terry to "My own darling Isa," September 3, 1864, Terry Family Papers, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.
61. "Seventh Connecticut," 161.
62. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 739, 752.
63. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 363-364.
64. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 217-218, 229.
65. Ibid., Pt. 1, 699; "SHSP," XIV, 552.
66. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 878.
67. "SHSP," XIV, 552-554.
68. Richmond Enquirer, August 31, 1864.
69. James F. J. Caldwell, "The History of a Brigade of South Carolinians, Known First as 'Gregg's' and Subsequently as 'McGowan's Brigade' " (Philadelphia, 1866), 176 (cited hereinafter as "McGowan's Brigade").
70. Richmond Enquirer, August 31, 1864.
71. Macon Daily Telegraph, September 1, 1864.
72. "SHSP," XIV, 552-553.

73. William V. Izlar, "A Sketch of the War Record of the Edisto Rifles, 1861-1865," (Columbia, S.C., 1914), 98 (cited hereinafter as "Edisto Rifles").
74. Charles M. Clark, "The History of the Thirty-Ninth Regiment Illinois Volunteer Veteran Infantry (Yates Phalanx) in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865" (Chicago, 1889), 211 (cited hereinafter as "Thirty-Ninth Illinois").
75. "Third New Hampshire," 521, 525.
76. "Thirty-Ninth Illinois, 211; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 688.
77. Ibid., 699.
78. "Thirty-Ninth Illinois," 211.
79. Macon Daily Telegraph, September 1, 1864.
80. Ibid., 688, 700.
81. Ibid., 696; Richmond Enquirer, August 31, 1864; Macon Daily Telegraph, September 1, 1864; "Lee's Lieutenants, 549.
82. "Eleventh Maine," 245.
83. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 364, 747.
84. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 689, 700.
85. Wounded in the left shoulder by the initial Confederate volley, Private Henry M. Hardenbergh, the color bearer of the 39th Illinois, continued to advance and singlehandedly captured the Alabama regiment's flag, leaving its color sergeant mortally wounded. For this exploit, Hardenbergh, who at the time of his enlistment resided in Bremen Township, which the author presently serves as clerk, received the Medal of Honor and a promotion to First Lieutenant in the 36th Regiment U.S. Colored Troops. They came posthumously, however. A Confederate sharpshooter killed Hardenbergh on August 28th, 1864. "Thirty-Ninth Illinois," 211-213; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 849.
86. Ibid., 700, 849-850.
87. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 102, 700.
88. Ibid., 700, 739, 747, 752, 755, 758; Richmond Enquirer, August 31, 1864.
89. "One Hundredth New York," 288-289.
90. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 102, 711, 718, 724; "Third New Hampshire," 521; Henry F. W. Little, "The Seventh Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion" (Concord, N.H., 1896) 292 (cited hereinafter as "Seventh New Hampshire"); Charles K. Cadwell, "The Old Sixth Regiment, Its War Record, 1861-5" (New Haven, Conn., 1875), 100 (cited hereinafter as "Old Sixth Regiment").
91. "Third New Hampshire, 521.
92. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 102, 711, 718, 724; "Third New Hampshire," 521; "Seventh New Hampshire" 292; "Old Sixth Regiment," 100.
93. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 364, 384.
94. Kate M. Scott, "History of the One hundred and fifth regiment of Pennsylvania volunteers" (Philadelphia, 1877), 117-118.
95. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 364, 384.
96. Ibid., 766; "Twenty-Fourth Massachusetts," 348-349; Nicholas DeGraff Memoir, 1862-1865, "Civil War Times Illustrated," Collection of Civil War Papers, United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (cited hereinafter as "DeGraff Memoir").
97. "OR," 700; "Seventh U.S.C.T.," 36.
98. Ibid., 700; "Seventh U.S.C.T.," 36.
99. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 229.
100. Ibid., Pt. 1, 752; "One Hundredth New York," 289.
101. "OR," XLII, Pt., 1, 747, 755.
102. Ibid., 384.
103. Ibid., 375-376, 379.
104. Ibid., 102, 689.
105. Ibid., 102.

106. Ibid., 689, 694.
107. Ibid., 747.
108. "Seventh U.S.C.T., 36; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 700, 747, 766.
109. Ibid., 724.
110. Charles A. Stevens, "Berdan's United States Sharpshooters in the Army of the Potomac, 1861-1865" (St. Paul, 1892), 483.
111. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 363, 371, 373.
112. "SHSP," XIV, 553.
113. Richmond Enquirer, August 31, 1864.
114. Ibid.
115. William C. Oates, "The War between the Union and the Confederacy and its lost opportunities, with a history of the 15th Alabama regiment" (New York, 1905), 374 (cited hereinafter as "The War Between the Union and the Confederacy"). Oates may have mistaken Sanders for Anderson.
116. Ibid., 375.
117. Ibid., 376.
118. "Lee's Lieutenants," 774; "McGowan's Brigade," 176.
119. Ibid., 177.
120. Richmond Enquirer, August 31, 1864.
121. "McGowan's Brigade," 177.
122. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 379, 694.
123. "Eleventh Maine," 246; "Third New Hampshire," 525; "Old Sixth Regiment," 100.
124. Ibid., 101.
125. "OR," XLII, Pt, 1, 700, 711, 724.
126. Ibid., 694.
127. Ibid., 376.
128. Ibid., 364.
129. DeGraff Memoir; "A Boy Goes to War," 70; "OR,"XLII, Pt. 1, 766.
130. Ibid.
131. "A Boy Goes to War," 70.
132. Ibid.
133. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 747.
134. "A Boy Goes to War," 70.
135. Ibid.; DeGraff Memoir; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 120.
136. "Perry's Saints," 257-258; James H. Clark, "The Iron Hearted Regiment: Being an Account of the Battles, Marches and Gallant Deeds Performed by the 115th Regiment N.Y. Vols." (Albany, N.Y., 1865), 159.
137. "The War Between the Union and the Confederacy," 377.
138. Richmond Enquirer, August 31, 1864.
139. John D. McConnell, "Recollections of the Civil War," Richmond National Battlefield, 10 (cited hereinafter as "Recollections of the Civil War").
140. "The South Carolinians," 150-151.
141. Ibid., 151.
142. Ibid.; "Recollections of the Civil War," 10.
143. Ibid.
144. "Eleventh Maine," 247.
145. "McGowan's Brigade," 177-178.
146. Ibid., 178; "Perry's Saints," 257-258; "Eleventh Maine," 245.
147. "Recollections of the Civil War," 10; "CV," XXXIII (1925), 127; Richmond Enquirer, August 31, 1864.
148. "McGowan's Brigade," 178.
149. Richmond Enquirer, August 31, 1864; "N.C. Regiments," II, 57.
150. "Eleventh Maine," 245-246.

151. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 747-748.
152. Ibid., 766.
153. "Ninety-Seventh Pennsylvania," 316.
154. "Thirty-Ninth Illinois," 212.
155. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 718, 725.
156. Though a reporter wrote that Little's men handled the 9th U.S. Colored Troops with "gloves off," the usual ugliness between colored troops and Confederates did not prevail. "Gloves off" meant no prisoners, as at the Crater in July or at Fort Gilmer in September. A contemporaneous letter written by an officer on Field's staff bears witness to the propriety with which the rebels treated their colored prisoners taken on August 16th. Ibid., 694; George M. Dennett, "History of the Ninth U.S.C. Troops from Its Organization till Mustered Out" (Philadelphia, 1866), 15; Richmond Enquirer, August 31, 1864; Richard W. Corbin, "Letters of a Confederate Officer to His Family in Europe During the Last Year of the War of Secession" (New York, 1913), 61 (cited hereinafter as "Letters of a Confederate Officer").
157. Albert Maxfield, "Roster and statistical record of Company D, of the Eleventh Maine infantry volunteers" (New York, 1890), 44.
158. Douglas Southall Freeman, "R. E. Lee" (New York, 1935), Vol. III, 484-485, quoting John E. Davis to Charles Marshall, n.d., "SHSP," XVII (1889), 242.
159. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 229.
160. Ibid., 230.
161. Ibid., Pt. 1, 640; "First Maine Cavalry," 310; William Hyndman, "History of a Cavalry Company, A Complete Record of Company 'A,' 4th Penn'a Cavalry" (Philadelphia, 1870), 222 (cited hereinafter as "Company 'A,' 4th Penn'a Cavalry").
162. "N.C. Regiments," III, 619.
163. "Charming Nellie," 254.
164. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 91; "First Maine Cavalry," 310.
165. "SHSP," XIV, 554; "N.C. Regiments," III, 619; "Charming Nellie," 254; "Hood's Texas Brigade," 250.
166. Ibid.
167. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 219.
168. "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 141.
169. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 224-225.
170. Ibid., 225; "General William Birney's Answer," 9½
171. Ibid., 231.
172. Ibid., 232.
173. Ibid., 232, 239-240.
174. Ibid., Pt. 1, 116-121; Ibid., Pt. 2, 299.
175. Ibid., 245-246; Ibid., Pt. 1, 219; Richmond Enquirer, August 31, 1864; "Rebel War Clerk's Diary," 267.
176. "Movements of the Confederate Army," 33; Charles T. Loehr, "War History of the Old First Virginia Infantry Regiment, Army of Northern Virginia" (Richmond, Va., 1884), 33 (cited hereinafter as "First Virginia").
177. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 222.

Chapter 5

1. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 219.
2. Ibid., Pt. 2, 244.
3. Ibid., Pt. 1, 220.
4. Ibid., Pt. 2, 249.
5. Ibid., Pt. 1, 220.
6. Ibid., Pt. 2, 258.
7. P. Regis de Trobriand, "Four Years with the Army of the Potomac" (Boston, 1889), 658.

8. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 243.
9. Ibid., 879; "First Virginia," 33; Lee A. Wallace, Jr., "1st Virginia Infantry" (Lynchburg, Va., 1984), 52.
10. "Movements of the Confederate Army," 33.
11. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 220.
12. Ibid., LI, Pt. 2, 1035.
13. Ibid., 1036; Ibid., XLII, Pt. 1, 220; William McDonald, "A History of the Laurel Brigade, Originally the Ashby Cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia and Chew's Battery" (Baltimore, 1907), 268 (cited hereinafter as "Laurel Brigade"); Edward L. Wells, "Hampton and his Cavalry in '64" (Richmond, Va., 1899), 273.
14. "Movements of the Confederate Army," 33.
15. "One Hundredth New York, 290.
16. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 753, 758; "Eleventh Maine," 253; "One Hundredth New York," 291.
17. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 220.
18. Ibid., LI, Pt. 2, 1035-1036.
19. "First Virginia," 33.
20. "Ninth Virginia," 141; "Movements of the Confederate Army," 33.
21. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 220.
22. "First Virginia," 33-34.
23. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 299.
24. Ibid., 300; Ibid., Pt. 1, 617.
25. Ibid., 220; Ibid., Pt. 2, 300-301.
26. Ibid., 1190.
27. "SHSP," XIV, 554-555; "Lee's Sharpshooters," 153; "First Virginia," 34.
28. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 221.
29. "N.C. Regiments," II, 625.
30. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 1192-1193.
31. Ibid., XL, Pt. 3, 728-742; Ibid., XLII, Pt. 2, 1214-1222, 1224-1228.
32. Ibid., XLII, Pt. 1, 121.
33. Bratton's Brigade of Field's Division lost at least twelve killed, seventy-eight wounded and twenty missing. Ibid., 938; Columbia "Daily South Carolina, August 25, 1864. Anderson's Brigade lost at least five killed, forty-eight wounded and twenty-five missing. Record Group 109, National Archives. Law's Brigade may have lost as many as 311 killed, wounded and missing. "The War Between the Union and the Confederacy," 377; Richmond Enquirer, August 26, 1864. The figures for these three brigades do not appear to reflect all their missing on August 14th, around 125. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 172, 195.

    Gregg's Brigade of Field's Division lost about four killed, sixteen wounded and one missing. Bryce A. Suderow, "Confederate Casualties During the Siege of Petersburg, June 13-Aug. 25, 1864" (1984), 44. Benning's Brigade lost at least five killed and twenty-one wounded. Records Group 109, National Archives.

    McGowan's Brigade of Wilcox's Division lost at least fifteen killed, 103 wounded and eight missing. "McGowan's Brigade," 178, 180. Lane's Brigade lost at least eight killed, fifty-four wounded and twenty-seven missing. "SHSP," IX (1881), 357.

    Sanders' Brigade of Mahone's Division lost at least eight killed, twenty-one wounded and thirty-eight missing. Richmond Sentinel, October 2, 1864. Wright's Brigade lost at least forty-five killed, seventy-four wounded and 211 missing. Macon Daily Telegraph, August 31, 1864; Ibid., September 5, 1864; Ibid., September 8, 1864; Augusta Chronicle & Sentinel, October 6, 1864; Augusta Daily Constitutionalist, August 30, 1864. Harris' Brigade lost at least thirteen killed, wounded and missing. Richmond Enquirer, September 1, 1864.

    Two of the four units (including the 7th Georgia Cavalry, detached from Young's Brigade of Butler's Division) in Gary's Brigade of the Department of Richmond lost at least three killed, twenty-two wounded and sixteen missing. Charleson Daily Courier,

September 6, 1864; Columbia Daily South Carolinian, August 30, 1864. The brigade probably lost twice as many.

Barringer's Brigade of W. H. F. Lee's Division lost at least eleven killed, sixty-one wounded and five missing. Richmond Sentinel, August 26, 1864. The brigade may have lost as many as 125 killed, wounded and missing. "N.C. Regiments," III, 619. The losses of two of the three regiments in Chambliss' Brigade exceeded thirty-six killed, wounded and missing. Robert K. Krick, "9th Virginia Cavalry" (Lynchburg, Va., 1982), 39; "13th Virginia Cavalry," 37. The brigade's losses probably approached the number of men lost by Barringer's Brigade.

Three of four units in Young's Brigade of Butler's Division lost at least thirteen wounded. Richmond Enquirer, August 27, 1864. Rosser's Brigade probably suffered as many casualties as did Young's Brigade.

The Confederate artillerists lost at least six wounded. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 935.

34. "Letters of a Confederate Officer," 62.
35. "One Hundredth New York," 294-295.
36. "SHSP," XIV, 554-555.
37. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 505.
38. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 337.
39. "First Virginia," 34.
40. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 341.
41. Ibid., 42; 81; Ibid., Pt. 2, 359, 393, 520-521.

Chapter 6

1. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 431.
2. Ibid., Pt. 2, 316.
3. Ibid., 275.
4. Phillip Cheek and Mair Pointon, "History of the Sauk County Riflemen Known as Company 'A,' Sixth Wisconsin Veteran Volunteer Infantry, 1861-1865" (Madison, 1909), 134 (cited hereinafter as "Sauk County Riflemen")
5. Henry R. Pyne, "The History of the First New Jersey Cavalry (Sixteenth Regiment, New Jersey Volunteers.)" (Trenton, 1871), 280 (cited hereinafter as "1st New Jersey Cavalry").
6. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 152.
7. William H. Locke, "The Story of the Regiment" (Philadelphia, 1868), 357.
8. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 153.
9. Ibid., Pt. 1, 70; Ibid., Pt. 2, 164-165, 168.
10. A. M. Judson, "History of the Eighty-Third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers" (Erie, Pa., 1865), 106 (cited hereinafter as "Eighty-Third Pennsylvania").
11. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 169.
12. Ibid., 1178, 1186.
13. Ibid., 219.
14. Ibid., 169.
15. Ibid., 211.
16. Ibid., 214.
17. Ibid., 211-212, 226.
18. Ibid., 242-243.
19. Ibid., 212, 226.
20. Ibid., 244.
21. Ibid., 245.
22. Ibid., 251.
23. William H. Powell, "The Fifth Army Corps (Army of the Potomac): A Record of Operations during the Civil War in the United States of America, 1861-1865" (New York, 1896), 710-711 (cited hereinafter as "Fifth Army Corps"); "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 251.

24. Ibid., 251, 260.
25. Ibid., 245; "Virginia Campaign," 252.
26. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 245.
27. Ibid., 251.
28. "Movements of the Confederate Army," 33; "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 246, 1192.
29. Ibid., 271; Ibid., Pt. 1, 458.
30. Ibid., Pt. 2, 252.
31. Ibid., Pt. 1, 458, 464.
32. Ibid., 431, 483.
33. Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, Vol. V ("Petersburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg"), (Boston, 1906), 247-248 (cited hereinafter as "MHSM").
34. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 272.
35. Ibid., Pt. 1, 458, 460, 466.
36. Edwin C. Bearss, "Battle of the Weldon Railroad," Petersburg National Battlefield, 5.
37. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 272.
38. Ibid., Pt. 12, 428.
39. "Battle of the Weldon Railroad," 5-6.
40. "OR," XLII, Pt. 12, 429, 460.
41. Ibid., Pt. 2, 272.
42. Ibid., Pt. 1, 433, 460-461, 466-467.
43. "History of the 121st Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers" (Philadelphia, 1893), 83 (cited hereinafter as "121st Pennsylvania").
44. "OR," LXII, Pt. 1, 431; Ibid., Pt. 2, 275.
45. "Death in the Trenches," 105.
46. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 251.
47. Ibid., Pt. 1, 460-461, 463, 466-467.
48. Horatio N. Warren, "The Declaration of Independence and War History, Bull Run to the Appomattox" (Buffalo, 1894), 47.
49. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 471.
50. Ibid., 474.
51. Ibid., Pt. 2, 272-273.
52. Ibid., Pt. 1, 433, 471.
53. Ibid., 474.
54. Ibid., 463.
55. Ibid., 480.
56. Ibid., 471.
57. Ibid., 540; Ibid., Pt. 2, 273.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., Pt. 1, 471, 474.
60. Ibid., Pt. 2, 273; Diary, Washington L. Dunn, August 18, 1864, United Daughters of the Confederacy Collection, Georgia Department of Archives and History (cited hereinafter as "Dunn Diary").
61. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 273.
62. Ibid. Pt. 1, 491.
63. Ibid., 503.
64. Ibid., 522.
65. Ibid., 491.
66. Ibid., 509.
67. Ibid., 503.
68. Abner R. Small, "The Sixteenth Maine Regiment in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865 (Portland, Me., 1886), 195 (cited hereinafter as "Sixthteenth Maine").
69. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 474, 480.
70. "Battle of the Weldon Railroad," 6.

71. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 474, 540.
72. Ibid., 540.
73. Ibid., 474.
74. Ibid., 433.
75. Ibid., 474; Ibid., Pt. 2, 273.
76. Ibid., Pt. 1, 474.
77. Ibid., 480.
78. Ibid., 474; "Sixteenth Maine," 195.
79. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 1186.
80. Ibid.
81. Henry Heth, "Report of December 7th, 1864," Heth Papers, Eleanor S. Brockenbrough Library, Museum of the Confederacy (cited hereinafter as "Heth Report"); James L. Morrison, ed., "The Memoirs of Henry Heth" (Westport, Conn., 1974), 190.
82. "N.C. Regiments," III, 309.
83. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 1187; Johnson Hagood, "Memoirs of the War of Secession" (Columbia, S.C., 1909), 289; Dunn Diary, August 18, 1864.
84. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 858; Ibid., Pt. 2, 1186; Ibid., Pt. 3, 1341.
85. Dunn Diary, August 18, 1864.
86. "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 289.
87. Dunn Diary, August 18, 1864.
88. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 474.
89. Ibid., Pt. 2, 264, 273.
90. Ibid., Pt. 1, 474.
91. Ibid., pt. 2, 263, 1187.
92. Ibid., 263, 268.
93. "N.C. Regiments," III, 309.
94. Heth Report.
95. "N.C. Regiments," III, 309.
96. "Sixteenth Maine," 195-196.
97. "N.C. Regiments," III, 309.
98. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 474, 480; "Sixteenth Maine," 195.
99. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 480; "N.C. Regiments," III, 309-310.
100. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 480; "MHSM," V, 251.
101. Ibid., 471, 474, 480.
102. Ibid., 491, 503, 508.
103. Ibid., 491, 503, 508.
104. Ibid., 509.
105. Ibid., 491, 503, 508.
106. Ibid., 483, 534.
107. Ibid., 483.
108. Ibid., 488; Emerson G. Taylor, "Gouverneur Kemble Warren: The Life and Letters of an American Soldier, 1830-1882" (Boston, 1932), 193 (cited hereinafter as "Gouverner Kemble Warren").
109. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 540.
110. Ibid., 534.
111. Ibid., 535.
112. Ibid., 488.
113. Ibid., 483-484.
114. Ibid., 471.
115. Ibid., 467, 469.
116. Ibid., 471.
117. Ibid., Pt. 2, 274.
118. "Gouverneur Kemble Warren," 192.

119. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 273.
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122. Heth Report.
123. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 273, 1275.
124. Ibid., Pt. 1, 471.
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126. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 273.
127. Ibid., 274; Ibid., Pt. 1, 471, 474, 484.
128. Ibid., 486, 490.
129. Ibid., 488, 492.
130. Ibid., 492.
131. Ibid., 492, 510, 517.
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134. Ibid., Pt. 2, 268, 274, 276; Dunn Diary, August 18, 1864.
135. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 540-541.
136. Ibid., Pt. 2, 274-278.
137. Ibid., 250.
138. Ibid., 268.
139. Ibid., 262.
140. Ibid., 263.
141. Ibid., 271.
142. Ibid., 266, 281.
143. Ibid., 276.
144. Ibid., 293.
145. Ibid., 289.
146. Ibid., 290.
147. Ibid., 276, 305.
148. Ibid., 282, 284.
149. Ibid., 291.
150. Ibid., 1187.
151. Heth Report.
152. Dunn Diary, August 18, 1864; "MHSM," V, 254.
153. "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 141; "Movements of the Confederate Army," 33; "Virginia Campaign," 275.
154. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 1194-1195.
155. "Meade's Headquarters," 217.
156. "OR,", XLII, Pt. 1, 503.
157. Ibid., 429; Ibid., Pt. 2, 1187; Heth Report.
158. Richmond Enquirer, August 20, 1864. The number of wounded reached about 200, high in proportion to the number of killed. Petersburg Register, August 19, 1864. Davis' Brigade lost 210 killed or wounded. Ibid., August 22, 1864. Dearing's Brigade lost heavily in prisoners, around twenty. Ibid., August 19, 1864; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 460, 465. Heth lost about thirty prisoners. Richmond Whig, August 20, 1864.
159. Ibid., Pt. 2, 1275. Whatever the state of their discipline, the 2nd and 11th Mississippi had exceptional combat records that extended back to First Manassas. Dunbar Rowland, "Military History of Mississippi, 1803-1898" (Nashville, 1908), 44-49, 54-57. As for Archer's and Field's Brigades, the components of Walker's Brigade, they had formed part of the famous Light Division in its heyday. "Richmond Redeemed," 216.

Chapter 7

1. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 492, 535.

2. Ibid., 589, 593, 595-596.
3. Ibid., Pt. 2, 305.
4. Ibid., Pt. 1, 492, 509, 535.
5. Ibid., 535.
6. Ibid., 539.
7. Ibid., 536.
8. Ibid., 537, 539.
9. Ibid., 536-537.
10. Ibid., 538-539.
11. Ibid., 539.
12. Ibid., 535.
13. Ibid., 538.
14. "Meade's Headquarters," 219; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 341.
15. Ibid., 53, 341.
16. "Meade's Headquarters," 219; "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 315-316.
17. Ibid., 550, 557.
18. Ibid., 538.
19. Ibid., 535.
20. Levi W. Baker, "History of the Ninth Mass. Battery" (South Framingham, Mass., 1888), 129; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 535, 537, 539.
21. Ibid., 589; Lewis Crater, "History of the Fiftieth Regiment, Penna. Vet. Vols., 1861-65" (Reading, Pa., 1884) 70 (cited hereinafter as "Fiftieth Pennsylvania").
22. Ibid.
23. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 293.
24. Ibid., Pt. 1, 504; Pt. 2, 313.
25. Ibid., 314-315.
26. Ibid., Pt. 1, 492.
27. Ibid., 535, 538.
28. Ibid., Pt. 2, 306.
29. "Meade's Headquarters," 219.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., 219-220.
32. Ibid., 219.
33. Ibid.
34. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 492.
35. Ibid., 522; "Battle of the Weldon Railroad," 32.
36. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 510; Ibid., Pt. 2, 313.
37. Ibid., Pt. 1, 479; Joseph Hayes, "Report of November 26, 1867," Petersburg National Battlefield.
38. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 539.
39. "Meade's Headquarters," 219-220.
40. Ibid., 220.
41. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 313.
42. Ibid., 311, 320.
43. Ibid., Pt. 1, 493.
44. Ibid., 538.
45. "Meade's Headquarters," 220; "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 313; Ibid., Pt. 1, 493, 539.
46. "Movements of the Confederate Army," 33.
47. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 1190.
48. Ibid.
49. George Bernard Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina (hereinafter referred to as "Bernard Papers").
50. Ibid.

51. "Nineteenth Maine," 209-210.
52. James I. Robertson, Jr., "General A. P. Hill: The Story of a Confederate Warrior" (New York, 1987), 285-286 (cited hereinafter as "General A. P. Hill"; "OR" XXXVI, Pt. 2, 967; "The Historical Magazine," Vol. VII, Second Series, No. 6 (June, 1870), 393.
53. Ibid., 392-393.
54. "Bernard Papers."
55. Ibid.
56. "The Historical Magazine," VII, Second Series, No. 6 (June, 1870), 404-405; "Blue and Gray," Vol. V, No. 1 (Jan., 1895), 30; William H. Stewart, "A Pair of Blankets" (New York, 1911), 170.
57. Dunn Diary, August 19, 1864.
58. "Bernard Papers."
59. Ibid.
60. "A Pair of Blankets," 171.
61. Ibid.; "Bernard Papers."
62. Ibid.
63. O. B. Curtis, "History of the Twenty-Fourth Michigan, of the Iron Brigade, Known as the Detroit and Wayne County Regiment" (Detroit, 1891), 271 (cited hereinafter as "Twenty-Fourth Michigan").
64. Ibid.
65. "Sauk County Riflemen" 130-131; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 535-536.
66. Ibid., 494.
67. Ibid., 506.
68. R. E. M'Bride, "In the Ranks from the Wilderness to Appomattox Court House" (Cincinatti, 1881), 118-119.
69. Heth Report.
70. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 858.
71. Alfred S. Roe, "The Thirty-Ninth Regiment, Massachusetts Volunteers, 1862-1865" (Worcester, Mass., 1914), 248 (cited hereinafter as "Thirty-Ninth Massachusetts").
72. "The Memoirs of Henry Heth," 190-191.
73. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 484, 485, 489.
74. Isaac Hall, "History of the Ninety-seventh regiment, New York volunteers ('Conkling Rifles,') in the War for the Union" (Utica, 1890), 218 (cited hereinafter as "Ninety-seventh New York").
75. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 504.
76. John D. Vautier, "History of the 88th Pennsylvania Volunteers in the War for the Union, 1861-1865" (Philadelphia, 1894), 197 (cited hereinafter as "88th Pennsylvania").
77. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 510-511.
78. Ibid., 541; "MHSM," V, 256.
79. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 541.
80. Ibid., 510, 517.
81. Ibid., 510.
82. "88th Pennsylvania," 197-197.
83. Wendell D. Croom, "The War History of Company 'C', (Beauregard Volunteers) Sixth Georgia Regiment, (Infantry)" (Fort Valley, 1879), 25-26 (cited hereinafter as "Sixth Georgia"); "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 504.
84. "MHSM," V, 257.
85. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 504, 508, 595.
86. Ibid., 472, 474, 479.
87. "Sixth Georgia," 26.
88. "OR," XVII, Pt. 1, 474; "Sixth Georgia," 26.
89. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 430, 472, 474; "Sixth Georgia," 25-26; "Dunn Diary," August 19, 1864; Joseph Hayes, "Report of November 26, 1867," Petersburg National Battlefield; Fifth

Army Corps," 714.
90. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 472.
91. "Battle of the Weldon Railroad," 37.
92. "A Pair of Blankets," 172; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 940.
93. "N.C. Regiments," III, 213.
94. "CV," VII, 217.
95. "Thirty-Ninth Massachusetts," 248.
96. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 505, 522-523.
97. "Thirty-Ninth Massachusetts," 252.
98. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 494.
99. "MHSM," V, 259.
100. "Thirty-Ninth Massachusetts," 249.
101. "88th Pennsylvania," 198.
102. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 510.
103. "Thirty-Ninth Massachusetts," 252; "Ninety-seventh New York," 219.
104. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 510.
105. "Bernard Papers."
106. "A Pair of Blankets," 172.
107. Ibid., 171-172.
108. "Bernard Papers;" "N.C. Regiments," III, 213.
109. "Bernard Papers."
110. Ibid.; "A Pair of Blankets," 173.
111. Ibid., 173-175.
112. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 589.
113. Ibid., 593; R. C. Eden, "The Sword and Gun, a History of the 37th Wis. Volunteer Infantry (Madison, 1865), 33.
114. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 550.
115. Ibid., 593.
116. Ibid., 595.
117. Ibid., 590.
118. Ibid., 593.
119. Ibid., 595.
120. Ibid., 593.
121. Ibid., 557.
122. Ibid., 550.
123. "History of the Thirty-Fifth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers, 1862-1865" (Boston, 1884), 285-286 (cited hereinafter as "Thirty-Fifth Massachusetts").
124. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 124, 491, 494, 593.
125. "A Pair of Blankets," 172-173.
126. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 550.
127. Ibid., 564.
128. Ibid., 564.
129. "Battle of the Weldon Railroad," 44.
130. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 595.
131. Ibid., 472, 593-594, 595-596.
132. Ibid., 467.
133. Ibid., 461.
134. James M. Gibbs, "History of the First Battalion Pennsylvania Six Months Volunteers and 187th Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry" (Harrisburg, 1905), 124 (cited hereinafter as "187th Pennsylvania"); "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 475.
135. Ibid., Pt. 2, 325-326.
136. Ibid., Pt. 1, 940.
137. Ibid., Pt. 2, 310.

138. Ibid., Pt. 1, 122-128, 430, 940; Ibid., Pt. 2, 1210.
139. Macon Daily Telegraph, August 27, 1864.

Davis' Brigade of Heth's Division lost 63 killed, wounded and missing on August 19th. Petersburg Daily Register, August 22, 1864; Ibid., August 25, 1864.

The 55th Virginia of Walker's Brigade of Heth's Division lost two killed thirteen wounded and one missing on August 18th and August 19th. The 40th Virginia lost three killed, fifteen wounded and one missing on those days. Richmond Enquirer, September, 2, 1864. The 47th Virginia lost one killed, eight wounded and seven missing on August 19th. Richmond Examiner, September 7, 1864. The 2nd Maryland Battalion lost five killed, thirty-five wounded and thirty-eight missing during the Battle of Globe Tavern, but lost most of its prisoners during a picket affair on August 20th. W. W. Goldsborough, "The Maryland Line in the Confederate States Army" (Baltimore, 1900), 183-184. Walker's Brigade also contained the 22nd Virginia Battalion, the 1st, 7th and 14th Tennessee and the 13th Alabama. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 1218, 1219.

The 6th Virginia of Mahone's Brigade lost three wounded and six missing. Richmond Dispatch, August 24, 1864. The 12th Virginia lost six killed, twenty-seven wounded and four missing for a total of thirty-seven of ninety-four carried into action. Petersburg Daily Register, August 22, 1864. The 16th Virginia lost twenty-one killed and twenty-two wounded. Richmond Enquirer, September 2, 1864. The 41st Virginia lost five killed, twelve wounded and eighteen missing. Petersburg Daily Register, August 22, 1864. The 61st Virginia lost about 77 killed, wounded and missing of fewer than 200 men carried into action. "A Pair of Blankets," 175; "SHSP," XXIV (1896), 103. George S. Bernard put the brigade's loss at 187 out of over 500 muskets carried into action. "Bernard Papers."

Company B, 2nd Georgia, of Colquitt's Brigade, lost one killed, two wounded and eight missing on August 19th. Macon Daily Telegraph, August 26, 1864. Company C, 6th Georgia, lost one killed and one prisoner. "Sixth Georgia," 26. The 23rd Georgia lost six wounded out of 260 rifles. Southern Watchman (Athens, Ga.), September 7, 1864. The 27th Georgia lost 57 casualties on August 18th and 19th. Dunn Diary, August 20, 1864.

Bragg claimed to have taken fifty-seven prisoners. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 536. White claimed to have taken sixty prisoners. Ibid., 550. Hartranft claimed fifty or sixty prisoners. Ibid., 593. Humphrey claimed 100 prisoners. Ibid., 595. Wheelock's brigade may have taken as many as sixty prisoners. "Ninety-seventh New York," 220.

140. Dunn Diary, August 19, 1864.
141. "The Historical Magazine," VII, Second Series, No. 6 (June, 1870), 404-405; "A Pair of Blankets," 172; Blue and Gray," V, No. 1 (January, 1895), 30; "Bernard Papers."
142. "A Pair of Blankets," 175.
143. T. Harry Williams, "P. G. T. Beauregard: Napoleon in Gray" (Baton Rouge, 1955), 238.
144. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 458.
145. "Virginia Campaign," 276, note 1.
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid., 276.
148. "Fifth Army Corps," 716.
149. "MHSM," V, 260.
150. "Fiftieth Pennsylvania," 71.
151. "Ninety-seventh New York" 220.
152. "MHSM," V, 259.
153. "Thirty-Fifth Massachusetts, 287.

Chapter 8

1. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 940.
2. "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 288-289.

3. "First Virginia," 33.
4. T. N. Dupuy, "The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare" (Indianapolis, 1980), 326-327.
5. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 940; "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 141.
6. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 344.
7. Ibid., 327, 329, 359.
8. "Alabama Historical Quarterly," Vol. XXXIX (1977), 173.
9. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 1191.
10. Ibid., 1192.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 359, 360, 1192; Ibid., Pt. 1, 940; "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 289; Dunn Diary, August 20, 1864; "CV," XXIX (1921), 216; Heth Report.
13. "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 289.
14. Ibid., 289-290.
15. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 1192.
16. "SHSP," XXIV, 103.
17. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 1192.
18. Ibid., 394; "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 296, note.
19. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 1193.
20. Ibid.
21. Richard L. Jones, "Dinwiddie County: Carrefour of the Commonwealth" (Richmond, Va., 1976), 145; "MHSM," V, 261-262.
22. Ibid., 262.
23. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 348.
24. Ibid., Pt. 1, 550, 551, 594.
25. Ibid., 458, 461, 465; Ibid., Pt. 2, 345.
26. Ibid., Pt. 1, 489.
27. Ibid., Pt. 2, 338, 341.
28. Ibid., 338; "MHSM," V, 261.
29. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 388.
30. Ibid., 340.
31. Ibid., Pt. 1, 430, 505, 515, 518, 521, 551, 552, 590, 594, 596.
32. Ibid., 484, 534, 536; Ibid., Pt. 2, 346.
33. "Meade's Headquarters," 221; Charles Camper and J. W. Kirkley, comps., "Historical Record of the First Regiment Maryland Infantry" (Washington, 1871), 171 (cited hereinafter as "First Maryland"); "The Maryland Line in the Confederate States Army, 182-185; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 489.
34. Ibid., 597; Ibid.; Pt. 2, 341, 344, 345.
35. Ibid., 339, 342.
36. Ibid., 340.
37. Ibid., Pt. 1, 472.
38. Ibid., 484.
39. Ibid., 488.
40. Ibid., 472, 475; "MHSM," V, 261.
41. "187th Pennsylvania," 119-120.
42. "Virginia Campaign," 219, 222-223.

Chapter 9

1. "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 290; "Alabama Historical Quarterly," XXXIX, 174.
2. "Movements of the Confederate Army," 34.
3. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 430.
4. "MHSM," V, 262.
5. "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 290; "Alabama Historical Quarterly," XXXIX, 173.
6. "MHSM," V, 262-263.

7. Alan Nevins, ed., "A Diary of Battle: The Personal Journals of Colonel Charles S. Wainwright, 1861-1865" (New York, 1962), 454 (cited hereinafter as "Diary of Battle").
8. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 541.
9. "Thirty-Fifth Massachusetts," 288.
10. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 515; "Journal of the Military Service Institute of the United States," Vol. XIII (1892), 424-425.
11. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 481.
12. "Sauk County Riflemen," 133.
13. Ibid.; "Alabama Historical Quarterly," XXXIX, 174.
14. "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 296; "The Historical Magazine," VII (Second Series), No. 6 (June, 1870), 405.
15. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 484.
16. "The Historical Magazine," VII (Second Series), No. 6 (June, 1870), 405.
17. "Sauk County Riflemen," 133; "Alabama Historical Quarterly," XXXIX, 174.
18. "Sauk County Riflemen," 134.
19. "Alabama Historical Quarterly," XXXIX, 174.
20. "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 290.
21. Ibid.
22. "Edisto Rifles," 81.
23. "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 290.
24. "Edisto Rifles," 81.
25. "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 290-291.
26. Ibid.
27. "Sauk County Riflemen," 134; "First Maryland," 173.
28. "Sauk County Riflemen," 134.
29. "Alabama Historical Quarterly," XXXIX, 174.
30. "Confederate Military History," VII, 444.
31. "Movements of the Confederate Army," 34.
32. "Soldiers of Florida" (Live Oak, Fla., 1903), 207; "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 1188-1189.
33. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 484.
34. "Movements of the Confederate Army," 34.
35. "Movements of the Confederate Army," 34; "Military History of Mississippi, 1803-1898," 80; "First Maryland," 172.
36. "Alabama Historical Quarterly," XXXIX, 174.
37. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 541-542.
38. "Sauk County Riflemen," 134-135.
39. "Twenty-Fourth Michigan," 273.
40. "O.R.," XLII, Pt. 1, 939.
41. Ibid., 431.
42. Ibid.; "Alabama Historical Quarterly," XXXIX, 174.
43. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 541-542; "Diary of Battle," 454.
44. Heth Report.
45. "CV," XXIX, 216.
46. "N.C. Regiments," III, 248.
47. Heth Report.
48. "N.C. Regiments," III, 248.
49. "CV," XXIX, 216.
50. Heth Report.
51. "N.C. Regiments," I, 599.
52. Heth Report.
53. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 474.
54. "CV," XXIX, 216; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 491.
55. "N.C. Regiments," III, 248.

56. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 491.
57. "N.C. Regiments," III, 248.
58. Mary G. Brainard, "Campaigns of the One Hundred and Forty-sixth Regiment New York State Volunteers, Also Known as Halleck's Infantry, the Fifth Oneida, and Garrand's Tigers" (New York, 1915), 241.
59. Ibid.
60. "N.C. Regiments," IV, 564.
61. Ibid., I, 599; "Diary of Battle," 454; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 542.
62. "History of the Corn Exchange Regiment, the 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers" (Philadelphia, 1888), 502.
63. "N.C. Regiments," III, 248.
64. Ibid., I, 599.
65. Ibid., IV, 564.
66. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 475.
67. "N.C. Regiments," III, 377.
68. "CV," XXIX, 216.
69. "N.C. Regiments," III, 377.
70. Ibid., II, 299.
71. Ibid., 625.
72. Ibid., 299.
73. Ibid., III, 377.
74. Ibid., 377-378.
75. Ibid., II, 625.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., III, 378.
78. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 542; "Diary of Battle," 454.
79. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 542; "Diary of Battle," 454.
80. "CV," XXIX, 216.
81. Ibid.
82. "OR,", XLII, Pt. 1, 542.
83. "Ninth Mass. Battery," 142.
84. "Diary of Battle," 454-455.
85. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 518-519.
86. Diary, Joseph Mullen, Jr., August 21, 1864, Elizabeth S. Brockenbrough Library, Museum of the Confederacy, Richmond, Virginia (cited hereinafter as "Mullen Diary"); "N.C. Regiments," III, 378.
87. "Battle of the Weldon Railroad," 62.
88. "N.C. Regiments," I, 599.
89. "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 291.
90. "Edisto Rifles," 81.
91. "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 291.
92. "Eighty-Third Pennsylvania," 107.
93. "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 291-292.
94. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 482-483.
95. Ibid., 484; "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 292-294; "Eighty-Third Pennsylvania," 107.
96. "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 294; "Edisto Rifles," 84.
97. "Eighty-Third Pennsylvania," 107.
98. "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 294; "Edisto Rifles," 84.
99. "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 294.
100. Ibid., 294-295.
101. "Edisto Rifles," 84.
102. Ibid., 84-85.

103. "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 295; "Edisto Rifles," 85.
104. "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 295.
105. Ibid.
106. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 463.
107. Ibid.; "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 295.
108. "Edisto Rifles," 87.
109. "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 299.
110. "Edisto Rifles," 96; "Memoirs of the War of Secession," 298.
111. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 542-543.
112. Ibid.
113. "N.C. Regiments," I, 435; Ibid., III, 540, 619-620.
114. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 600; "121st Pennsylvania," 84.
115. Ibid.
116. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 600; "Tenth New York Cavalry," 226.
117. "N.C. Regiments," I, 435; Ibid., III, 540, 619-620; "187th Pennsylvania," 125; "MHSM," V, 265n; "First New Jersey Cavalry," 289.
118. "The Historical Magazine," VII (Second Series), No. 6 (June, 1870), 405; "SHSP," XIV, 555.
119. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 354, 355.
120. "Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant," 604.
121. "OR," XL, Pt. 1, 28.
122. "B&L," 723.
123. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 355, 369.
124. Ibid., 349-350.
125. Ibid., 358, 376.
126. Ibid., 368-369.
127. Ibid., 357; Ibid., Pt. 1, 222.
128. "General Hancock," 260.
129. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 227.
130. "Meade's Headquarters," 221.
131. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 87, 91; Ibid., Pt. 2, 375.
132. Ibid., 391.
133. Ibid., 389-390; Ibid., Pt. 1, 833.
134. Ibid., 369-370, 375.
135. "First New Jersey Cavalry," 288.
136. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 833.
137. In Heth's command east of the railroad, Cooke's Brigade lost seven killed, fifty-five wounded and three missing. Raleigh Daily Confederate, August 26, 1864. Ransom's Brigade lost twenty-four killed, 159 wounded and sixty-two missing. Richmond Examiner, August 31, 1864.

    In Heth's command west of the railroad, the 26th North Carolina of MacRae's brigade lost six killed and twenty wounded. Raleigh Daily Confederate, August 27, 1864. The 44th North Carolina of MacRae's Brigade lost seven killed and twenty-one wounded. Ibid. The 47th North Carolina of MacRae's Brigade lost four killed and twenty-two wounded. Ibid., August 30, 1864.

    In Mahone's command north of the Vaughan Wagon Road, Harris' Brigade lost at least 250 killed, wounded and missing and may have lost as many as eleven killed, 108 wounded and 151 missing. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 939; Richmond Enquirer, August 31, 1864. The 2nd, 5th and 8th Florida of Finegan's Brigade lost four killed, eighteen wounded and one missing. Ibid., September 2, 1864. Losses in the 9th, 10th and 11th Florida approximately equalled those in the other half of Finegan's Brigade. "Soldiers of Florida," 207-244. Sanders' Brigade lost three killed, thirty-seven wounded and one missing. Richmond Sentinel, October 29, 1864.

In Mahone's command south of the Vaughan Wagon Road, Wright's Brigade, Scales' Brigade and the detachment of Thomas' Brigade each probably suffered fewer casualties than did Sanders' Brigade.

Hagood's Brigade lost fourteen killed, 125 wounded and 309 missing. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 937.

Barringer's Brigade suffered sixty-eight casualties. "N.C. Regiments," III, 620.

138. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 431, 590, 851.
139. For Confederate losses on August 18th, see note 158 to Chapter 6.

For Confederate losses on August 19th, see note 139 to Chapter 7.

For Confederate losses on August 20th, see note 33 to Chapter 8.

For Confederate losses on August 21st, see note 137 to Chapter 9.

Cf. Thomas L. Livermore, "Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America: 1861-1865" (Bloomington, In., 1957), 118.

140. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 128, 429, 430, 431, 432.
141. "The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee," 842.
142. Ibid., 794-795.
143. "Death in the Trenches: Grant at Petersburg," 57.
144. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 1195.
145. Ibid., 796.
146. Ibid., "Gouverner Kemble Warren," 193.
147. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 736.
148. Ibid., 882.
149. Richmond Enquirer, August 30, 1864; "Rebel War Clerk's Diary," 267.
150. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 1195.
151. Ibid., 1199-1200.
152. Ibid., 1195; "Grant Takes Command," 357; "Civil War Day by Day," 559.

Chapter 10

1. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 390.
2. Ibid., 409.
3. Ibid., 410.
4. Ibid., 391.
5. Ibid., 392, 415.
6. Ibid., 391.
7. Ibid., 391-392.
8. Ibid., 408; Ibid., Pt. 1, 834.
9. Ibid., Pt. 2, 391-392, 393.
10. Ibid., 408; "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 142.
11. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 418-419.
12. Ibid., 419.
13. Ibid., 435.
14. Ibid., 427; Ibid., Pt. 1, 835.
15. Ibid., 251.
16. Ibid., 261.
17. Ibid., Pt. 2, 420, 436-437.
18. Ibid., Pt. 1, 269; Ibid., Pt. 2, 427.
19. U. R. Brooks, "Butler and His Cavalry in the War of Secession, 1861-1865" (Columbia, 1909), 284 (cited hereinafter as "Butler and His Cavalry")
20. "First Maine Cavalry," 313.
21. "Laurel Brigade," 269; Frank M. Myers, "The Comanches: A History of White's Battalion, Virginia Cavalry" (Baltimore, 1871), 322 (cited hereinafter as "Comanches").
22. "Laurel Brigade," 269.
23. George Baylor, "Bull Run to Bull Run: Four Years in the Army of Northern Virginia"

(Richmond, 1900), 235 (cited hereinafter as "Bull Run to Bull Run").
24. "Laurel Brigade," 269; "Comanches," 322.
25. Charles M. Calhoun, "Liberty Dethroned" (Greenwood, S.C., 1903), 137.
26. "Bull Run to Bull Run," 235.
27. "Liberty Dethroned," 137-138.
28. Ibid., 270; "Bull Run to Bull Run," 235; "Liberty Dethroned," 138.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.; "Butler and His Cavalry," 284; "Bull Run to Bull Run," 235; "Laurel Brigade," 270-271.
31. "Liberty Dethroned," 138.
32. "Butler and His Cavalry," 284.
33. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 269; Ibid., Pt. 2, 427.
34. "Butler and His Cavalry," 284; "Liberty Dethroned," 138.
35. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 88, 95, 606-607.
36. "Comanches," 323; "Bull Run to Bull Run," 235.
37. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 606-607.
38. Ibid., 269.
39. "Comanches," 323.
40. Ibid., 251; Ibid., Pt. 2, 428.
41. "First Maine Cavalry," 313; "Liberty Dethroned," 139; "Comanches," 323-324; "Bull Run to Bull Run," 235; "Laurel Brigade," 271.
42. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 269-270; Ibid., Pt. 2, 427, 436.
43. "Hampton and His Cavalry in '64," 277.
44. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 420.
45. "Dinwiddie County: Carrefour of the Commonwealth," 120.
46. "Generals in Blue," 171; Thomas M. Aldritch, "The History of Battery A, First Regiment Rhode Island Light Artillery in the War to Preserve the Union, 1861-1865" (Providence, 1904), 375 (cited hereinafter as "Battery A, First Rhode Island").
47. Ibid., 375-376; John H. Rhodes, "The History of Battery B, First Regiment, Rhode Island Light Artillery, in the War to Preserve the Union, 1861-1865" (Providence, 1894), 325 (cited hereinafter as "Battery B, First Rhode Island").
48. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 448.
49. Ibid., Pt. 1, 228; Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, Commandery of the State of Illinois, "Military Essays and Recollections," Vol. III, 128 (cited hereinafter as "M.O.L.L.U.S.;" unless otherwise cited, all references will be to Vol. III).
50. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 245, 261.
51. Hyland C. Kirk, "Heavy Guns and Light: A History of the 4th New York Heavy Artillery" (New York, 1890), 342 (cited hereinafter as "Heavy Guns and Light").
52. Ibid., 342-343; John D. Billings, "The Tenth Massachusetts Battery" (Boston, 1881), 240-241.
53. Ibid., 241.
54. "Second Army Corps," 583.
55. "The Tenth Massachusetts Battery," 241.
56. Ibid., 244; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 288.
57. "Second Army Corps," 591-592; James M. Aubery, "The Thirty-Sixth Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry" (Milwaukee, 1900), 128, note; "Battery B, First Rhode Island," 331.
58. "Second Army Corps," 582-583.
59. "The Tenth Massachusetts Battery," 241.
60. Ibid., 247.
61. Ibid., 241.
62. Ibid., 240.
63. "Heavy Guns and Light," 337.
64. Richmond Enquirer, August 31, 1864.

65. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 222, 251, 285, 286, 835.
66. Ibid,. Pt. 2, 449.
67. Ibid., 471.
68. Ibid., 502.
69. Ibid., 449, 481.
70. Ibid., Pt. 1, 223-224, 252; "M.O.L.L.U.S.," 129-130.
71. "Hampton and His Cavalry in '64," 277-278; Letter, Wade Hampton to Francis A. Walker, March 29, 1884, Sessler Collection, Civil War Library and Museum, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (cited hereinafter as "Hampton Letter").
72. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 448.
73. Hampton Letter.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., 420, 448.
76. "Virginia Campaign," 310, 312, 314.
77. When the Federals finally did occupy Dinwiddie Court House, in early 1865, Lee called upon President Davis to prepare to abandon Petersburg and Richmond. "The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee," 922.
78. Ibid.; "Death in the Trenches," 57; "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 448, 1204-1205.
79. Ibid., 1195.
80. "Hampton and His Cavalry in '64," 277-278; "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 520-521, 1202.
81. Ibid., 471.
82. "SHSP," XIV, 555; "Letters of a Confederate Officer," 452-453.
83. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 1193, 1201.
84. Ibid., Pt. 2, 520-521; "Company 'A', 4th Penn'a Cavalry," 226.
85. Cadmus M. Wilcox, Reports, 1863-1865, Lee's Headquarters Collection, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia (cited hereinafter as "Wilcox Report"); Heth Report.

    The author infers Mahone's absence from his failure to receive mention in any report. The likelihood that a Major General would have remained with the five brigades of the Third Corps left in Petersburg also indicates Mahone's absence.
86. Ibid., Pt. 1, 858.
87. Ibid., Pt. 2, 468, 1202.
88. Wilcox Report.
89. Diary, John F. Sale Papers, August 24, 1864, Virginia State Archives, Richmond, Virginia (cited hereinafter as "Sale Diary").
90. Ibid.; Heth Report.
91. Sale Diary, August 24, 1864.
92. Ibid.; "Butler and His Cavalry," 303.
93. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 942; "Hampton and His Cavalry in '64," 278-279; Hampton Letter; Letter, Robert Crump to mother and sister, August 28, 1864, Petersburg National Battlefield (cited hereinafter as "Crump Letter").

Chapter 11

1. "OR, XLII, Pt. 1, 942-943; "Laurel Brigade," 275; Crump Letter.
2. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 498, 501, 502.
3. Ibid., Pt. 1, 251.
4. Ibid., 261, 418.
5. Report of Captain B. F. Rinaldi, August 28, 1864, James H. Lane Papers, 1864, Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama (cited hereinafter as "Rinaldi Report").
6. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 251.
7. Ibid., 282, 317-318.
8. Ibid., 252.
9. Ibid., 223; Ibid., Pt. 2, 481, 497.

10. "Butler and His Cavalry," 303; Wilcox Report; "McGowan's Brigade," 180.
11. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 223, 833; Ibid., Pt. 2, 481.
12. "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 142-143.
13. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 943.
14. "Heavy Guns and Light," 343.
15. "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 142-143; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 245; "History of the Eleventh Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry" (Philadelphia, 1902), 128.
16. "Liberty Dethroned," 140; Wilcox Report; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 228, 251, 607; "McGowan's Brigade," 180.
17. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 251, 607; "N.C. Regiments," I, 775-776; Ibid., III, 620.
18. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 227; Ibid., Pt. 2, 486.
19. Ibid., Pt. 1, 302, 317, 328; "Nineteenth Maine," 234; "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 143.
20. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 323; "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 143; George H. Washburn, "A Complete Military History and Record of the 108th Regiment, N.Y. Vols." (Rochester, 1894), 84 (cited hereinafter as "108th New York").
21. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 323.
22. William P. Haines, "History of the men of Co. F, with Description of the Marches and Battles of the 12th New Jersey Vols." (Camden, N. J., 1882), 80 (cited hereinafter as "Company F, 12th New Jersey").
23. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 323.
24. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 943; Wilcox Report.
25. Ibid., 323, 943; "N.C. Regiments," III, 620.
26. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 323-324.
27. Ibid., 302, 306, 308, 311, 317.
28. Ibid., 251, 285, 607; Edwin C. Bearss, "The Battle of Reams' Station" (1964), Petersburg National Battlefield, 36.
29. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 407, 417; "M.O.L.L.U.S.," 130-131.
30. Ibid., 618; Thomas G. Murphey, "Four Years in the War" (Philadelphia, 1866), 192-193.
31. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 262.
32. Ibid., 223-224, 245.
33. Ibid., 414.
34. Ibid., 317-318.
35. Ibid., 251, 282.
36. Ibid., 280, 282, 286-287.
37. Ibid., 277, 280, 285.
38. Ibid., 278, 284.
39. Ibid., 282, 285.
40. Ibid., 251.
41. Ibid., 282, 287, 288.
42. Ibid., 251, 288.
43. Ibid., 302, 311.
44. Ibid., 324.
45. Ibid., 251; "The Tenth Massachusetts Battery," 243.
46. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 229; Wilcox Report. Hancock's map designated the Heath farm as the Webb farm.
47. Wilcox Report; "Lee's Sharpshooters," 190.
48. Wilcox Report; "Lee's Sharpshooters," 190-191.
49. Wilcox Report.
50. Wilcox Report; "Lee's Sharpshooters," 191.
51. Ibid., 191-192.
52. Ibid., 192.
53. Ibid.
54. "The Tenth Massachusetts Battery," 244.

55. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 288.
56. Ibid., 302, 325.
57. Ibid., 607.
58. Ibid., 251, 284, 287, 288; St. Clair A. Mulholland, "The Story of the 116th Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry" (Philadelphia, 1899), 259 (cited hereinafter as"116th Pennsylvania").
59. Wilcox Report.
60. "MHSM," V, 280-281.
61. Wilcox Report.
62. "Lee's Sharpshooters," 192.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., 193.
65. Ibid., 192.
66. Ibid., 193.
67. "The Tenth Massachusetts Battery," 247.
68. Ibid., 248; "Battery B, First Rhode Island," 330; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 270, 277.
69. "The Tenth Massachusetts Battery," 245-246.
70. Ibid., 245.
71. "52nd New York", 119.
72. "Battery B, First Rhode Island," 328.
73. "The Tenth Massachusetts Battery," 314-315; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 414-415.
74. Ibid., Pt. 2, 457.
75. Ibid., 498, 499.
76. "Inside Lincoln's Army," 417.
77. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 475-476, 477, 505, 509, 511.
78. Ibid., 465, 467, 471-472.
79. Ibid., 472; Ibid., Pt. 1, 224.
80. Ibid., Pt. 2, 466.
81. Ibid., 451.
82. Alexander S. Webb, "The Peninsula" (New York, 1881), 150.
83. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 464-465, 467.
84. Ibid., 879-880.
85. Ibid., Pt. 1, 391, 392.
86. Ibid., Pt. 2, 473.
87. Ibid., Pt. 1, 391.
88. Ibid., 591; Ibid., Pt. 2, 487, 495.
89. Ibid., 482-483, 486.
90. Ibid, 224-225.
91. Ibid., 225, 227.
92. Ibid., 225.
93. Ibid., Pt. 2, 486.
94. Ibid., 467, 468.
95. Heth Report.
96. Wilcox Report; Mullen Diary, August 25, 1864.
97. Heth Report; Wilcox Report.
98. Ibid.
99. "General Hancock," 269.
100. "N.C. Regiments," II, 447; Wilcox Report.
101. Ibid.
102. "Lee's Sharpshooters," 195.
103. Wilcox Report.
104. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 325.
105. "Company F, 12th New Jersey," 80-82.

106. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 228, 607.
107. Ibid., 302, 306, 308.
108. Ibid., 252, 288-289; "N.C. Regiments," I, 680.
109. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 282, 287, 288-289.
110. Ibid., 252; "M.O.L.L.U.S.," 132.
111. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 482-483.
112. Ibid., 484.
113. Ibid., Pt. 1, 288-289.
114. Ibid., 391, 605.
115. Ibid., 225-226.
116. John Gibbon, "Personal Recollections of the Civil War" (New York, 1928), 259; "Diary of Battle." 460.

Chapter 12

1. Wilcox Report; "116th Pennsylvania," 265.
2. "Heavy Guns and Light," 348.
3. "The Tenth Massachusetts Battery," 255.
4. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 226, 293.
5. "Thirty-Sixth Wisconsin," 126.
6. Ibid.
7. Joseph P. Cullen, "The Siege of Petersburg," Harrisburg, Pa.: Historical Times, Inc., 1970, 29; "MHSM," V, 286.
8. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 252, 607-608; "The Tenth Massachusetts Battery," note, 250-251; "Laurel Brigade," 275; "CV," XXXII (1924) 169.
9. "N.C. Regiments," II, 447; Ibid., IV, 566; Ibid., V, 208-209.
10. Ibid., I., 680; Ibid., III, 78.
11. Ibid., I, 747; Ibid., II, 448.
12. Ibid., III, 97.
13. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 289.
14. Ibid., 289, 421.
15. Heth Report.
16. "Comanches," 326.
17. "N.C. Regiments," II, 480.
18. Heth Report.
19. Report of Major G. J. Best, August 29, 1864, James H. Lane Papers, 1864, Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama (cited hereinafter as "Best Report"); Wilcox Report; "N.C. Regiments," II, 447-448.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., II, 447; Ibid., IV, 565.
22. Ibid.; Ibid., V, 208-209.
23. Ibid.
24. Wilcox Report.
25. W. Springer Menge and J. August Shimrak, "The Civil War Notebook of Daniel Chisholm, A Chronicle of Daily Life in the Union Army 1864-1865" (New York, 1989), 36 (hereinafter referred to as "Civil War Notebook of Daniel Chisholm").
26. Ibid.
27. "OR," LVII, Pt. 1, 252.
28. "N.C. Regiments," III, 78.
29. Ibid., I, 747.
30. "Civil War Notebook of Daniel Chisholm," 36.
31. "The Tenth Massachusetts Battery," 249-250; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 415.
32. "N.C. Regiments," IV, 565-566; V, 208-209.
33. "The Tenth Massachusetts Battery," 248.

34. Ibid., 251; "Battery B, First Rhode Island," 329.
35. "N.C. Regiments," III, 30; Ibid., V, 209.
36. Heth Report.
37. "N.C. Regiments, III, 30; Ibid., V, 209.
38. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 280.
39. Ibid., 253.
40. Ibid., 227.
41. "N.C. Regiments," III, 31; Ibid., IV, 565; "The Tenth Massachusetts Battery," 247.
42. "N.C. Regiments," V, 210.
43. Ibid., III, 30.
44. Ibid., 97.
45. Ibid.
46. Heth Report.
47. "Thirty-Sixth Wisconsin," 129, 142.
48. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 280.
49. "The Tenth Massachusetts Battery," 251.
50. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 284, 285.
51. "N.C. Regiments," V, 210.
52. Ibid., III, 30-31; "Maine at Gettysburg" (Portland, Me., 1898), 318.
53. "Heavy Guns and Light," 349.
54. "Battery B, First Rhode Island," 330-331.
55. Ibid., 329; "Battery A, First Rhode Island," 378.
56. David P. Conyngham, "The Irish Brigade and Its Campaigns: With Some Account of the Corcoran Legion, and Sketches of the Principal Officers" (Boston, 1869), 477 (cited hereinafter as "The Irish Brigade").
57. "N.C. Regiments," V, 209.
58. Ibid., II, 669.
59. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 253, 289, 302.
60. Ibid., 421.
61. Ibid., 253.
62. "Thirty-Sixth Wisconsin," 126; "Maine at Gettysburg," 318.
63. Report of Major S. N. Stone, Aujgust 28, 1864, James H. Lane Papers, 1864, Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama (cited hereinafter as "Stone Report").
64. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 253.
65. Ibid., II, 480.
66. Best Report.
67. "Thirty-Sixth Wisconsin," 129; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 280.
68. "N.C. Regiments," III, 121.
69. "152nd New York," 119.
70. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 129.
71. "Thirty-Sixty Wisconsin," 142.
72. Letter of John W. Thomas, Petersburg National Battlefield.
73. Best Report; Rinaldi Report; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 421.
74. Ibid., 408, 421; "M.O.L.L.U.S.," 136.
75. "N.C. Regiments," II, 388-389 relates the story of how Heth assisted the color bearer of the 26th North Carolina of MacRae's Brigade in planting the 26th's colors on the Federal works in Reams Station. No other source corroborates this story. In light of the Wilcox Report, it appears apocryphal.
77. "Heavy Guns and Light," 347.
78. Wilcox Report.
79. Ibid.
80. "Battery B, First Rhode Island," 331-332.

81. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 270; "Heavy Guns and Light," 347; "Lee's Sharpshooters," 295; Wilcox Report.
82. "Heavy Guns and Light," 348.
83. "Lee's Sharpshooters," 196.
84. "Heavy Guns and Light," 347.
85. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 318.
86. Ibid., 293.
87. "Battery A, First Rhode Island," 380.
88. "General Hancock," 273; "Heavy Guns and Light," 354.
89. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 318.
90. "The Comanches," 326.
91. "CV," XVIII, 26; Ibid., XIX, 231.
92. "Thirty-Sixth Wisconsin," 126.
93. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 408, 417.
94. "N.C. Regiments," III, 30-31.
95. "Lee's Sharpshooters," 296.
96. "N.C. Regiments," II, 57.
97. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 226, 293.
98. "Generals in Blue," 171.
99. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 324; "108th New York," 84.
100. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 306, 324; "The Irish Brigade," 479.
101. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 293, 318, 324.
102. "The Irish Brigade," 479.
103. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 306, 308.
104. Ibid., 324; Charles W. Cowtan, "Services of the Tenth New York Volunteers (National Zouaves,) in the War of the Rebellion" (New York, 1882), 312 (cited hereinafter as "National Zouaves"); "108th New York," 84.
105. "Company F, 12th New Jersey," 78.
106. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 329.
107. Ibid., 324; "National Zouaves," 312, 316; "Company F, 12th New Jersey," 80-81.
108. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 324.
109. Ibid., 306, 308.
110. Ibid., 293.
111. Ibid., 324.
112. Ibid., 246, 318.
113. "The Tenth Massachusetts Battery," 253.
114. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 246.
115. "Company 'A', 4th Penn'a Cavalry," 226-227; "General Hancock," 33; "M.O.L.L.U.S.," 140.
116. Ibid.
117. "The Tenth Massachusetts Battery," 253, note; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 246.
118. "General Hancock," 275.
119. "CV," XIX, 231; "M.O.L.L.U.S.," 137; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 253, 262.
120. Ibid., 262, 607-608; "Battery A, First Rhode Island," 380.
121. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 262.
122. Best Report.
123. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 246.
124. Ibid., 227, 246, 293.
125. Wilcox Report; The Southern Recorder (Milledgeville, Ga.), September 13, 1864; "A Pair of Blankets," 180-181.
126. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 262.
127. The Southern Recorder (Milledgeville, Ga.), September 13, 1864; "N.C. Regiments," V, 211; "McGowan's Brigade," 181; "A Pair of Blankets," 181.

128. "Comanches," 327-327.
129. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 246.
130. Ibid., 294, 318.
131. Crump Letter.
132. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 943; "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 142.
133. "Butler and His Cavalry," 304.
134. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 943.
135. "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 143; "Heavy Guns and Light," 340.
136. "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 143.
137. "Laurel Brigade," 273.
138. "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 143.
139. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 293-294.
140. "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 144; Macon Daily Telegraph, September 3, 1864.
141. "Battery A, First Rhode Island," 380; "Comanches," 326-327.
142. "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 144.
143. "Butler and His Cavalry," 304.
144. "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 144; "The Irish Brigade," 479.
145. "One Hundred and Fortieth Pennsylvania," 236.
146. "Ninth Virginia Cavalry," 144.
147. "MHSM," V, 284.
148. "The Irish Brigade," 479.
149. Wiley C. Howard, "Sketch of Cobb Legion Cavalry" (Suffolk, Va., 1986), 12.
150. "Comanches," 327; "Laurel Brigade," 273-274.
151. Ibid.; "CV," XVI (1908), 142.
152. "National Zouaves," 313.
153. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 227, 324.
154. Westwood Tood Reminiscences, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
155. Ibid
156. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 227, 254; "M.O.L.L.U.S.," 138.
157. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 226, 591. Hancock presided over the court martial that found Willcox's leadership wanting at the Crater. "Virginia Campaign," 431.
158. "CV," V (1897), 580; Wilcox Report.
159. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 489.
160. Ibid., 486.
161. Ibid., Pt. 1, 227, 391, 392, 591.
162. Wilcox Report.
163. "Laurel Brigade," 276.
164. Heth Report.
165. "Bull Run to Bull Run," 237; "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 227, 608, 629.
166. Wilcox Report; Mullen Diary, August 25, 1864.
167. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 131, 608, 940.
168. "N.C. Regiments," II, 480.
169. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 940.
170. "N.C. Regiments," II, 57.
171. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 940.

Lane's Brigade of Wilcox's command lost twelve killed, ninty-seven wounded and six missing. "SHSP," IX, 357. McGowan's Brigade lost two killed and twenty wounded. "McGowan's Brigade," 181. Anderson's Brigade lost at least two killed and twenty-seven wounded, but no more than a total of fifty casualties. Record Group 109, National Archives; Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel, September 9, 1864. The 13th North Carolina of Scales' Brigade lost one killed, sixteen wounded and six missing. Raleigh Daily Confederate, September 28, 1864.

Initially, Wilcox stated: "My entire loss was 200, in McGowan, slight, 22 total, Lane's the most, Scales but little, Anderson not much. . .". Subsequently, Wilcox revised this sentence to read: "My entire loss was over 300, in McGowan's brigade it was slight, 22 total, Lane's the most 115, Scales but little, Anderson not much. . ." Wilcox Report. If Lane's Brigade lost the most, however, a total loss for Wilcox's command of over 300 does not make sense since it would have had to occur principally in Scales' Brigade, for which the fewest figures exist, but which Wilcox still said had lost "little."

Accepting Wilcox's initial estimate as his closest to the mark and taking the other available figures into acocunt yields by process of elimination thirty-four as the number of men lost by Scales' Brigade at Second Reams Station. In light of the loss suffered by the 13th North Carolina and Wilcox's feeling that he had initially underestimated his losses, the author estimates that Scales' Brigade suffered approximately fifty casualties and that Wilcox's command lost about 220 men at Second Reams Station.

Wilcox's tendency to revise his reports, sometimes years after their preparation, detracted from his credibility. "Lee's Lieutenants," I, 258, note 86.

In Heth's command, Cooke's Brigade suffered the most. The 15th North Carolina, on Cooke's far right, lost twenty-three killed and ninety-one wounded. "N.C. Regiments," I, 747. The 46th North Carolina, on the 15th's left but still crossing the open field, lost seventy-three killed and wounded. Ibid., III, 78. Assuming that the two regiments of Cooke's left lost what the similarly circumstanced two regiments of Lane's right lost yields seventeen as the approximate number of men lost by Cooke's left. (The 7th North Carolina, on the left of Lane's Brigade, lost four killed and twenty-eight wounded. "N.C. Regiments," I, 385. On the 7th's right, the 28th North Carolina lost six killed, and thirty-one wounded. Stone Report. In the brigade's center, the 37th North Carolina lost twenty-four wounded and five missing. Best Report. On the brigade's far right, the 18th North Carolina lost one killed and five wounded. Rinaldi Report. By process of elimination, the 33rd North Carolina, to the 18th's left, must have suffered eleven casualties. Wilcox Report.) Company G of the 27th North Carolina, however, one of the regiments on Cooke's left, alone lost one killed and seven wounded of eleven taken into action. Wagstaff, H. M., ed., "The Jas. A. Graham Papers, 1861-1864.", The Jas Sprunt Historical Studies, Vol. XX, No. 2 (1928), 313 (cited hereinafter as "Graham Papers"). In view of the smallness of one of the regiments of Lane's Brigade providing comparison and the losses of Company G of the 27th North Carolina, the author estimates the losses of Cooke's left at approximately fifty men, and the brigade's entire loss at around 240 men.

In MacRae's Brigade, the 26th North Carolina lost three killed and twenty-two wounded. Raleigh Daily Confederate, September 2, 1864. The 47th North Carolina lost three killed and thirty-four wounded. Ibid., September 28, 1864. These figures indicate that MacRae's Brigade lost approximately 140 men, a lighter loss than that of Cooke's Brigade but still substantial.

Sanders' Brigade lost seven wounded and two captured. Richmond Sentinel, October 29, 1864. The 12th Virginia of Mahone's Brigade lost one killed and one wounded. Macon Daily Telegraph, September 3, 1864. Company I, 61st Virginia lost none. "SHSP," XXIV, 103. The losses of Mahone's Brigade probably totalled around ten.

Heth's command thus suffered about 400 casualties at Second Reams Station.

172. Ibid., 944. Butler's Division lost six killed, twenty-five wounded and two missing. W. H. F. Lee's Division lost ten killed, fifty wounded and one missing.
173. "Hampton and His Cavalry in '64," 283.
174. "Second Army Corps," 606.
175. "General Hancock," 275.
176. "Personal Recollections of the Civil War," 259; "Diary of Battle," 459-460; Glenn Tucker, "Hancock the Superb" (Dayton, Oh., 1980), 255.

177. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 595, 981, 1071-1072; Ibid., Pt. 3, 13-14, 40, 493-500, 542-543.
178. "Personal Recollections of the Civil War," 248-251, 259-263.
179. "OR," XLII, Pt. 3, 713-714.
180. "General Hancock," 275-276.
181. "Hancock the Superb," 255. The historian of the Irish Brigade and the Corcoran Legion claimed that Hancock's force faced three-to-one odds. "The Irish Brigade," 479. A historian of the 12th New Jersey claimed that the Confederates had 30,000 men at Second Reams Station. "Company F, 12th New Jersey," 80-81.
182. Hill estimated the strength of his infantry force at 8,000. "CV," XXII (1914), 117. This must have represented an estimate of his infantry's strength on paper, though. (Hill also concurred in an estimate of Hancock's strength at 20,000. Ibid.) Two brigades of Heth's Division numbered about 2,200 men on paper. Two brigades of Mahone's Division numbered about 1,800 men on paper. Three brigades of Wilcox's Division numbered about 3,500 on paper. One brigade of Field's Division numbered about 900 men on paper. These figures, based on dividing the number of a division's brigades into the abstract of the division's returns, yield an overall estimate of around 8,400 infantry with Hill at Second Reams Station. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 1243.

    Employing a similar method, dividing the number of the II Corps' divisions into the abstract of the corps' returns, yields a very similar estimate of 8,800 infantry with Hancock. Ibid., 611. This method does not even take into account the terrible Federal losses at Second Reams Station. Factored in, they suggest that Hancock had over 11,000 infantry. Ibid., Pt. 1, 131. That this method results in an obvious overestimation of Hancock's force renders suspect the results obtained by the application of the method to Hill's force.

    During late August and early September, 800 men represented the highest estimate of the actual strength of the average infantry brigade in the Third Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 684. The average infantry brigade in Hill's force had marched and fought more than had the average infantry brigade in Hancock's force. It seems reasonable to allow for at least as great a reduction in Hill's force as in Hancock's force for the effects of marching and fighting. Accepting Federal estimates of Hancock's actual infantry force as from 6,000 to 6,500 men requires acquiescence in 6,500 as the largest number of men with which Hill could possibly have begun the march from Petersburg to Reams Station.
183. The route taken by the Confederate infantry from Petersburg to Reams Station measured about fifteen miles. Terry's two-brigade force of 1,800 men had dwindled to 700 on a much shorter march on the previous day. Ibid., 502. While the Confederates did not lose as high a percentage of men as did Terry's force, the effects of straggling must account in part for Hill's failure to arrive at Reams Station at the appointed time in that his men could not move until 7 a.m. on August 25th.

    Shattered in the fighting at Second Deep Bottom, Anderson's Brigade had 600 or 700 men on the battlefield at Second Reams Station. Wilcox Report.

    Cooke's, MacRae's and Lane's Brigades had no more than 1,750 men between them. "N.C. Regiments," I, 747; Ibid., II, 448. (This almost certainly meant the effective strength, or "muskets." Effective strength meant all privates and non-commissioned officers present for duty. Total strength meant all privates and non-commissioned officers present, including sick, in arrest and on extra duty. Aggregate strength meant all officers and men present. Real strength meant effective strength plus officers present for duty. "SHSP," Vol. XLIII (1920), 206n.) Only twenty-five men of the 18th North Carolina in Lane's Brigade saw combat at Second Reams Station. Rinaldi Report. Only eleven men of Company G of the 27th North Carolina fought at Second Reams Station. Graham Papers, 313. Lane's Brigade had fought at Second Deep Bottom. Cooke's and MacRae's Brigades had fought at Globe Tavern on August 21st.

    Prior to Second Deep Bottom, Federal intelligence officers had estimated the

strength of McGowan's Brigade at 1,250 men, equal to their estimate of Lane's Brigade at that time. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 159. Lane's Brigade had lost more heavily than had McGowan's Brigade at Second Deep Bottom. "SHSP," IX, 357; "McGowan's Brigade," 178, 180. Lane's Brigade fielded no more than 600 men at Second Reams Station. "N.C. Regiments," I, 747; Ibid., II, 448.

Scales' Brigade, the freshest of the Confederate infantry brigades at Second Reams Station, numbered around 700 men on September 6th. The 38th North Carolina, the largest regiment in the brigade, had 200 men on that date. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 718.

Sanders' Brigade, which fought in all three of August's battles, numbered no more than 500 men as of September 1st. Ibid., 628. The 9th Alabama had eighty-seven muskets as of September 4th, and the brigade had no more than 600. On July 30th, the brigade had fielded only about 630 men at the Battle of the Crater. "CV," III (1895), 68; "SHSP," Vol. XXXVI (1908), 165.

Mahone's Brigade had only fielded "over 500 muskets" at the Battle of Globe Tavern on August 19th. Bernard Papers. On that date, the 12th Virginia had taken into action from ninety to ninety-four men. Bernard Papers; Petersburg Daily Register, August 22, 1864. The 61st Virginia had taken into action 150 "muskets," 19 officers and 15 ambulance men on August 19th. This regiment's Company I took 20 men into action at Second Reams Station. "SHSP," XXIV, 103. Estimates of the average brigade in Mahone's Division varied from 500 men as of September 1st to under 800 as of September 4th. "OR," XLII, Pt. 23, 628, 684-685. The brigade went to Reams Station without the 41st Virginia, which remained in the Petersburg trenches. Ibid., 475, 476.

184. Hill concurred in this estimate of Hampton's strength. "CV," XXII, 117. Cf. Hampton Letter; "Second Army Corps," 603; "M.O.L.L.U.S.," 133. Hampton's entire mounted force numbered no more than 4,500 as of September 5th. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 698.
185. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 858; Ibid., Pt. 3, 1341; "Thirty-Sixth Wisconsin," 126.
186. "General Hancock," 261-265.
187. Ibid., 269-270.
188. Heth Report.
189. "Maine at Gettysburg," 318.
190. "N.C. Regiments," V, 211.
191. Stone Report.
192. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 1207.
193. "N.C. Regiments," II, 575.
194. "The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee," 922.
195. "OR," XLII, Pt. 2, 448.
196. Ibid., 443, 1205.

Chapter 13

1. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 132.
2. The author infers this from the losses of Johnson's Division in the Petersburg trenches from August 1st to August 19th, 150 men killed and wounded. Ibid., 884-889. Hoke's Division also held Petersburg trenches in close proximity to the Federals. Pickett's Division and Thomas' and Scales Brigades of Wilcox's Division held the Howlett Line close to the Federals at Bermuda Hundred. On the right of the Petersburg trenches, greater distances separated Heth's and Mahone's Divisions from the opposing Federals.
3. Ibid., 132.
4. Ibid., 884-889.

For Confederate losses at Second Deep Bottom, see Chapter 5, note 33.
For Confederate losses at Globe Tavern, see Chapter 9, note 139.
For Confederate losses at the "fight by moonlight," see Chapter 10, note 43.
For Confederate losses at Second Reams Station, see "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 940.

5. Ibid., XL, Pt. 1, 218-238.
6. Cf. Ransom Bedell to his cousin, August 24, 1864, Ransom Bedell Letters, Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield, Illinois.
7. "OR," XL, Pt. 1, 218-249.
8. Foster's brigade lost 71 killed, 423 wounded and 69 missing for a total of 563 casualties. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 119.
9. Terry's division lost 160 killed, 802 wounded and 138 missing for a total of 1,100 casualties. Ibid.
10. Coan's brigade lost 16 killed, 94 wounded and 84 missing for a total of 194 casualties. Ibid., 120.
11. William Birney's Third Brigade lost 22 killed, 118 wounded and 83 missing for a total of 223 casualties. Ibid.
12. The Colored Brigade lost 14 killed, 117 prisoners and 5 missing for a total of 136 casualties. Ibid.
13. The X Corps lost 213 killed, 1,154 wounded and 311 missing for a total of 1,678 casualties. Ibid.
14. Macy's brigade lost 14 killed, 132 wounded and 45 missing for a total of 191 casualties. Ibid., 117.
15. Miles' brigade lost 21 killed, 122 wounded and 131 missing for a total of 274 casualties. Ibid., 116. Craig's brigade lost 7 killed, 109 wounded and 118 prisoners for a total of 234 casualties. Ibid., 118.
16. The II Corps lost 82 killed, 561 wounded and 321 missing for a total of 964 casualties. Ibid., 119.
17. The II Corps lost 117 killed, 439 wounded and 2,046 missing for a total of 2,602 casualties. Ibid., 131.
18. The First Division lost 63 killed, 221 wounded and 967 missing for a total of 1,251 casualties. Ibid., 129. The Second Division lost 42 killed, 215 wounded and 1,005 missing for a total of 1,244 casualties. Ibid., 130.
19. Smyth's brigade lost 16 killed, 81 wounded and 140 missing for a total of 237 casualties. Ibid.
20. Lynch's brigade lost 25 killed, 64 wounded and 156 missing for a total of 245 casualties. Ibid., 129.
21. The Second Cavalry Division lost 28 killed, 117 wounded and 80 missing for a total of 225 casualties. Ibid., 121.
22. The Second Cavalry Division lost 15 killed, 45 wounded and 9 missing for a total of 69 casualties. Ibid., 131.
23. The V corps lost 188 killed, 821 wounded and 2,660 missing for a total of 3,669 casualties. Ibid., 125.
24. The V Corps lost about 66 killed, 478 wounded and 392 missing for an approximate total of 936 casualties. Ibid., 429.
25. The V Corps lost around 46 killed, 218 wounded and 2,457 missing for a total of about 2,721 casualties. Ibid., 430.
26. The V Corps lost approximately 37 killed, 162 wounded and 103 missing for a total of around 302 casualties. Ibid., 431.
27. The IX Corps lost 60 killed, 315 wounded and 218 missing for a total of 593 casualties. Ibid., 127.
28. Spear's brigade lost 8 killed, 45 wounded and 18 missing for a total of 71 casualties. Ibid., 131.
29. Grant's army group lost 877 killed, 4,153 wounded and 5,969 missing for a total of 10,999 casualties.
30. For Confederate casualties at Second Deep Bottom, see Chapter 5, note 33.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.
34. "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 429.
    For Confederate casualties in Davis' and Walker's Brigades, see Chapter 6, note 158; Chapter 7, note 139; Chapter 8, note 33; and Chapter 9, note 137.
35. Petersburg Register, August 22, 1864.
36. See Chapter 8, note 33.
37. See Chapter 9, note 137.
38. Ibid.
39. "CV," XX (1912), 481.
40. For Confederate losses at Second Deep Bottom, see Chapter 5, note 33.
    For Confederate losses at Globe Tavern, see Chapter 9, note 139.
    For Confederate losses at the "fight by moonlight," see Chapter 10, note 43.
    For Confederate losses at Second Reams Station, see "OR," XLII, Pt. 1, 940.
41. "Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era," 732.
42. "Meade's Headquarters," 208.
43. "Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac," 494.
44. "Lee's Lieutenants," 639.
45. "R. E. Lee," IV, 20.
46. "Virginia Campaign," 283, 284.
47. "Military Memoirs of a Confederate," 545.
48. "Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant," 439.
49. "Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era," 772, 775-776.
50. "The Civil War Diary of Josiah Gorgas," 140; Walter H. Taylor, "General Lee: His Campaigns in Virginia, 1861-1865" (Norfolk, 1906), 262-263.
51. "Mary Chesnut's Civil War," 642.
52. "Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era," 858.
53. "Grant," 188.
54. "Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era," 722.

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